



Migration, Integration and Citizenship in France between 1990 and 2018: The State of the Art

Country Report: France

By

Dr. Ayşe Tecmen

ERC AdG PRIME Youth Post-doc Researcher

İstanbul Bilgi University

European Institute

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
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**İstanbul
Bilgi University**



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Dr. Ayşe Tecmen

**ERC AdG PRIME Youth Post-doc Researcher,
İstanbul Bilgi University
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Introduction

This literature review provides a discussion of the significant developments in France's immigration and integration policies between 1990 and 2018.¹ The paper is written within the framework of the ERC Advanced Grant Project titled "Nativism, Islamophobia and Islamism in the Age of Populism: Culturalisation and Religionisation of what is Social, Economic and Political in Europe"² (ISLAM-OPHOB-ISM).

This paper focuses on the Maghrebi, Muslim-origin migrants as there is a long history of emigration from Morocco to France, which also means that there is a sizable settled Moroccan community in France³. Nonetheless, while research on Moroccan-origin migrants comprise a significant part of the research on migration and integration in France, Turkish-origin migrants also receive extensive attention in the literature.

In this sense, there is a comprehensive literature on Muslim-origin migrants in France. As will be discussed in this literature review, France's migration and immigration policies are widely-discussed in relation to the securitisation of migration after September 11, restrictive measures, both actual and proposed, associated with various political figures, including Nicolas Sarkozy as well as Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen. To that end, as will be shown in this review, the French case is marked by varying discourses which constantly explore and (re)articulate the relations between *laïcité* and religious communities.

As such, the paper follows significant developments such as elections, new discourses, the rise of populism and the rising terrorist threats in the country in a chronological manner. However, it does not assess the impact and reception of these elements from the perspective of the migrant communities. It rather constitutes a study into the context which has shaped the experiences of migrants and their descendants.

¹ I would like to thank Ayhan Kaya, Max Valentin Roberts, Jais Adam-Troian, and Ayşenur Benevento for their support, suggestions and remarks during the writing of this report.

² This project with the acronym of "ISLAM-OPHOB-ISM" has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme grant agreement no. 785934. This research analyses the current political, social, and economic context of the European Union, which is confronted by two substantial crises, namely the global financial crisis and the refugee crisis. These crises have led to the escalation of fear and prejudice among the youth who are specifically vulnerable to discourses that culturalise and stigmatize the "other". Young people between the ages of 18 to 30, whether native or immigrant-origin, have similar responses to globalization-rooted threats such as deindustrialization, isolation, denial, humiliation, precariousness, insecurity, and anomia. These responses tend to be essentialised in the face of current socio-economic, political and psychological disadvantages. While a number of indigenous young groups are shifting to right-wing populism, a number of Muslim youths are shifting towards Islamic radicalism. The common denominator of these groups is that they are both downwardly mobile and inclined towards radicalization. Hence, this project aims to scrutinize social, economic, political and psychological sources of the processes of radicalization among native European youth and Muslim-origin youth with migration background, who are both inclined to express their discontent through ethnicity, culture, religion, heritage, homogeneity, authenticity, past, gender and patriarchy.

³ In the scope of the "ISLAM-OPHOB-ISM" project, Lalla Amina Drhimeur (2020a, 2020b) has provided an extensive literature review on the Moroccan-origin migrants in France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. See <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/publications/state-art-moroccan-emigration-europe/>

1. Background: Post-War Migration to France

Citizenship acquisition and the rise of anti-immigrant nationalist discourse in France have historically described citizenship on political rather than ethnocultural terms since the French Revolution, inviting all foreigners, the so-called “Friends of Liberty”, to join the French State. The decree of 26 August 1792 gave French citizenship to individuals who had defended freedom and the values of the revolution through their writings or acts. In addition to the principle of *jus sanguinis*, which automatically attributes citizenship those born to French parents, the revolutionaries attributed the principle of *jus soli* specific conditions that guaranteed France’s attachment and loyalty. Since the revolution, the dominance of the *jus soli* principle has remained. While 1851 law on citizenship gave French citizenship to third-generation immigrants, 1889 law on citizenship, which still exists with minor changes, automatically ascribed French citizenship to immigrants of second-generation (Brubaker, 1992: 85-86). Brubaker argues that the *jus soli* embodies a civic notion of the nation, open to newcomers, while *jus sanguinis*, characterises an idea of the nation based on ethnicity (Brubaker, 1992). To that effect, Brubaker observes that differences in conceptions of nationhood in France and Germany are embodied and expressed in sharply differing definitions of citizenship. French citizenship law reflects state-centred, assimilationist self-understanding of the French. German citizenry definition based on a community of descent is restrictive toward non-German immigrants while due this understanding’s ethnocultural approach, ethnic Germans are accommodated (Brubaker, 1992: 14–15).

French citizenship law embodies the *jus soli* principle through Article 23, attributing citizenship at birth to third-generation immigrants and Article 44, attributing citizenship at the age of 18 to second-generation immigrants raised in France and living there since the age of 13, given that they did not opt out of French citizenship during the preceding year, and were not convicted of any crimes. French citizenship law also allows dual citizenship (Kaya, 2009). However, nationalists recently criticised French citizenship law for turning foreigners into French citizens on paper without making sure they were “French at heart” (*Français de Coeur*) (Kaya and Kentel, 2005: 14-15).

In the aftermath of WWI, the French state began to recruit immigrants for the labour force. In turn, *the Societe generale d’immigration* (SGI) was established as a private organisation, which later became a public organisation (Schain, 2012: 96). The first wave of immigrant workers decided to settle down in big cities such as Marseille, Nice, Saint Etienne, Grenoble, Lyon, Venissieux, in the north, and in the eastern suburbs of Paris such as Saint Denis, Aubervilliers and Boulogne-Billancourt, in which they found employment, or where they had family members (Collomp, 1999; Kaya, 2009).

Morocco and Algeria, and to a lesser degree Tunisia, dominate the southern Mediterranean migration flows to Europe due to the colonial ties between Europe and the countries of this region (Safir, 1999). Scholars from various disciplines have illustrated the history and politics of immigration (see Weil 1991; Noiriel 1996; Schnapper 1991; Viet 1998; and Chemillier-Gendreau 1998). Others have explored emigration, from the African point of view, and the roles of African immigrants in both French and African societies (see MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000).

France is particularly vital in these migration flows as the total number of Maghrebians in France increased to more than 40 thousand by the end of WWII. Postwar reconstruction works, and the out-migration from Southern Europe in the 1950s and 1960s (King, 2000) stimulated a growing demand in foreign labour which encouraged migration streams from the Maghreb to France for almost three decades (1945-1975) (see Stora, 1992; Samers, 1997, Samers 2003; Zéhraoui, 1999).

During the glorious thirty years (*les Trente Glorieuses*) following the Second World War (see Crafts and Toniolo, 2012), three main variables determined immigration policies: financial reconstruction; the desire to boost the French population; and the conviction that France has the ability to integrate migrants. *Les Trente Glorieuses* meant a time of development, prosperity and social change between 1945 and 1975, or more precisely, between France's 1944 liberation to the economic downturn caused by the 1973 oil crisis.

Kristin Ross notes that the pace at which French society was transformed after the war from an agricultural, empire-oriented, Catholic nation into a completely developed, decolonised, and urban one meant that things required modernisation such educated middle managers, inexpensive cars and other 'mature' consumer durables, a functionalist set of social sciences or a work force of ex-colonial laborers (Ross, 1996: 4). Because of their "quasi-citizen" status (see MacMaster, 1997; Lloyd, 2003; Lorcin, 2006; Silverstein, 2004; House and MacMaster, 2006), employees were still coming to France in large numbers after the independence of the Maghreb countries.

The first settlers were French nationals living in Algeria, known as '*pieds-noirs*' and were followed by the *harkis*.⁴ In 1962, shortly after the independence of Algeria, the two governments signed a workforce agreement that led to a concentration of the Algerian population in Paris, Lyon and Marseille. Family reunification increased from the early 1970s, and by 1999 there were more than 700,000 Algerians living in France. Also estimates show that half of the North African-origin population in France are Berber, speaking non-Arab Kabyle people, and the other half are Arab origin. The first wave arrived in France as troops from the African colonies, aiding the French forces during World War I (Kaya, 2009: 63-64, see also Weil, 1996; Lanier, 1991; de Haas, 2005, Morin, 1991; Dewitte, 1999).

