City Narrative

Amsterdam

Netherlands

The Contemporary History of Amsterdam in the Aftermath of World War II

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"Nativism, Islamophobism and Islamism in the Age of Populism: Culturalisation and Religionisation of what is Social, Economic and Political in Europe"

This research analyses the current political, social, and economic context of the European Union, which is confronted by two substantial crises, namely the global financial crisis and the refugee crisis. These crises have led to the escalation of fear and prejudice among the youth who are specifically vulnerable to discourses that culturalise and stigmatize the "other". Young people between the ages of 18 to 30, whether native or immigrant-origin, have similar responses to globalization-rooted threats such as deindustrialization, isolation, denial, humiliation, precariousness, insecurity, and anomia. These responses tend to be essentialised in the face of current socio-economic, political and psychological disadvantages. While a number of indigenous young groups are shifting to right-wing populism, a number of Muslim youths are shifting towards Islamic radicalism. The common denominator of these groups is that they are both downwardly mobile and inclined towards radicalization. Hence, this project aims to scrutinize social, economic, political and psychological sources of the processes of radicalization among native European youth and Muslim-origin youth with migration background, who are both inclined to express their discontent through ethnicity, culture, religion, heritage, homogeneity, authenticity, past, gender and patriarchy.

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For more information, please visit the project Website: https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr

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Preface

In this research, we argue that local aspects are as important as national and global aspects to understand the root causes of radicalisation, extremism, nationalism, populism, fundamentalism and violence. In this respect, we want to magnify the contemporary history of each city in which we conduct our interviews with both native and Muslim-origin youngsters as far as the processes of deindustrialization, unemployment, poverty, exclusion, alienation and isolation are concerned. Because we claim that radicalisation processes of both groups of youngsters in the European context are likely to result from their local forms of response to the detrimental effects of globalisation. We believe that revealing local socio-economic, political, demographic and ethno-cultural dynamics may help us better understand the current forms of youth radicalisation.

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Introdocution

Amsterdam is the capital city and the largest city in the Netherlands with 854.316 inhabitants. (IOS 2019) (Figure 1). After decades of large-scale immigration, Amsterdam is known as a city with one of the most diverse populations in the world. More than half of the city's population is born abroad or has at least one parent born abroad. The largest immigrant groups have origins in Morocco, Turkey and Surinam (Ibid).

Figure 1. Map of Amsterdam



Source: IOS 2019

Amsterdam is one of the three fastest-growing economies in Europe. From being in a deep economic crisis in the early-1980s, it transformed into a city with a strong economy and a growing population (Kloosterman 2014). During the 1950s, Amsterdam had a strong manufacturing industry sector. Globalization however fostered the downgrading of such industries, relocating manufacturing jobs to areas with cheaper labour (Rath 2014). The economy of Amsterdam in the new global era is mainly service-oriented (IOS 2019).

1. Demographic structure and History of Migration

First- and second-generation immigrants make up more than half of the population according to the latest official numbers of 2019 (IOS). After World War II, between the 1950s and 1970s, Amsterdam, like many other cities in Europe, received guest workers from countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Italy and Turkey. The Netherlands signed an agreement to employ temporary workers, to fill the vacancies of mainly physical, low-level jobs. An assumption underlying this agreement was that migrants would eventually return to their homeland. Recruitment for guest-workers stopped in 1973, during the first oil crisis. However, migration from these countries continued in the form of family reunification (Hartog and Zorlu, 2001;5). The major immigrant groups in the Netherlands are those coming from Morocco, Turkey and Suriname. Suriname was part of the Dutch Kingdom until 1975 when the country became an independent republic (Rath, Foner, Duyvendak & van Reekum 2014). During the 1970's, almost one-third of the total Surinamese population left for the Netherlands. Other 'post-colonial immigrants' came from Indonesia and the Antilleans. During the 1990's, immigrants from mainly Nigeria, Ghana and other African countries migrated to Amsterdam.



Source: IOS 2019

The city centre of Amsterdam is predominantly inhabited by the native white, while Turks and Moroccans mainly live in the Westerns part of Amsterdam. According to the official statistics of Amsterdam for 2020, 45,6% of the Turkish inhabitants of Amsterdam live in New-West and 42,7% of the inhabitants with a Moroccan background also live in New-West (OIS 2020). 39,1% of the Amsterdam inhabitants with a Surinam background and 35% of the inhabitant with an Antilles background live in the South-East of Amsterdam. Next to immigrants who were recruited for unskilled jobs, immigrants from former colonies, and refugees, Amsterdam also has a sizeable population of expatriates (Figure 2). In 2018 more immigrants came to Amsterdam than ever (43,325), most came from the United Kingdom related to the Brexit (IOS 2018). Several European and international

headquarters, such as; Adidas, Booking.com, Panasonic Europe, Netflix and Cisco Systems are situated in Amsterdam, attracting business people, students and educated professionals. While migration from mainly non-Western countries is restricted, the highly educated from other Western countries can relatively easily enter the Netherlands (Rath et al. 2014).

Figure 2. Inhabitants of Amsterdam with a non-western migration background per neighborhood, 1st January 2019 (percentages)



2. Industrialization and Impact on Local Economy

Amsterdam transitioned from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. After World War II, in the 1960s, the Netherlands needed workers for unqualified, manufacturing jobs.

