


City Narrative

COLOGNE

Germany

The Contemporary History of Cologne in
the Aftermath of World War II

By **Melanie Weißenberg**, ERC PRIME Youth Project
Researcher, European Institute, İstanbul Bilgi University; and
PhD Candidate in Political Science, İstanbul Bilgi University



DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3888335

“Nativism, Islamophobia and Islamism in the Age of Populism: Culturalisation and Religionisation of what is Social, Economic and Political in Europe”

This research analyses the current political, social, and economic context of the European Union, which is confronted by two substantial crises, namely the global financial crisis and the refugee crisis. These crises have led to the escalation of fear and prejudice among the youth who are specifically vulnerable to discourses that culturalise and stigmatize the “other”. Young people between the ages of 18 to 30, whether native or immigrant-origin, have similar responses to globalization-rooted threats such as deindustrialization, isolation, denial, humiliation, precariousness, insecurity, and anomia. These responses tend to be essentialised in the face of current socio-economic, political and psychological disadvantages. While a number of indigenous young groups are shifting to right-wing populism, a number of Muslim youths are shifting towards Islamic radicalism. The common denominator of these groups is that they are both downwardly mobile and inclined towards radicalization. Hence, this project aims to scrutinize social, economic, political and psychological sources of the processes of radicalization among native European youth and Muslim-origin youth with migration background, who are both inclined to express their discontent through ethnicity, culture, religion, heritage, homogeneity, authenticity, past, gender and patriarchy.

This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme grant agreement no. 785934.

For more information, please visit the project Website:
<https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr>



@BilgiERC



@BilgiERC

Preface

In this research, we argue that local aspects are as important as national and global aspects to understand the root causes of radicalisation, extremism, nationalism, populism, fundamentalism and violence. In this respect, we want to magnify the contemporary history of each city in which we conduct our interviews with both native and Muslim-origin youngsters as far as the processes of deindustrialization, unemployment, poverty, exclusion, alienation and isolation are concerned. Because we claim that radicalisation processes of both groups of youngsters in the European context are likely to result from their local forms of response to the detrimental effects of globalisation. We believe that revealing local socio-economic, political, demographic and ethno-cultural dynamics may help us better understand the current forms of youth radicalisation.

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya
Istanbul Bilgi University
ERC AdG Principal Investigator
ayhan.kaya@bilgi.edu.tr


Table of Contents

1.	Demographic Structure and History of Migration	5
1.1.	Populational changes	6
1.2.	Outgoing Migration	8
1.3.	Incoming Migration	9
2.	Industrialization and Impact on Local Economy	16
2.1.	Main Industries after WWII	16
2.1.	Deindustrialization	19
2.2.	Relative Deprivation in Neighborhoods with Migrant-origin Residents	23
3.	City Politics and Participation	24
3.1.	Discourse on the Construction of the Cologne Central Mosque	25
3.2.	The Right-wing Populist Party Pro Köln	30
3.3.	Public Discourse after the 2015/16 New Year's Eve Events	33
3.4.	Right-wing Nativist Organizations	35
3.5.	Muslim Organizations	36
3.6.	Islamist Organizations and Networks	38
3.1.	Chronology of Issues Pertaining to Radicalization	43
4.	Literature	48

1. Demographic Structure and History of Migration

Cologne's population has been constantly growing, mainly due to international immigration and a birth rate that exceeds the death rate (Figure 1). 40,1 percent of Cologne's population have a migration background. During the end of the 1960s until the mid-1980s, native young wealthy families emigrated to the surrounding areas of Cologne. In 2018 young families likewise, emigrate but this time because they are no longer able to afford the high rents.

Figure 1 The Cologne Districts - Population Density 2017



Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch Köln 2018, p. 15

After the Second World War until the 1980s immigration to Cologne was mainly characterized by groups of formerly evacuated people, displaced people, ethnic German emigrants and refugees from the Soviet occupation zone. After the mid-1950s, international immigrants were mainly


labor migrants and people seeking asylum. After Germany stopped its recruitment agreements with other countries in 1974, international immigration mainly occurred in the course of family reunions and people seeking asylum. In 2016, the number of registered foreign citizens sharply increased due to the refugee crisis. This number declined again in 2018. The same year, one-third of Cologne's immigrants were from EU-countries.