In 1966, France signed a recruitment treaty with Turkey and the first migrants were among who had applied to the Turkish Employment Office (*Is ve Isci Bulma Kurumu*) to go to Germany (Kastoryano, 1986: 165; Firat, 2003: 76). The first stage of migration, called anonymous migration, consisted of workers who were admitted into France after being turned away from the oversaturated job market in Germany. The second stage, or nominal migration, was mainly comprised of workers recruited for private-sector jobs (Strassburger, 1995).

Nominal migration was rather more popular in France compared to Germany. French-Turks

⁴ *Harkis* are native Muslim Algerians who served as auxiliaries in the French Army during the Algerian War of Independence from 1954 to 1962.

originating from the same region in Turkey have tended to concentrate in particular places. This background makes it more practical for the French-Turks to carry on their traditional solidarity networks for a longer period of time than the German-Turks' network of solidarity. The French state has delegated it to individual companies willing to recruit foreign labour to fill labour shortages. The Government was needed in this process as far as the diplomatic issues were concerned, as well as for diplomatic issues with other countries. Several Turkish-French Turks interviewed stated that they were planning to go to Germany after spending a few years in France, and that they could not make it to Germany (Kaya, 2009: 65; Weil, 1991; Heckmann and Unbehaun, 1999; Firat, 2003).

Three main reasons—the need for a labor force, the uncertain status of former colonial people and respect for civil and human rights—resulted in comparatively open immigration policy in France until the mid-1970s (Kofman et al, 2010: 4). However, only part of the post-war migration debates developed around migrant workers; another significant topic was the need for population growth faced with declining domestic birth rates. By splitting residency permits from work permits, the government opened gates to job-seekers and their families. This made migrants see themselves as permanent residents rather than transient workers (Kivisto, 2002: 172 in Kaya, 2009: 63).

As Ayhan Kaya argues (2009), the changing perception of foreign labour from the 1960s to 1970s by the French public was visible in the transformation of the naming of non-European immigrants. In France, the term '*immigre*', which is contrasted by "*etranger*" (stranger) is highly politicised, and it has come to bear very negative implications. The use of the term '*immigre*' is not only applied to those who are themselves immigrants, but also immigrants' children born and raised in France. Migrant, or '*etranger*', was used to refer to the temporary character of migration, while the term '*immigre*' highlights the permanence of African immigrants, perceived as being threatening national, cultural and social unity with unwelcome cultural, religious, social and linguistic differences (Kaya, 2009: 67).

In a similar vein, Ineke Van Der Valk (2003) also studied the discursive properties of the mainstream right-wing UDF and RPR French parliamentary discourse between 1996 and 1997 and found that right-wing political discourse across the globe is based on the negative "other" presentation, not only of the 'other's, who are almost systematically derogated, accused of abuse and thus criminalised but also of their supposed allies, the political Left, which are systematically delegitimised (for a discussion of politics and discourse; see Blommaert and Bulcaen, 1997; Chilton and Schäffner, 1997).

After Maghreb countries' independence (see Willis, 2012; McFerren, 1984; Grilli, 1994) and until the mid-1970s, migration was an essential factor of socio-economic integration between the Maghreb and Southern Europe while contributing to the region's stability (Tapinos, 2000; Miotti, and Oudinet, 2009; Bilgili, and Weyel, 2009; Darrat and Pennathur, 2002; Ennaji, 1991.). By 1975, the estimated number of Maghrebians in France was 1.1 million, but the mid-1970s is regarded as the official end of migration to Europe. Only migrants involved in family reunion were officially permitted to enter in Europe, and this regulation stimulated illegal migration, which can be explained as a reaction of closing doors in front of immigrants (Zohry 2005: 5-6).

Stopping immigration led the migrant population to stay in place, so the family reunification migration increased considerably. The Chirac and Barre governments aimed to halt family reunification as well by denying visas and expelling family members. The Mauroy government's approach was different, making anyone who came to France before January 1981 eligible for a temporary resident permit. This was to allow them time to apply for regularisation. Furthermore, internal control was instituted through "inspectors du travail," which made unexpected work checks and had the power to punish employers if any illegal employee was found. Charles Pasqua, the Chirac government's interior minister, dealt with the problem with the border police, he expanded the "*Police de l'Air et des Frontières*" ability to carry out border checks, arrest and deport (Hollifield 1999: 65-66 cited in Kofman et al, 2010: 5).

The 1974 suspension of economic immigration had different implications for immigrants from Africa who emigrated in the late 1960s without their families and wives. July 1974's new immigration law stopping non-EU workers' migration-imposed conditions on those immigrants who wanted to bring their families to France, such as proving self-sufficiency to accommodate a family. Regardless of the family entry and relocation challenges, many immigrant families chose to settle in France. The frequent changes in France's migration legislation encouraged sub-Saharan Africans to stay in France without legal residency permits, which explains why the number of people residing in France without a residence permit is very high among sub-Saharan African immigrants (Kaya, 2009: 64).

The effects of these policies are seen in the 1990s when less than 100,000 people migrated yearly to France between 1993 and 1999. This was one of the lowest rates since the 1950s. Consequently, the number of undocumented immigrants increased, as more than 12,000 people were apprehended when trying to enter the country illegally (Hollifield, 2004: 200, cited in Kofman, 2010: 5).

At the same time, the Iranian Revolution and the second oil crisis in 1979 stimulated prejudices against Arabs and Islamophobia. An increase followed Jean-Marie Le Pen's victory in municipal elections in the city of Dreux in 1983 in 'terrorist' activity in 1986. Industrial restructuring and rising unemployment produced widespread discontent in cities and disadvantaged suburban housing estates. This deprivation led to various studies on, 'social exclusion' and the development of Islam, that is a type of Islam that constitutes a perceived threat to the security of the French people (Kepel, 1987; Kepel and Ghazaleh, 2004), simultaneously the *banlieue* (suburbs) were racialised, criminalised and turned into a 'deviant construction' (Hargreaves, 1996, 2007; Rosello, 1997, Samers, 2003: 355). These constructions also led to the Beur Movement in the early 1980s, which mainly mobilised migrant youths from the metropolitan suburbs (*banlieues*). The term '*beur*' comes from *verlan*, a form of French slang that inverts the syllables within words. The word *arabeu* (Arabian) is thus changed into beu-ra-a and subsequently shortened to beur (see Chabanet, 2016; Bloom, 1999; Fagyal, 2005).

As noted above, in the early-1980s, with the rise of the National Front and growing challenges by the second generation from North Africa, immigration became a primary

political concern.⁵ There were other factors besides the rise of the FN that contributed to the politicisation of migration. In fact, when François Mitterrand and the Socialist Party (PS) were elected in 1981, they employed this issue for two reasons; to break with the former president's Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's centre-right rhetoric, and also to break with the Socialists' main left-wing competitor, the French Communist Party (PCF) (Martin, 2000: 259-261). During the 1981 presidential election, the PCF candidate Georges Marchai spoke against increased immigration. Similarly, Montigny-les-Cormeilles and Vitry-sur-Seine's Communist mayors were involved in a contentious debate on this subject. Therefore, by taking a moderate immigration stance, the PS could be politically more "leftist" than its communist rival. Moreover, another favoured immigration politicisation: the right-wing alliance rhetoric of RPR-UDF (Rally for the Republic- Union for French Democracy) (for more information on the political system and parties in France, see Knapp (2004); Mair, Müller, Plasser (2004)). Faced with the collapse of the PCF, the right could no longer use anti-communism as an excuse for mobilising the conservative electorate: thus, as the political scientist Pierre Martin states, "After 1981, those of the Socialist friends of immigrants were replaced by those of the Communists" (Martin, 2000: 261).

As Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel (2005: 14-15) noted the French saw themselves as an assimilationist nation. However, they were unprepared for the presence of large numbers of people of colour and large numbers of Muslims. Alec Hargreaves (1995: 26-7 cited in Kaya and Kentel 2005: 14-15) summarised the situation in the following passage:

The seeming invisibility of past generations of immigrants and of those who are today descended from them is often regarded as proof of the success with which they have been incorporated into French society. Immigrants who have settled in France during the post-war period, and more particularly those who have come to the fore during the past twenty years, are often felt to threaten this tradition. It is widely claimed that people of Third World origins much harder to 'integrate' than Europeans. Far from disappearing without a trace, they have actually increased in visibility at a time when successive governments have been claiming that immigration is at an end... the fear is that immigration is leading remorselessly to the formation of permanently distinct minorities within French society."