Mainly migrant workers took up these unqualified, low- skilled jobs (Zorlu & Hartog 2001). Globalization and deindustrialization, however, have diminished these jobs. The manufacturing industry especially was hard hit, resulting in high unemployment rates among migrant workers. In the 1980's, Amsterdam was dealing with unemployment rates that were much higher than the national average (24%), compared to the native population unemployment rates among migrant workers were even higher. In 1989, 31% Moroccan

immigrants were unemployed and even 42% of the Turkish immigrants. During this economic crisis, employment growth came from the expansion of the service industry. One the one hand there was a demand for high-skilled workers in the producer services; on the other hand, there was a demand for lower-skilled workers in the consumer services. This reflects the transition from an economy dominated by manufacturing to an economy based on services activities. Low-skilled youngsters from both native and migration background continued to add to the pool of the unemployed. Between 2000 and 2010, the economy grew rapidly. Unemployment rates dropped, not only for the native Dutch but for people with a migration background as well, although to a lesser extent than the previously mentioned group (Kloosterman 2014).

Contrary to the industrial city, educational qualifications seem much more important in this new service-based economy. Official numbers of the IOS show that between 2014-2018 unemployment rates have again dropped among all groups. Unemployment rates are the highest among non-Western migrants and low-educated people (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Amsterdam's unemployed labor force as a percentage of the labor force (unemployment rate) by gender, age groups, migration background and education level, 2014-2018

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Gender					
men	8,2	7,7	6,5	5,8	5,2
women	8,8	7,5	6,8	5,5	4,3
Age Group					
15-24 years	15,1	10,3	11,4	8,4	7,4
25-44 years	6,9	6,1	5,2	4,8	3,7
45-74 years	8,0	8,8	6,9	5,9	5,4
Migration background					
Dutch	5,7	5,0	4,7	3,7	3,8
Western	6,4	7,2	6,1	4,7	4,1
Non-Western	14,5	12,4	10,2	9,4	6,8
Educational level					
low educated	18,3	16,4	13,1	11,3	9,5
Secondary trained	10,6	9,1	8,2	8,2	6,1
Highly educated	4,3	4,5	4,0	3,0	3,2
total	8,5	7,6	6,7	5,7	4,8

Source: IOS 2019

Among the non-Western migrants, a difference is observable between the second generation born in the Netherlands and the first generation. Crul and Molenkopf (2012) show in their study that second-generation youngsters are experiencing upward economic mobility

compared with their parents. Second-generation youngsters from disadvantaged immigration backgrounds show progress, they are more educated than their parents, and many hold professional positions.

3. City Politics and Participation

Compared to other countries, it is relatively easy for immigrant-origin individuals to politically participate in the Netherlands (Kranendonk & Vermeulen, 2019: 634). It even shows one of the highest levels of minority representation of the West. According to Kranendonk & Vermeulen, this is the result of various factors, such as: "a tradition of pillarization, a system wherein secular and religious groups are organized hierarchically in a so-called pillar: a national political party tops the structure and locally affiliated institutions, such as schools and associations, come below" and foreigners' right to vote (ibid). In their 2018 study, they examine how social identification and group networks, and their interactions, affect Moroccan and Turkish immigrants' political participation in the Netherland. Turkish immigrants have greater political participation and vote more often for someone of the same origins, resulting in a better political representation compared to Moroccan immigrants. Another difference between the two migrant groups is the difference in effect among those who are embedded in religious networks. Religious identification has mainly among Turkish migrants a negative effect on all forms of political participation. One possible reason for this effect, according to Kranendonk & Vermeulen (2018) is that being embedded in religious networks and identifying as a Muslim segregates Turkish migrants from mainstream society. Their research was conducted before the emergence of the immigrant-origin party in the Netherlands, DENK. The researchers argue that possibly DENK is successfully attracting this group who previously withdrew from participation in Dutch politics. During the national elections of 2017, DENK managed to gain three seats in parliament. In Amsterdam DENK also managed to gain 3 seats in the city council 2018-2022. The PVV, a political party with mainly Islamophobic rhetoric, doesn't have any seats in the city council contrary to the right-wing populist party FvD who also gained 3 seats in the city council 2018-2022.

During the last Amsterdam municipal elections of 2018, the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) and Research Information and Statistics (OIS) of the municipality of Amsterdam investigated voter turn-out amongst inhabitants of Amsterdam with a migration background (Kranendonk, Michon & Vermeulen, 2018). Their findings show that turn-out is structurally low among Moroccan (24%) and Surinamese inhabitants of Amsterdam (25%) and sharply increased among Turkish inhabitants, from 34% in Amsterdam in 2014 to 48% in 2018. DENK became the big winner and received the most significant support from Turkish and Moroccan inhabitants of Amsterdam. DENK received 49% of the votes among Moroccans and 74% of the votes among the Turkish inhabitants of Amsterdam. For more than 20 years the Labour Party (PvdA) was the largest party amongst inhabitants of Amsterdam with a migration background. Support dropped sharply in 2018 among Turkish and Moroccan inhabitants for the Labour

Party, from 40% in 2014 to 4% and 13% in 2018 respectively. DENK benefited from this loss, and the Green Party (GroenLinks) also performed better among voters with a migration background. DENK received relatively much support among low-educated Turkish inhabitants of Amsterdam. Highly educated voters with a Turkish background have opted significantly more for the Green Party and the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). There were no significant links between the level of education and voting choice among inhabitants with a Moroccan background. DENK received most of the votes in Amsterdam New-West and The North of Amsterdam. The big winner of the city council elections of 2018 was the Green Party with 10 seats.

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