1.1. Populational changes

The number of Cologne's inhabitants – with a comparatively 'young' average age of 42 – has constantly been growing mostly due to a positive migration balance. In addition, the birth rate has been exceeding the death rate since 2005 (Stadt Köln, 2013, 2019; Schäfke, 2017). However, a changing migration trend will most likely also affect Cologne's population growth. The 2018 net migration was almost balanced, most likely because more and more families emigrate to areas around Cologne (Stadt Köln, 2020c).

After World War II, the number of inhabitants dropped to 454,939 people as many former residents were evacuated during the war. It lasted until 1959 that the population of Cologne reached the same number of inhabitants as before the war (773,280 people). The number of Cologne's citizens rose to 847,037 people in 1969 because displaced people, ethnic German immigrants and refugees from the Soviet occupation zone settled in Cologne. Furthermore, formerly evacuated inhabitants returned to the city (Stadt Köln, 1959, p. 12, 2019, p. 11; Schäfke, 2017, pp. 221, 302–309).

Figure 2 Population of Cologne 1945–2015



Sources: Yearbook of Statistics Cologne 2018 (Stadt Köln, 2019, p. 11), Special Evaluation Time Series Inhabitants of Cologne since 1945, Office for Urban Development and Statistics of the City of Cologne (Stadt Köln, 2020g)

Cologne's sharp population increase to over a million inhabitants in 1975 resulted from the Cologne Act that was part of a regional reform in North Rhine-Westphalia¹. Accordingly, the cities of Porz and Wesseling and several communities were incorporated. The population declined again due to the successful lawsuit by the city of *Wesseling* against its incorporation in 1976 (Mattenklodt, 1981; Dietmar and Jung, 2009, p. 159; Stadt Köln, 2019, p. 11).

Mostly because of international immigration Cologne's population rose from a low point of 862,274 inhabitants in

¹ Gesetz zur Neugliederung der Gemeinden und Kreise des Neugliederungsraumes Köln

1985 to 1,000,799 inhabitants in 1991 (Stadt Köln, 2019, p. 11). Official numbers from the municipality include people with secondary residence in Cologne, which is why Cologne celebrated to have become a “real” million inhabitant city in 2010 (Rundschau, 2010; Schäfke, 2017, pp. 304–305).

1.2. Outgoing Migration

Before the aforementioned regional reform in 1975, the number of Cologne’s residents had been decreasing from 850,174 people in 1969 to 829,122 residents in 1974. Cologne’s loss of 50,000 native German inhabitants between 1970 and 1974 was not balanced out by the immigration 30,000 international labor migrants (Stadt Köln, 1974, p. 14). This decline was caused by native residents moving to regions surrounding the city and continued after the regional reform in 1975 until the mid-1980s despite international labor migration. While in 1976, Cologne had 1,017,636 inhabitants the population declined to about roughly 965,274 citizens in 1985. Between 1970 and the mid-1980s, Cologne lost about ten percent of its population to surrounding areas. The emigrants were mostly young wealthy families moving to more spacious apartments.

Another significant out-migration related development occurred in in 2008 during the financial crisis. At that time, the number of emigrating people exceeded the number of people immigrating to the city (Schäfke, 2017, pp. 304–306; Stadt Köln, 2019, p. 11). In the light of a balanced net migration caused by the emigrating families in 2018, other than in the 1970s and 1980s, these families have to leave

Cologne because they are no longer able to afford housing in the city. The Germany-wide rise of rents in urban centers is an outcome of the rising gap between rich and poor and the related Germany-wide process of gentrification that also strongly affects Cologne's urban landscape (Stadt Köln, 2015).²

1.3. Incoming Migration

Cologne's urban society has changed with the immigration of different groups of people. During the first years after the Second World War, evacuated citizens, displaced people, *Übersiedler*innen* from the GDR and *Aussiedler*innen* (immigrants of German descent from former Eastern Bloc countries) fled or moved to Cologne. Displaced persons and refugees from the Soviet occupation zone composed 6 percent of Cologne's population in 1950 and about 16% in 1962. In the mid-1960s, the city administration calculated that about 18 percent of Cologne's population were displaced persons, and refugees from the Soviet zone. After the immigrants belonging to these groups no longer applied for residence permits, the local demand for labor started rising. In the 1960s there were over 7,000 vacancies in Cologne and the demand for unskilled labor continued to grow (Stadt Köln, 1959, p. 12, 2019, p. 11; Schäfke, 2017, pp. 302–305, 501).