Furthermore, the anti-immigration discourse was not just compounded by the Far Right but also by the mainstream right; for example, in 1991 Jacques Chirac argued that France had too many (an overdose) of the wrong kind (Muslims and Blacks) and that they were able to live off social benefits given the size of their families (cited in Kofman et al, 2010: 5).

Additionally, in the mid-1980s, the *jus soli* principle of citizenship also came under attack from the far right. Jean Marie Le Pen's National Front proclaimed "*Etre Français, cela s'hérite ou se mérite*" ("To be French, you have to inherit it or deserve it") proclaimed Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front. Beginning in 1984–1985, proposals to change that policy in favour of a more restrictive approach were advanced by New Right intellectuals, the National Front, and France's centre-Right political parties. A series of proposals to reform

⁵ On 1 June 2018, the party was renamed as *Rassemblement national* (National Rally).

the law were proposed from the political Right between 1984 and 1986. This discourse was also used to legitimise the Pasqua's immigration in 1986, which proposed preventing the naturalisations and integration of African immigrants, and increasing the waiting period from one to two years for the non-national husbands and wives of French citizens before they could apply for naturalisation (Kofman et al., 2010: 5, for discussions of Pasqua Laws, see Bourdieu, 1998; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; Fassin, 2001; Van Der Valk, 2003; Samers, 2003; Derrida, 2005). Advocates of nationality law reform played on public fears of 'automatically' granting French citizenship to immigrants and argued that the Maghrebian youth who were not assimilating did not consider themselves French, devaluing French nationality and threatening the long-term preservation of French national identity. In turn, restrictive reform proposals thereby soon gained widespread public support, and a center-Right coalition government committed to such reform was elected in March 1986 (Thomas 2006: 240).

This topic also became a part of the 1986 legislative campaign, as centre-right parties and FN argued that second-generation immigrant needed to demand French nationality rather than acquiring it via the *jus soli* principle. Upon pressures and protests from left-wing political parties then-prime minister, Jacques Chirac, slowed down the reform process, delaying consideration of a new bill until after the legislative elections. Subsequently, in 1987, Chirac appointed a special commission of experts from both sides of the political spectrum, to study French nationality law and make recommendations. The essential proposal then being considered was making the acquisition of French citizenship by French-born children of foreign parents conditional upon their actively requesting it, rather than granting it to all but those who actively declined it (Thomas 2006: 241). The Commission defended an understanding of being French as a matter of choice rather than birth (Long, 1988; Wayland 1993; Brubaker 1992). In brief, the Commission recommended retaining the *jus soli* principle but changing its mode of application to second-generation immigrants through introducing the notion of consent. The Commission's report formed the basis for the Law No 93.933 from July 22nd, 1993 (Wayland, 1993).

2. The Pasqua Laws and the Mehaignerie Law: 1993-1998

Even though immigration to France had decreased by the early-1990s, Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front Party gained a large portion of the electorate with its anti-immigrant rhetoric and calls to expel Muslim immigrants from France. Politicians across the political spectrum responded by calling for "immigration zero," and the right-wing coalition that came to power in 1993 turned zero immigration into policy.⁶ The 1993 "Pasqua Law" named after French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, aimed at restricting legal migration flows in the following ways: banning foreign graduates from accepting work offers from French employers and refusing them permanent residency status, extending the waiting period for family reunification from one to two years and refusing foreign spouses residence permits.

The 1993 Mehaignerie nationality reform law (named after Pierre Mehaignerie who was the Minister of Justice at that time) rescinded the 1973 reform that extended Article 23,

⁶ Source: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/immigration-policy-in-france/>

granting the right of double *jus soli* to certain former colonies and overseas territories of France (Feldblum 1999: 150-152). In other words, “Charles Pasqua, the Interior Minister, gave his name to a law on the conditions of entering and living in France for foreigners and Pierre Méhaignerie, the Justice Minister, gave his to the reform of nationality laws” (Duchesne, 2005: 4).⁷ Instead of receiving French citizenship automatically at age 18, the new, 1993 law required that:

persons born in France of foreign parents can acquire French citizenship between the ages of 16 and 21 by declaration if the five years residence requirement and the non-convictions required are satisfied”. Persons who have expressly declined French citizenship during the year preceding their majority and persons who have been convicted of certain crimes are excluded from this provision... Naturalisation becomes secondary to the acquisition of citizenship in France. In contrast to the declaration, the naturalisation procedure is discretionary, i.e. subject to the control and approval of the administration. The naturalisation procedure in France requires five years of permanent residence, majority, linguistic competence, assimilation to the French community, and good moral and customs which means no sentences to more than six months or to offences or crimes against the State’s security. Unlike many other countries, France does not require from the candidates to naturalisation to renounce their original citizenship. The requirements to naturalisation are founded on the presumptions of the assimilation, attachment and loyalty of foreigners settled in France (Kaya and Kentel 2009: 14-15).

The law’s main provisions thus reflected ‘the new nationalist consensus over citizenship priorities’ established during the late 1980s, confirming the predictions of the perspective of the national tradition (Feldblum, 1999). In order to discourage immigrants from settling, the second Pasqua law withholding several social rights such as health care or the possibility to appeal the decisions regarding asylum was proposed. The Constitutional Council ruled that some provisions were unconstitutional, and the amended Bill still imposing restrictive procedures for asylum applications was passed in 1994.

As in the 1950s, in the 1990s French foreign policy and relations with former colonies, especially Algeria, became a driving factor in immigration and refugee policy in the 1990s (see Drhimeur 2000a, 2000b). The government felt compelled to grant asylum to many members of the Algerian political and intellectual class. Also stepped up pressure to keep other Algerians out, and carefully to keep the established Algerian community under surveillance. In 1996, Jean-Louis Debré replaced Charles Pasqua as the Minister of the Interior and pledged to limit foreigners’ rights and tackle illegal immigration. The proposed Debré Law of 1996 was designed to resolve the ambiguous status of some of the *sans*

⁷ Moderate parties of both left and right omitted immigration from their agenda during the 1993 parliamentary, 1994 European and 1995 presidential elections. In part this may be accounted for by their reluctance to draw attention to an issue which the FN ‘owned’ or to risk inflaming tensions which were becoming increasingly visible in the early 1990s with confrontations between youths and riot police in the run-down suburbs (*banlieues*) and the shooting by the police of a second-generation immigrant, Khaled Kelkal, after the 1995 Paris metro bombings attributed to the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) (Marthaler, 2008).

papiers. This included French-born children of illegal immigrants and the foreign spouses of French citizens. Under the proposed new law, to be eligible for a one-year residence permit, 'foreign' children under 16 would have to prove continuous residence in France for ten years, and 'foreign' spouses had to have been married for at least two years. Although the Debré Law had some liberal intent, it became the focus of controversy and protest as the Conservative National Assembly added a provision requiring all private citizens to inform local authorities when they received a non-EU foreigner at home (Hollifield, 2000: 126).

In other words, the Debré Law required African visitors to bring proof of appropriate accommodation and financial resources for their staying in France as well as for their return (Hollifield, 2004: 205; Weil, 2004: 240-241; Van Der Valk, 2003; Samers, 2003; Fassin, 2001). All these measures, even after the introduction of external controls through visas, had no provisions regarding quotas, in the same spirit of the republican tradition that imposes an equal treatment for all citizens of developing countries (Hollifield 2004:205-206).⁸

Nonetheless, it is essential to note that the French state did not collect information about the ethnic-origin of its citizens up until 1995. In turn, Michèle Tribalat's analysis of the MGIS survey in *Faire France* performed the essential service of breaking the "French ethnicity taboo" (Tribalat, 1995, see also Tribalat et al., 1996; Hargreaves, 1995). Tribalat's comparative field study among Algerian, Moroccan, Spanish, Portuguese, Southeast Asian, and Turkish migrants in France marked a turning point in French social scientific study of immigration. Tribalat begins by stating her preference for the term "assimilation" because she was situating her research problematics in relation to the French model, which is "secular and egalitarian by very principle and founded on the individual's autonomy in his or her relations with the state and society". She then defines assimilation as "the reduction of specificities through population mixing and behavior convergence". The presupposition is that a more or less radical form of acculturation is a necessary prerequisite to "successful" integration (quoted in Safi 2008: 9; see also Blum, 2002; Hargreaves, 1995). As Kaya and Kentel (2004: 16) noted, Tribalat's

conclusion was quite striking in pointing out that the Turks set up an exception. According to him, French-Turks migrants were the most resistant groups against integration, or assimilation. French-Turks do not prefer to speak French at home although they are rather competent in French; they set up parallel communities to the majority society in their own ethnic enclaves; they are more oriented to religiosity compared to the other Muslim communities; they do not prefer intermarriage with the French; and they are less inclined with education.