These shortages of labor were addressed with the recruitment of foreign workers. After ratifying the first labor recruitment agreement with Italy in 1955, Germany

² Empirical information on the process of gentrification in Cologne see Friedrichs and Blasius, 2016

signed recruitment agreements with seven other countries until 1968: Greece, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. The agreement with Turkey was signed in 1961. The agreement with Morocco was ratified two years later (Martin, 1991, p. 63, 2002, pp. 7, 34). Accordingly, international migration to Cologne after 1955 was mainly characterized by labor migration. In addition to that, incoming migrants were also refugees who came in great numbers until 1995, and again after 2015 (Schäfer, 2017, pp. 303, 308–309). Germany's recession in 1974 that was caused by the oil crisis marked the end of Germany's labor recruitment agreements with non-EC countries in 1973.

Figures about Cologne's labor migrants exist since 1961. Among the roughly 20,000 workers, 40 percent are from Italy, 10 percent from Greece and another 10 percent from Spain. Turkish citizens appear in the statistics for the first time in 1962, rising from 2,000 individuals at that time to 20,000 people in 1972. In 1972, Turkish immigrants constituted one-third of the 60,000 foreign workers in Cologne. By 1972 more than 10,000 family members from Turkey have joined their working relatives (Schäfer, 2017, p. 310). International migrants enter contemporary statistics as 'foreigners' since 1963. In 1963, 38,603 people are registered as 'foreigners', reaching 52,410 people in 1966 (Stadt Köln, 2020g).


Hardly affected by the regional reform, the number of foreign citizens living in Cologne continued to rise³, reaching more than 100,000 people in 1974. The number of migrants was reaching more than 150,000 people in 1981. Paralleled by decreasing numbers of native residents, the number of foreign residents also declined to 135,560 people in 1985. After 1985, the number of Cologne's foreign residents has steadily been rising.

In 2012, Cologne had 180,415 residents with foreign citizenship. Due to the refugee crisis, the number of registered foreign citizens sharply increased to 208,403 people in 2016 (Stadt Köln, 2020g). According to the Migration Report of 2018, the number of asylum applications has decreased significantly, while the number of immigrants from the EU has been rising. More than half of Germany's immigrants are from EU countries. Another significant change is the rising in the number of international students at German universities (BMI, 2020, pp. 4–5; Die Bundesregierung, 2020). These developments have also altered the population of Cologne. While the majority of incoming people in 2015 were refugees, one-third of Cologne's immigrants were from EU-countries in 2018 (Stadt Köln, 2016, p. 9). The change to almost balanced net migration in 2018 not only occurred because of emigration as the proportion of immigrating people, including international migrants, has dropped as well (-1700) (Stadt Köln, 2020c).

³ The number of foreign citizens dropped from 115,339 people in 1975 to 114,914 people in 1976.

Since 2005 there has been a change in the registration of Cologne's international citizens. Foreign citizens are now included in the new category of "migration background", a category which includes German citizens who are descendants of immigrants (including individuals who naturalized). Furthermore, non-German citizens of the first, second and third generations (designated as foreigners) and *Aussiedler*innen* (ethnic German immigrants) are included in this category.

Figure 3 Cologne's Population with Migration Background and Foreign Citizenship




Source: Special Evaluation Time Series Inhabitants of Cologne since 1945, Office for Urban Development and Statistics of the City of Cologne (Stadt Köln, 2020g)

The proportion of Cologne's population with a migration background is comparatively high. It has been continuously rising except in 2008, the year of the financial crisis when

Cologne's total population dropped as well (see Figure 2 and 3). In 2019, people with migration background constituted 40,1 percent of Cologne's population in comparison to 35,1 percent in 2017, and 31 percent in 2005 (Stadt Köln, 2019, p. 41, 2020g).

Figure 4 Cologne's Population with Migration Background and Turkey-origin



Source: Own calculations based on Special Evaluation: Time Series - Turkey-origin and Morocco-origin citizens of Cologne with and without German Citizenship 2005-2019 (Stadt Köln, 2020e), Special Evaluation Time Series - Inhabitants of Cologne since 1945 (2020c)

Figure 4 shows that Cologne's population of Turkey-origin remains almost constant. In 2019, Cologne had 4463 more residents of Turkey-origin than in 2005. In 2019 people of Turkey-origin present 8,54 percent of Cologne's total population (Köln, 2020b, 2020a; see also Figure 4). Due to a changed citizenship law of 2000, according to which citizenship rights are based on the country of birth, the


number of German citizens of Turkey-origin significantly rose from 23,246 people in 2005 to 40,863 people in 2019, while the proportion of Turkish citizens has been decreasing more slowly with 65,509 Turkish citizens in 2005 and 52,355 Turkish citizens in 2019 (Stadt Köln, 2020e).