⁸ The exceptionalism of France in terms of its republican values has been the subject academic studies discussion (see Brubaker, 1992; Favell, 2001). Scholars have also argued that there are some elements of rhetorical multiculturalism in the evolving understanding of French republicanism (see Bryant, 1997; Wieworka, 1998). However, Joppke (2009: 29) argues that French republicanism is only a variant of European liberalism. Rosanvallon (2007) notes that French Republicanism is characterized by tensions between an ideology of national unity built on the primacy of the state and a history of pragmatic adjustments to the reality of social and cultural pluralism (Rosanvallon 2007).

Tribalat's holistic conclusions deriving from quantitative work have been sharply criticised by scholars (Firat, 2003; Favell, 2010; Simon 2008). Tribalat's study is also one of the most cited in research on ethnic diversity in France, focusing on the cases of second-generation immigrants. As Richard Alba (2005: 29-30) notes in immigration societies, the social distinction between immigrant and second generations and natives is sociologically very complex. Alba argues that the immigrant parents of the second generation are distinctive in their language and some of their customs; and their labour-market concentrations, their religion, and their racial appearance may also vary. However, there are diverse paths to the construction of this boundary as it

hinges on the materials available in the social-structural, cultural, legal, and other institutional domains of the receiving society, as well as on characteristics and histories that the immigrants themselves present. Hence, boundaries do not have the same character everywhere; and though invariably they do allow for some assimilation to occur, the terms under which this happens vary from one societal context to another (for similar studies see also Silberman et al, 2007; Alba and Silberman, 2002).

In addition to these debates, on April 21, 1997, President Chirac, dissolved the National Assembly and called for early elections, almost a year ahead of schedule. Many observers saw this unexpected move as a strategic calculation, based on opinion polls showing that his ruling majority on the Right would be re-elected (Jerome et al, 1999: 163). However, when the left returned to power in 1997 (for a discussion on the return of the left-wing to power in France, see Hainsworth, 1998; Jerome et al., 1999), the new Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin,⁹ appointed sociologist and historian Patrick Weil to recommend revisions to the nationality and immigration laws (see also Weil 2001).

In his report, Weil highlighted the results of the 1993 Mehaignerie law's (named after Pierre Mehaignerie who was the Minister of Justice at that time) implementation showing that most eligible youth were requesting French citizenship, often as early as possible, not boycotting the new procedure as many had predicted (Weil, 1997: 26). Naturalizations rose 21% in 1994 (Feldblum, 1999: 151). Weil (1997: 26–9) also noted that not all eligible youth were informed of the law, and there were problematic inequalities in the rates at which

⁹ Lionel Jospin joined the Socialist Party in 1971 and won a parliamentary seat six years later. When François Mitterrand became president in 1981, Jospin was promoted to head of the party. As minister of education during Mitterrand's second term, Jospin developed a plan to build new classrooms throughout the country, as well as seven new universities, but he also encountered controversy. In 1989 he made the decision to allow Muslim female students to wear veils in public schools, a violation of the principle of separation of church and state in the view of many French people. In the early 1990s Jospin's political career was in severe decline. He lost his cabinet post in 1992 and his parliamentary seat in 1993. With Mitterrand suffering from cancer and other leading Socialists plagued by scandal, the party selected him as its presidential candidate in 1995. Although he ran with no platform and little fanfare, he only narrowly lost to Jacques Chirac, the candidate of the conservative Rally for the Republic party. After the Socialists and their allies won a majority in the National Assembly in 1997, Jospin was appointed by Chirac to replace Alain Juppé as prime minister (<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Lionel-Jospin>).

French nationality was being acquired in different districts due to problems of information and with the administration of the new procedures. “Weil’s report raised concerns about how the law was working in practice and particularly about the capacity of ill-coordinated local administrations to execute it fairly and equitably” (Thomas 2006: 242: 243, see also Bloom, 1999). Weil’s report was also consistent in some ways with the political strategy of the 1987–1988 Nationality Commission. In contrast to expectations, postnationalists sought to reassure the public that immigrants becoming citizens did want to be French and were assimilating.

However, in light of the new research Weil cited, an elective mode of acquiring citizenship was no longer deemed essential to demonstrating these claims. An extensive new study of assimilation was shown to have found that immigrants of non- European backgrounds were not assimilating less readily than had those from other European countries. Nor did it confirm widespread assertions that the public-school system no longer ensured integration as well as it had for previous generations. The importance of cultural assimilation was thus reaffirmed, but the public was now reassured that it was already working (Thomas, 2006: 136).

In 1997, a large-scale regularisation of illegal immigrants demanding amnesty (*sans papiers*) was also taking place. Some feared that extending citizenship too readily to new-borns would make it too easy for illegal immigrants to become parents of French children, a status many were then using as their main basis for demanding papers and resisting deportation. And when Jean-Marie Le Chevallier of the National Front sought to change the Guigou legislation to abolish *jus soli* in 1997, he received no support. Granting citizenship only by descent or naturalisation drew considerable attention from France’s traditional right-wing parties and many people before the Nationality Commission’s 1987–88 research (Thomas, 2006: 243-244). In 1997, however, Le Chevallier was unable to secure any enabling votes for such an amendment, overwhelmingly refused by spokespersons for all other groups as contrary to French custom (*ibid*). Weil (1997) also argued that the 1993 Pasqua law deterred international students and young professionals from settling in France, depriving the country of a source of human capital and undermined its national interests in the global competition.

The 1998 immigration law established a special status for scientists and scholars. Further steps were implemented that year to ease entry requirements for different highly qualified technical groups. Computer experts earning more than 180,000 FF a year and highly skilled temporary employees earning more than 23,000 FF a month, benefiting from a simpler process, may seek family reunification if they receive a one-year permit. Despite these reforms, France remained behind the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom in its quest for highly skilled mobile labour¹⁰.

Despite the centrality of migration to the French government and popular opinion, by the end of the 1990s, demands for more stringent measures on migration and asylum were no longer an essential subject of the government’s agenda (Boswell 2003: 21). However, in the

¹⁰ Source: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/immigration-policy-in-france/>

2000s, starting in 2002, French immigration policy was driven by Nicolas Sarkozy (2002–2007 Minister of the Interior, leader of the centre-right UMP and, from 2007–2012, President of the Republic).¹¹ Sarkozy’s rhetoric and policy on immigrant regulation and integration diverged dramatically from earlier centre-right treatment of these problems, which reacted to political pressure and popular sentiment (Marthaler, 2008). Sarkozy’s Presidency (2007–2012) was characterised by the intense salience of immigration on the domestic agenda. The French President became deeply associated with this issue throughout his former tenures as the French Interior Minister (2002–2004; 2005–2007) (see Marthaler, 2008; Schain, 2008).

3. Securitisation of Islam after 9/11

While 11 September 2001 attacks mark a sharp break in how Western states viewed Islam, the responses were shaped by their specific experiences with Islam (i.e. Muslim-origin migrants, refugees etc.) and with terrorism. As Bowen (2009) argues the build-up of internal security, and efforts to create an Islamic national institution began in the 1990s when violence spilt over from Algeria. As a result, the DST (*Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire*), the RG (*Renseignements Generaux*), judges detailed to investigate security threats, and other agencies were instituted. However, politicians did not refrain from deploying a politics of fear by evoking security concerns. As Bowen (2009) notes, the alleged Islamic threat also led to several attempts to establish a single national body to present Islam to the state. In 1991, Interior Minister Pierre Joxe formed an advisory ‘Council for Reflection on French Islam,’ which failed the following year. But Pasqua’s 1995 effort to put the Paris Mosque at the centre of French Islam by a ‘Council of French Muslims’ based on a ‘Charter of the Muslim Faith’ was successful. The third attempt by Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Minister of the Interior in the Jospin government from 1998 to 2000, was the ‘Consultation of French Muslims’ in November 1999 and proceeded with the effective creation of the French Council for Islamic Faith by Nicolas Sarkozy in 2002 (Bowen, 2009: 2442–2443).

Besides, there was a controversy during this consultation and the Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement proposed a charter defining “The juridical principals and foundations governing the relationships between the Republic and the Muslim cult”. Some criticised this charter as the stigmatisation of Muslims because their adherence to Republican principles was implicitly presented as being uncertain). Others criticised Chevènement for having withdrawn for the original charter draft the right to change religion, because of the

¹¹ In 2002, after Chirac’s re-election as president, Sarkozy returned to office as interior minister. In 2004, he was asked to choose between his government post and becoming president of the UMP party. In 2007 Sarkozy ran for president of France and won 53 percent of the vote. He promised a "rupture" with France's past, including radical economic reforms, closer relations with the U.S. and labour market liberalization. He was sworn in as president on May 16, 2007, and finished first in the runoff election on May 6, 2007. The French people elected Sarkozy to the presidency on April 22, 2007; he was re-elected in May 2007 in a run-of election. He promised a “rupture” with France’s past, including radical economic reforms that would reduce taxes and liberalize the country’s labour market, and closer relations with the United States (<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nicolas-Sarkozy>).

opposition of the UOIF (Union of Islamic Organisations of France) (Kepel, 2014: 199, see also Chevènement, 2004: 392-394).

As Natalie Doyle notes (2011: 479), following his re-election in 2002, President Chirac set out to defuse the controversy surrounding the issue of Islam that had been allowed to develop throughout the 1990s. He gave the *Commission de réflexion sur l'application du principe de laïcité dans la République*, the task to reflect on possible measures to promote a 'peaceful application of the French principle of *laïcité* [secularity]'. This Commission was headed Bernard Stasi, which produced a report on *laïcité* on 11 December 2003, which detailed the state's responsibilities to combat anti-Muslim sentiments as the 1990s witnessed the juxtaposition of Islam and French republicanism.

The Stasi report, it seems, was trying to address two problems: the success of the National Front in promoting anti-Muslim sentiment, and the growing sense of alienation of a proportion of young Muslims, the two being locked in a kind of positive feedback loop that focused attention on the question of religious difference rather than on underlying social problems. In brief, the many recommendations formulated by the Stasi Commission pointed to the failure of successive governments to promote the social integration of the 'second generation' of immigrants from Muslim countries, mostly North African countries, born to often semi-literate parents, who migrated when unskilled labour was needed in Western Europe (Doyle 2011: 479-480).

Among the report's observations were the difficulties in finding employment and the social hostility which resulted from the populist discourse regarding the competition between native and migrant-origin youth in the labour market (for a more detailed discussion of the Stasi report, see O'Brian 2005; Akan 2009; Body-Gendrot, 2007).

3.1. The Headscarf Affair: an everlasting affair

Nonetheless, the Stasi report (2003: 9) also advised the French government to ban headscarves and other ostentatious religious symbols from public schools (Kılıç et al., 2008; Loenen, 2009).¹² This reinvigorated the headscarf debate, which had started in 1989, that still remains a much-debated issue in academia. It should be noted that despite the institutional arrangements in France that reinforce a 'no ethnic politics' model, this model has been challenged on various occasions. The major and one of the most studied ruptures in this sense is the *affaire des foulards* (headscarves affair) of 1989. For instance, Feldblum suggests that the nationalist mindset of French immigration politics in the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s as well as the integrationist strategies of Franco-Maghrebi groups, and the *immigré* perspective of the state and political community contributed to the emergence of the headscarf affair as a long-lasting debate (Feldblum, 1993). In this sense, the 1989 debate highlighted the use of integration as a means of addressing cultural differences (Bonnaïfous, 1992). Integration was then institutionalised through the establishment of

¹² See also the case of *Sahin v Turkey* (Grand Chamber), Application No 42393/98.

'Haut Conseil pour l'Intégration' in 1990 by Michel Rocard. As a result, "French policies have favoured integrating *'immigrés'* once they have been accepted as legal residents" (Van Der Valk, 2003: 311-312, see also Peter, 2008).

In brief, the 'headscarf affair' in France arose from a series of events. The first one occurred in September 1989, when three Muslim schoolgirls were expelled from their lower secondary public school in Creil, a town in northern France, for refusing to remove their Islamic headscarves at school. Similar incidents occurred which were countered by protests across France. "The headscarf became associated with social policies of immigration, integration and assimilation, despite the somewhat contradictory fact that many of the Muslim girls concerned had been born or had grown up in France" (Jones 2009: 48-49). Following parliamentary elections in 1993, illegal immigrants became increasingly targeted in police round-ups, and Algerians, as well as other North Africans, were detained on suspicion of being or sympathising with fundamentalist militants sometimes (ibid.: 54). As such, the *affaire du foulard* became a crucial moment in the politicisation of ethnic identity in France (Kepel, 1994).

As noted by Elaine Thomas (2000: 177), Jean-Marie Le Pen claimed that 'colonisation' has political and theological elements, and '[w]hen you go to someone else's place, you conform to their mores'. This, as noted above, also raised questions about integration and cultural conformity in the laws of the 1990s. As such, "it was widely accepted that these pieces of cloth signified a rejection of 'integration,' and they were also widely regarded as signifying submission to sexual subordination, obscurantism, and arbitrary paternal authority" (Thomas, 2000: 185).

Caitlin Killian (2003) conducted a study exploring the Muslim immigrant women's views of their place in French society and found that even those who disagreed with the French public opinion often invoke arguments that are more French than North African. She found that North African women show that younger, well-educated women defend the headscarf as a matter of personal liberty and cultural expression. Highlighting the general differences, she also found that older, poorly educated women either defend or reject the veil without discussing it in the context of secularism (Killian 2003; see also Keaton 1999: 47).

Similarly, Trica Danielle Keaton's (1999) identifies national identity as a "floating signifier" among diasporic communities in France and argues that Muslim girls in secondary education asserting their national identity aim to negotiate the complex expectations of home, secular schools during a period in France when the notion of French identity itself is being transformed. Nonetheless, it should be noted that controversies about headscarf issue cannot be only understood through the theoretical framework of immigration and colonialist legacies, but also as a resurgence of this anticlerical tradition. During the Third Republic, a part of the left was strongly opposed to Catholic public practices and attacked them in newspapers, electoral speeches, etc. Besides, following the adoption of the 1905 law, the "*querelle des inventaires*" (inventory quarrels) provoked another deep opposition between Catholic regions and the secular government.

The most recent event was in 2003 when Nicolas Sarkozy insisted that Muslim women must pose bare-headed for official identity photographs. In the aftermath of this controversy,

schools became an issue again, and politicians from the major parties declared their loyalty to the Republic (Scott, 2005: 108).

Subsequently, on 17 March 2004, Law 2004-228 was published in the Official Journal of France to regulate, in educational establishments, the wearing of symbols that express religious adherence. The law prohibits symbols that “ostensibly” manifest a particular religious belief (for a detailed discussion of legal precedent and mindset for the 2004 Law, see Lyon and Spini, 2004). Significantly, the debates afterwards focused on the human’s rights aspect of this issue, the feminist perspective (Lyon 2004); and the legal discourses relating religious and cultural pluralism (Wiles 2007).

A significant event, which is frequently discussed in terms of the 2003 headscarf debate in France is the case of Turkey (Gökarıksel and Mitchell, 2005; Barras, 2009, 2014; Hancock, 2008; Ulusoy, 2007; Tarhan, 2007; Winter, 2009; Kuru 2009). These studies argue that despite the differences in their socio-cultural and religious composition, as laicist states France and Turkey provide insight into how laicite offers a form of governance in the modern era.

3.2. First Sarkozy Law and the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM)

The first Sarkozy law (Law 2003-1119 of 26 November 2003 on immigration control, the residence of aliens in France and nationality) aimed to institute more restrictive measures on immigration control with provisions to improve integration. The new law had two key objectives: first, to restrict illegal immigration, and to reduce the number of asylum-seekers. It was also justified on the grounds that this law would also facilitate integration among settled migrants.

The shift in centre-right policy under Sarkozy towards a tougher and more radical approach appears to have been driven by party political as well as public policy considerations. In the aftermath of the 2002 presidential election, he was prepared to turn what had hitherto been a threat to the centre-right into an opportunity by adopting a more hardline position to compete with Le Pen on his territory. This involved two principal risks: potentially alienating the more centrist section of the centre-right electorate and helping to legitimate the far-right programme. However, it also presented Sarkozy with an opportunity, primarily but not solely, in electoral terms (Marthaler 2008: 387-388).