In the light of an increasing number of residents with a migration background, the proportion of Turkey-origin migrants among Cologne's population with migration background significantly dropped from 28 percent in 2005, to about 21,3 percent in 2019. This can be understood as caused by the rising numbers of incoming refugees, especially during 2015 and 2016.

In 2018, Morocco origin citizens⁴ represented – regardless of citizenship – a very small part of the total population Cologne with 0,71 percent. This percentage has risen from 0,44 percent in 2005 (own calculations based on Köln, 2020b, 2020a).

⁴ In 2004 and before that, more than half of Morocco-origin migrants live in North Rhine-Westphalia, mainly in Düsseldorf and the Ruhr area. Another area where many Morocco-origin Migrants live is Hesse (Kagermeier, 2004; Didero and Pfaffenbach, 2013, p. 370).

Figure 5 Cologne's Population with Morocco-origin



Source: Own Calculations based on Special Evaluation: Time Series - Turkey-origin and Morocco-origin citizens of Cologne with and without German Citizenship 2005-2019 (Stadt Köln, 2020e), Special Evaluation Time Series - Inhabitants of Cologne since 1945 (2020c)

There are no neighborhoods in Cologne with a high proportion of Morocco-origin inhabitants. Some shops serving Morocco-origin customers can be found in the Taunus street in the district of Kalk, the neighborhood where most Morocco-origin people live (Didero and Pfaffenbach, 2013, p. 380). In comparison to people with Turkey-origin, the tendency to naturalize and to give up Moroccan citizenship is higher among Morocco-origin people.

2. Industrialization and Impact on Local Economy

Cologne's most important industry is vehicle construction. The enterprise Ford is the city's largest employer. Other important industries are the chemical industry, machine and mechanical engineering and the food industry. The number of workers employed in the industrial sector started decreasing in the 1970s. In particular, during the mid-1980s the manufacturing sector cut 63,000 jobs. People no longer working in production increasingly entered jobs in the service sector. However, the service sector was not able to cover the loss of jobs in manufacturing. Among 70-80 percent of labor migrants have been working in the productions sector.

The most disadvantaged districts of Cologne (Chorweiler, Kalk and Mülheim) in terms of income, unemployment rates and dependence on social welfare at the same time have a comparatively high proportion of residents with migration background.

2.1. Main Industries after WWII

Cologne was a late starter in the industrial revolution. Industries mainly settled in the rural areas around Cologne. Only by the end of the 19th century when neighboring towns were incorporated Cologne became an industrial center.⁵

⁵ For a short overview on Cologne's industrial history see Giebler and Buschmann, 202; for an overview of Cologne's modern economic and industrial history see Buschmann, Hennies and Kierdorf, 2018; Doppelfeld, Kellenbenz and van Eyll, 1975; Hillen *et al.*, 2013

The city was almost entirely destroyed during the Second World War. Therefore, it lasted a couple of years to rebuild the city. After the monetary reform in 1948, the economic boom often referred to as “Economic Miracle” (*Wirtschaftswunder*) started showing an impact on the growth of Cologne’s industrial sector. The local economy especially boomed during the 1950s and the 1960s. While nearly three fourth of apartment buildings were destroyed, the majority of the 204 industrial companies did not suffer from severe damage. Stored outside Cologne means of production had been protected (Dietmar and Jung, 2009, pp. 156–157; Schäfke, 2017, pp. 481–495).

Cologne is a center of vehicle construction, chemical industry, machine and mechanical engineering and food industry (IHK Köln, 2014, p. 13; Stadt Köln, 2020b). Vehicle construction is by far the most important industrial sector in Cologne. With around 18,400 employees; Ford is the main employer in the automotive sector and the largest employer in the region of Cologne today (IHK Köln, 2017). Ford employs 45 percent of Cologne’s industry workers (Stadt Köln, 2020a, p. 13). Furthermore, Citroën, Toyota and Peugeot also have their headquarters in Cologne (Stadt Köln, 2020b).