2003 was also important for the Muslim community in France. As Islam has become the second-largest religion in the country, the State required representation of different Islamic communities present on its territory. Scholars argued that Islam in France was weakened by the lack of a central authority that is respected by the diverse Muslim organisations and communities (House, 1996). The mobilisation within the Muslim community in the 1990s was attributed to the Mosque of Paris and its connection with the Algerian state. As such, the Minister of the Interior Pierre Joxe established a new contact committee with the Muslim community developing the Working Council on Islam in France (CORIF) (Fernando, 2005). The CORIF was an attempt to sever the Algerian state’s perceived influence over the

Paris Mosque while establishing closer ties between the Muslim minority and the French polity (see Kepel, 1997; Guiraudon, 2000; Samers, 2003; Fernando, 2005).

In 1999, Minister Chevenement consulted all the organisations responsible for Islamic faith to determine the structure of the Council and initially selected four leading organisations:

- The Muslim Institute of the Paris Mosque (*Institut Musulman de la Mosquée de Paris*): It was attached to the Paris Mosque, and founded in 1916 during the First World War and has historical links with Algeria.
- The Union of Islamic Organisations of France (*Union des Organisations Islamiques de France* (UOIF)): It was founded in 1983 and is the largest of the Muslim federations in France with close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.
- The National Federation of Muslims in France (*Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France* (FNMF)): It was founded in 1985 and receives funding from Morocco.
- French chapter of *Jama'at al Tabligh (Tabligh)*: It is a pietistic movement founded in India in 1927 (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007: 2).¹³

Two other Muslim communities later joined the Council: the Turks, whose organisations have historically always been very active in the organisation of the faith, and the sub-Saharan Africans, with the Federation of the Islamic Associations of Africa, the Antilles and the Comore. These communities were represented by The French federation of Islamic associations of Africa, the Comoros and the French Antilles (*Fédération française des Associations islamiques d'Afrique, des Comores et des Antilles*), which was formed in 1989, as an umbrella organisation for Muslims who adhere to a traditional form of Islam rooted in African and French West Indian culture, as well as The Coordination Committee for Turkish Muslims in France (*Comité de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France- CCMTF*) is which is linked to Turkey. (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007: 2).

On 3 May 2003, the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM) was officially created. The CFCM, whose mandate is global, operates at the local level through the *Councils Régionaux du Culte Musulman* (CRCMs) (Regional Councils for Muslim Faith) whose mandate is specific and participates in dialogue with Prefectures and local elected officials. The CFCM represents the Muslim group of faith; its function is to settle questions emerging from religious observance, but it has no divine authority as it is not a philosophical entity offering opinions on religious matters (see Peter 2008: 100; Laurance and Vaisse 2007). Its objectives include defending the dignity and interests of Islam in France; encouraging and organising the sharing of information and services between places of religious worship, encouraging discussion within the faith groups, providing representation in dealings with official authorities for places of Muslim worship¹⁴. As Nora Fellag (2014) notes, this has also been influential in the depiction of the Maghrebi community in France as Muslims, rather than French citizens, which led to the legitimisation of various structural restrictions towards integration.

¹³ See http://www.fides.org/en/news/2763-THE_FRENCH_COUNCIL_OF_MUSLIM_FAITH_CFCM

¹⁴ See http://www.ambafrance-eau.org/IMG/muslim_faith.pdf

As Benjamin Bruce (2012) writes in France and Germany, immigrants, whether Turkish, Maghrébin or otherwise, were plagued with the assumed temporariness of their guest worker states. In turn, state services, most notably education and religion were “outsourced”. The establishment of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) was a response to internal political concerns surrounding the integration of immigrants in France and an attempt to “domesticate Islam”. However, they have not replaced the long-running cooperation with sending states concerning Islamic religious affairs; in some instances, they have even encouraged it (ibid: 34-50).

Nonetheless, Bonnefoy (2003: 2-3) asserts that institutionalising Islam also implies a distinction between “good” and “bad” Islam, in which the former is ‘integrated into the national community’, ‘bad’ Islam is seen as mostly foreign, imported through ‘transnational networks’, connected with ‘international terrorism’. To that end, Nicolas Sarkozy, French Minister of the Interior, once asserted,

It is important that the Republic dialogues with Muslims. It is an issue of appeasement. What I want is precisely an appeased and moderate Islam. I would add that this mutual recognition also gives us more ability to fight the few imams that transgress the law and preach violence and anti-Semitism. These should be expelled. (Sarkozy cited in Bonnefoy 2003: 3).

Similarly, Peter (2008) also notes that this institutional structure was a result of the dynamism among young Maghrebi, whose Muslim identity became more visible in the late-1990s.

3.3. The Riots of 2005: Understanding urban dynamics

By 2005 Sarkozy was emphasising the “*détournements de procedure systématiques*” (“systematic abuse of procedure”) referring to baseless asylum applications, sham marriages (*mariages blancs*), and out-of-date tourist visas. He stated that “it should be understood that if France wants to remain a generous and welcoming country, it must demonstrate its firmness to those who abuse and undermine its generosity (11 June 2005 to the executive of the UMP cited in Kofman 2010: 6). Sarkozy’s discursive construction of Muslims as abusers of the legal and administrative system was compounded by the rise of terrorist attacks in Europe, namely the Madrid bombing in 2004 and London underground bombing in 2005.

In addition, the riots that took place in France in October and November 2005, following the death of two young boys from Clichy (a deprived area of the outskirts of Paris) after a police chase, were dubbed “race riots” with a political dimension (Jobard, 2009: 235).¹⁵ The

¹⁵These riots were mirrored on a smaller scale in Villiers-le-Bel in 2007 when two local youths died in a collision involving police officers, which have been debated in similar ways. This has led to the emergence of a “rioting” as a recurrent social phenomenon in France. For an overview, see Moran, 2011 and 2012; Jobard, 2009; Waddington, Jobard, and King, 2013; Murphy, 2011b.

predominately Arab-immigrant suburbs of Paris, Lyon, Lille and other French cities erupted in riots by socially alienated teenagers, many of them second- or third-generation immigrants.

As Jocelyn Cesari (2005) notes ethnicity, culture, and Islam tend to be portrayed as the leading causes of social and economic marginality in France (Cesari, 2005). As such, the riots signalled the failure of the *égalité* ideal, which was challenged by the realities of the 21st century (Haddad and Balz 2006: 23). As Jobard (2009: 238) writes, two factors encouraged this type of interpretation. First, the Interior Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, argued that these riots were simply a violent phenomenon traced to a group of ‘hooligans’ (*voyous*) ‘fully known to police.’ The second factor was the ‘copy-cat effect’ with government figures maintaining that television pictures of the initial unrest had an imitation effect on youths in other areas (ibid).

It is vital that while the majority of the studies (for a study noting that rioters were seeking recognition of their minority status Murphy, 2011a: 33; for a survey of the racial inequality that triggered the riots see Terrio, 2009) on the riots focus on the motivations of the rioters, Schneider (2008: 133) argues that radical Muslims did not instigate the uprisings, children of African polygamists, or despairing youth suffering from high unemployment but instead they were provoked by a terrible incident of police brutality. As Olivier Roy (2005) writes, the riots were not instigated or carried out by jihadists who embodied the conventional Islamic characteristics with an Islamist agenda. As such, “the spontaneity of the riots and the lack of bearded leaders contrasts with the theories of self-segregating Islamic communities fuelled by Islamic radicalism and other crude cultural arguments that abound in media commentaries and popular discourse” (Boukhars, 2009: 299; see also Wenden, 2006: 47, Tshimanga et al., 2009). However, Gilles Kepel and Alexandre Jardin (2017) underline that an event provoked a “rebound” of these riots, an accident which had a certain religious “symbolism” when a tear-gas canister was thrown by the police in the Bilal mosque of Clichy-sous-Bois.

In response to the critiques that the riots were carried out by those who were excluded, Robert Castel underlines that the framework for understanding the youth’s behaviour was that

that they are trapped in a contradiction and that their blind violence is a nihilist response to the dead end in which they find themselves. They are not at all “excluded” ... but they experience their prerogatives through the impossibility of their concrete achievement. They are citizens without the positive attributes of citizenship and they negatively test their membership of the French nation through their non-achievement and unfulfilled promises’ (Castel 2006: 783).

Importantly, going back to the ethnicity-blind nature of studies on France, the lack of anthropological studies that anticipated such “riots” were also a consequence of the refusal to study this matter because it would perpetuate racist hierarchies. To that end, Fassin (2006: 2) argues that French anthropologists tended to analyse the traditional aspects of their society such as marketplaces in rural areas and those who turned to political studies rarely conducted studies on ethnicity, race or religion.

Moreover, following the 2005 riots, a Pew Global Attitudes Survey conducted in 2006 found that despite high levels of concern about joblessness, French Muslims generally feel more at home in France than do Muslim populations residing in Germany, Great Britain and Spain. For instance, the survey indicates that only a few Muslims living in France saw a natural conflict between being a devout Muslim and residing in modern society. Seven-in-ten French Muslims (72%) perceived no such conflict, a view shared by a virtually identical 74%-share of the French general public¹⁶.

4. Europeanisation and Post-national citizenship

The 2000s were also significant in France and other EU countries in terms of the establishment of “post-national citizenship” which resulted from European integration. This led to two contrasting perspectives regarding the relationship between immigration and citizenship. The post-nationalist perspective foresees increasing convergence in national citizenship policies (Thomas, 2006: 238). According to this view, the increasing international influence of human rights norms and respect for ‘personhood,’ is giving way to a new ‘post-nationalist model of membership’ in which national citizenship is therefore supposedly losing much of its traditional significance, especially for migrants (Soysal, 1994, 136–67; see also Jacobson, 1996; Savage 2004). The other perspective emphasises the importance of national political cultures and traditions, arguing that countries have distinct, deeply-rooted notions of nationhood shaping their approaches to citizenship. Therefore, their views and practices vary when they are confronted with similar challenges of immigrant settlement (Thomas 2006: 238-239). Additionally,

European states’ informal recognition of one another as key members of their international ‘reference group’ may also make policymakers more concerned about internationally shared understandings of liberal democratic legitimacy and thus contributes to convergence of European states’ approaches to national citizenship, even in the absence of effective formal pressures from European international organisations. To explain continued differences between cases, attention to these factors is best complemented by the national traditions perspective. However, a more flexible version allowing for the possibility of fundamental changes is needed (Thomas 2006: 269).

The most important and directly relevant work in this vein is Rogers’ Brubaker’s (1992, 1999, 2001, 2017) comparisons of France and Germany’s different historical sequences of the nation- and state-building led them to develop different conceptions of nationhood. Brubakers’ main argument is that in the German case nation-building was primary to state-building. In contrast, in France state-building was primary to nation-building leading to an ethnic-based understanding of citizenship in the former.

An important argument that is common in the literature on Europeanisation and migration is the debate among scholars over nation-states’ ability to control their external borders

¹⁶ Source: <https://www.pewresearch.org/2006/08/17/the-frenchmuslim-connection/>

given the expansion of free trade and the emergence of a human rights regime (Favell, 1998; Geddes and Scholten, 2016; Bommess and Geddes, 2000; Block and Bonjour, 2013; Schain, 2008; Czaika and Haas, 2013).

As Boswell and Geddes (2011) assert, there are two categorisations of immigration at the EU level that comprise direct political, social and legal repercussions on the French immigration policy: a) intra-EU immigration (formed by nationals of other EU member states), and b) non-EU immigration (composed of immigrants originating in non-EU countries who enter and settle in member-states) (Boswell and Geddes, 2011).¹⁷ France's participation in the Schengen Agreement (1985) and ratification of the Schengen Convention (1990), later incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) is another restraint on the French policy of border controls as this agreement anticipated the abolition of internal borders between certain states to strengthen the single market in exchange for the harmonisation and reinforcement of external border controls (Boswell and Geddes, 2011). Under this agreement, the participant states ought to recognise automatically the entry visas granted to non-EU citizens by any of the remaining member-states (Carrera et al., 2011).

5.1. Polish Plumber Debate

Despite the focus on the Muslim Maghrebi-origin migrants in political and social discourse, EU-origin migrants also became a source of controversy in France; namely, the debates surrounding the "Polish plumber" (*le plombier polonaise*) in 2005.¹⁸ Philippe de Villiers, *Mouvement pour la France's* leader (the party opposed the EU constitution referendum in France)¹⁹, used this term first (for a more detailed discussion, see Grossman and Woll, 2011; Marthaler, 2005; Hainsworth, 2005; Startin and Krouwel, 2013). Following the 2004 enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe, the Polish plumber became the symbol of cheap labour provided by a migrant community, which competed with the native French community.

The Swiss Socialist Party used the slogan "*Plombiers de tous pays unissez vous*" in its campaign in favour of the free circulation of people in Europe; Pascal Lamy, the French head of the World Trade Organization reportedly denounced "plumber

¹⁷ At intra-EU level, mobility rights instituting the freedom of circulation for EU citizens were enshrined in the Treaty of Rome (1957). The right of free movement is recognised for all citizens of the 27 EU member-states and protected by supranational law. Non-EU immigration was included in the EU's main legal and political framework after the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) and it is deprived of right to free movement. Although policy developments at the EU level have direct affect on the member-states' border controls and asylum policies, national governments maintain discretionary powers to manage labour immigration according to domestic priorities (Boswell and Geddes, 2011).

¹⁸ According to Schlipphak and Isani (2018), European citizens from a Muslim background are more prone to have positive opinions about the European Union.

¹⁹ Nonetheless, immigration was not the only issue behind the rejection of the EU Constitution during the European referendum in 2005. A part of the French left campaigned against this European Constitutional Treaty by describing it as too market-oriented, free-tradist and liberal. See for instance Crespy, 2008; Reungoat, 2019.

phobia” for twisting the debate of Europe’s future; and there was even talk in the French Socialist camp of building a statue in honour of the Polish plumber. But, interestingly, it didn’t end there. In June 2005 the Polish Tourist Board came up with a response to all the rhetoric with its own image of the Polish plumber as a hunky, young, Californian beach boy with bulging biceps flanked by images of the Tatra mountains. The caption went, “I’m staying in Poland, come one and all” (Maryniak 2006: 3-4).

Although this controversy did not necessarily spark as many academic studies as the Muslim Maghrebi-origin immigrants, the Polish plumber issue has also been debated in academia in relation to East-West migration in Europe (Spigelman, 2013; Van Riemsdijk, 2010; Drzewiecka, et al. 2014; Favell, 2008).

5.2. The Second Sarkozy Law of 2006

The second Loi Sarkozy (Law 2006-911 of 24 July 2006 on immigration and integration) was enacted in the wake of the 2005 riots and less than a year before the 2007 presidential elections. During the 2007 electoral campaign, Sarkozy as the candidate for the centre-right party- *Union pour un Mouvement Populaire* (UMP) declared that he would strengthen his ‘selective immigration policy’ and to promote ‘selected immigration’ (*immigration choisie*) rather than ‘unwanted immigration’ (*immigration subie*) (UMP, 2007). Sarkozy remarked that

‘In France, immigration retains negative connotations because it is not adequately regulated and not sufficiently linked to our economic needs, and because it is not accompanied by an ambitious integration policy’. The primary emphasis now was therefore on ‘selective’ immigration (*immigration choisie*) rather than ‘imposed’ immigration (*immigration subie*). ‘Imposed’ immigration included family reunification and asylum-seekers, which made up the vast majority of immigration into France, and ‘selective’ immigration would be tailored to France’s economic requirements, with the introduction of a renewable three-year residence permit called a ‘skills and talents’ permit (*carte de compétences et talents*) for highly qualified non-EU workers. Initial plans to introduce a quota system for immigrants with professional skills proved too controversial and were abandoned (Marthaler 2008: 390).

Furthermore, Sarkozy also pledged to create a ministry of immigration, integration and national identity to tackle this conflict between immigration and French national identity (Ivaldi, 2008; Mayer, 2007; Carvalho 2015: 54).

In explaining the rationale for the new legislation, Sarkozy further noted that in countries that practice selective immigration, xenophobia and the far-right are much weaker than in France thus, he constructed ‘selective immigration’ as ‘a defence against racism’ (for a discussion of selective immigration, see Constant and Zimmermann, 2005; Butcher and Piehl, 2007; Bertoli and Brücker, 2011; Storesletten, 2000). The 2006 law also abolished the de facto regularisation of illegal immigrants after ten years’ residence on French territory,

which meant that each immigrant would have to make an individual case for remaining in France. (Marthaler 2008: 390-391).

Complementing the controversy caused by the Sarkozy laws and the public discourse surrounding Muslim immigrants, and in 2008 the French Council of State (the highest body dealing with disputes between individuals and the public administration) upheld the decision made by government authorities that the Moroccan wife of a French citizen living in France with her husband and their three children did not qualify for French citizenship (Vakulenko, 2009:144). As Natalie Doyle (2011: 477) notes, this decision was based on a clause in the civil code that allows naturalisation to be refused to a person who is deemed to have failed the criterion of having assimilated into French society 'for reasons other than inadequate language proficiency'. However, the media portrayed this decision as a discriminatory measure against Muslims, which intensified the political and public debate regarding integration in France.

5. The 2010s: Terrorism and Islamophobia

As noted above, after the 9/11 attacks, concerns about rising immigration, terrorist attacks and radicalisation have dominated many European countries' political and public discourses. France has been particularly vulnerable in these discussions due to the high number of terrorist attacks (see side box). This has also been complemented by the rise of populist discourse. In terms of both radicalisation among Muslim youth in Europe and the rise of populism, scholars have noted that Muslim immigrants have increasingly been perceived as less desirable than other cultural and religious groups (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016, Kaya, 2019), difficult to assimilate (Bisin et al. 2008), as well as a threat to Western values (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). Nonetheless, studies have contested that these perceptions as well (Laurence and Vaisse, 2006; Joppke, 2009: 124–125).

Terrorist Attacks in France after 2010

2012 March - French Islamist Mohamed Merah shoots dead seven people, including three Jewish schoolchildren, in Toulouse, before himself being shot dead in a police siege of his flat.

2015 January - Islamist gunmen shoot dead 17 people in Paris - most of them staff at the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo - before being killed by security forces.

2015 November - Islamic State group claims responsibility for terror attacks in Paris that kill 130 people - deadliest attacks in France since Second World War, and in European Union since 2004 Madrid railway bombings. France announces state of emergency, launches renewed bombing raids in Syria.

2016 February - Government begins dismantling notorious 'Jungle' migrant camp at Calais on the English Channel.

2016 July - At least 84 people are killed in lorry attack on crowd celebrating Bastille Day in Nice. Islamic State claims responsibility.

2017 April - Islamist kills policeman in attack on Champs-Élysées in Paris.

Source: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17299605>

Concerning the rising visibility of populist discourse in France, Marine Le Pen assumed leadership of the Front National (FN) from her father Jean-Marie Le Pen in January 2011. Marine Le Pen distanced herself from the extreme views that traditionally had been associated with her father and the FN. However, she continued to present immigration, particularly from Islamic countries as a threat to France. Additionally, from Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen, there was also a progressive move from a general anti-immigration stance to a more specific anti-Islam one. Besides, since the takeover of Marine Le Pen, the National Front tries to claim an attachment to liberal values but directed in an Islamophobic perspective (Crepon, 2015).

Le Pen led the party to a record showing in the first round of cantonal elections in March 2011, and the party prevailed in two districts. In the first round of the 2012 presidential election, she finished third behind Sarkozy and Socialist candidate François Hollande (for a comprehensive discussion on the rise of Marine Le Pen and the FN, see Kaya, 2016, 2017, 2019).

Furthermore, the rise of Islamophobic discourse in France in the face of terrorism is often contrasted with the case of the United Kingdom (see, for example, Haubrich, 2003; Khosrokhavar, 2004; Brown 2006; Peter, 2008; Foley 2013). The reason for such comparisons is the fact that European Islamist terrorism recruits youth whose parents or grandparents came from the former European colonies, which made France and the UK particularly important. As such, these studies illustrate that Pakistanis or “Arabs” from North Africa in the UK, and individuals from Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia in France have played a significant role in the jihadist activities. The colonial ties which created a hierarchy on ethnocultural and racial basis and the discriminatory measures against integration of these Muslim communities are identified as the main causes of radicalisation among these communities (Khosrokhavar, 2004: 1). As Marret (2010) notes French Muslims, who have been involved in terrorist attacks, are usually from immigrant communities, predominantly Algerian, having suffered from long periods of unemployment, displaying various forms of delinquency and often undergoing radicalisation process in prisons (for terrorism in France, see also Laurance and Vaisse, 2007: 246-270).

In this sense, one should also be reminded about the debates surrounding the origins of the Jihadist phenomenon within French schools of thought which can be summarised through the contentious debate on “radicalisation of Islam” versus “Islamization of radicalisation” (Kaya, 2020; Tecmen, 2020). Gilles Kepel, Alexandre Jardin (2017) and Bernard Rougier (2015, 2020) interpret this phenomenon as a consequence of the development of the Salafist influence in European Muslim communities – even among the converts (Özyürek, 2015: 109-131). Conversely, Olivier Roy (2017) and Alain Bertho (2016) explain it by arguing that Islamism is the only “revolutionary” ideology which is currently available in today’s context of globalisation. Another interpretation is proposed by François Burgat (2019), who sees Islamism as a kind of further decolonisation in the symbolic and cultural fields.

One of the most notable and discussed attacks in France was perhaps attacks on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015. Fassin (2015) asserts that this attack led to an unprecedented national mobilisation took place in France in defence of the endangered ‘values of the Republic’: liberty, equality, fraternity, to which had been added *laïcité*, the

French version of secularism. This attack received a significant level of media attention which increasingly linked terrorism with Islam and Muslim, thereby using a “narrow” definition of terrorism. This definition placed the responsibility on external sources, foreign extremist organisations, Islamist ideologues and overseas training, rather than looking into the internal issues such as discrimination, youth marginalisation, lack of educational and work opportunities, which may have contributed to the rise of radicalisation within the French Muslim community (Polonska-Kimunguyi and Gillespie, 2016). In turn, this has been one of the many attacks which illustrated the relations between emotional public responses to terrorist attacks and the call for more authoritarian policies toward minority groups, particularly Muslims (Vasilopoulos, Marcus, Foucault, 2018).

Furthermore, in recent years, we have witnessed growing tensions within the French left-wing parties, regarding the interpretation of *laïcité* and the relationship with the religious issue. As it was noted above, the majority of the ethno-religious debates in France have been centred on the laicite principle and its accommodation of religion, mainly Islam. This tension was evident during the Socialist Party primary election for the 2017 presidential election when the two finalists from the two factions, Manuel Valls and Benoît Hamon, expressed vehemently opposing views. Manuel Valls described Benoît Hamon as naive and complacent towards Islamism, whereas Benoît Hamon accused Manuel Valls of fuelling Islamophobia²⁰. This issue was not visible in the presidential campaigns of Emmanuel Macron and Jean-Luc Mélenchon (radical left). However, a latent tension about the interpretation of *laïcité* episodically arises within their respective parties (“*La République en Marche*” and “*La France insoumise*”).

Conclusion

As the extant literature on the integration of Muslim-origin immigrants and the public perception of Muslims in Europe indicates, Islam has been increasingly constructed as a threat to Western values and way of life. Islam and Muslim-origin immigrants, both settled and newcomers, have been discursively associated with extremist or terrorist activities. In this sense, France has been particularly vulnerable to such a discourse due to the attitudes and statements of key political figures, including Jean-Marie Le Pen, Nicolas Sarkozy, and recently Marine Le Pen. A key source of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim views is the terrorist attacks that took place in various cities in France. Also, the country’s colonial ties have led to the formation of a sizeable North African (Maghrebi) immigrant community who have become identified with their Muslim identity. Nonetheless, as shown in this review, Turkish-origin migrants have also become a part of France’s Muslim-origin community, which is also represented in the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM). In this sense, the literature indicates that ethnic diversity among Muslim-origin migrants is often neglected in the public and the political discourse, as well as in academic research. To that end, this homogenisation is also a part of the securitisation of migration policies, which also does not recognize community-specific issues and needs in terms of integration.

²⁰ See <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/29/french-socialists-leftwing-rebel-benoit-hamon-elysee-manuel-valls-francois-hollande-presidency>

Negative public and political perceptions of Muslim-origin migrants *vis-à-vis* their religious identity were combined with a narrow definition of terrorism. This definition emphasised the community's ties with the country of origin rather than their socio-economic and political deprivations in France. In recent decades, this has become commonplace in the articulation of the terrorism discourse in European countries such as Germany and the Netherlands. As the ERC-funded PRIME Youth project will explore further, this biased articulation poses a challenge to the integration of Muslim-origin communities in European communities. It omits the shortcomings of successive administrations, both on the national and EU levels, in constructing successful integration policies that would facilitate dialogue among the native and migrant-origin communities. As a consequence, the emphasis is narrowly placed on the migrant-origin communities rather than the society in general.

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