In 1929, Ford moved its headquarters from Berlin to Cologne, where it had built a new plant next to the Rhine in Cologne’s northern neighborhood *Niehl* (Dietmar and Jung, 2009, p. 139; GmbH, 2011). Since less than ten percent of Ford’s plants were destroyed during the Second World War, the enterprise could quickly resume production (Klekamp,

1980, p. 121,123). After the War, Ford expanded its infrastructure (Huyer, 2007, p. 228). In 1973, two-third of Ford's 34,000 employees in the plant in Niehl, were non-German citizens. The international wagedworkers constituted part of the lower wage classes. The 12,000 wagedworkers of Turkish descent working for Ford were the largest closed group of Turkish workers in the Federal Republic of Germany (Foerster, 2015, pp. 252–253). This means that more than half the Turkish working population in Cologne worked for Ford (own calculations based on Köln, 2020c).

Mechanical engineering has a long tradition in Cologne. Today, the mechanical engineering sector employs around 15,471 people who predominantly work in medium-sized companies. The metal manufacturing industry employed 12,466 people in 2013 (IHK Köln, 2014, p. 13; Stadt Köln, 2020a, p. 13).

The urban development plan designated *Porz* as a settlement location for medium-sized commercial enterprises. Cologne became the destination for predecessors of the *Deutz AG*, a company for mechanical engineering specialized in manufacturing internal combustion engines. Later other factories in metalworking followed (Libor-Dörstel, 2001, pp. 39–41; Stadt Köln, 2020b). The *Deutz AG* was also one of the largest commercial vehicle manufacturers in Germany between the 1950s and the 1970s producing trucks and buses (Winternitz, 2017). Besides the *Deutz AG*, important companies of mechanical engineering include the *Leybold*

GmbH, the *Alfred H. Schütte GmbH & Co. KG*, and *Atlas Copco Energas GmbH* (Stadt Köln, 2020a, p. 13).

Like other industries the chemical industry in Cologne and the surrounding area largely developed during the 19th and 20th century (Hillen *et al.*, 2013, pp. 139–174; Rheinische Industriekultur, 2020). During the 1950s and 1960s industrial development in Cologne was characterized by the large-scale establishment of chemical and petrochemical industries in the northern and southern peripheries at the city's boundaries next to the *Rhine* river. *Shell* established a refinery in *Godorf*, a district in the south of Cologne. Additional large industrial settlements existed in *Worringen*, owned by *Erdölchemie GmbH* (Petrochemistry Inc.). During this period the company *Esso* located its refinery in the north of Cologne. An industrial park was established near *Ossendorf*, hosting 300 enterprises today (Libor-Dörstel, 2001, p. 39). The *Chemical Factory Kalk* was the predecessor of chemical factories that were later established in *Kalk* and *Deutz* (Libor-Dörstel, 2001, pp. 39–41). In 2013, 20,051 people worked in the chemical industry. Main employers today are the *Lanxess AG* and *Ineos Cologne GmbH*. Their production sites are located between *Leverkusen* and the *Rhine-Erft* district. The *Rhineland Refinery of Shell*, today the largest of shell's refineries, is located in *Godorf* and the neighboring city *Wesseling* (IHK Köln, 2017; Stadt Köln, 2020a, p. 13).

2.1. Deindustrialization

In the aftermath of the Second World War until the early 1970s industrial economic development was characterized

by continuous growth. However, global transformations of the economy after the 1970s resulted in a decreased share of the manufacturing industry in economic output. Although production volumes have not decreased the number of people employed in producing sectors and their share of total economic output has been decreasing since the 1970s. In Cologne, a downward trend in industrial employment started between 1970 and 1982 while the number of people employed in the service sector and their share in total economic output started increasing. This has led to the creation of numerous new job profiles and new companies. Structural transformations of the labor market continued from the mid-1980s onwards. In the mid-1980s, the manufacturing sector of Cologne suffered a loss of 63,000 jobs while there was an increase of 33,000 jobs in the service sector. The share of 160,000 jobs in the manufacturing sector in 1980 dropped to 77,975 jobs in 2007. The emerging service sector included insurances, credit institutions and personal services and media companies providing 365,693 jobs in 2007 in comparison to 259,000 jobs in the 1980s. This significant decline of employment in the manufacturing industry particularly affected the mentioned industrial sectors of mechanical engineering, vehicle construction, steel construction and the chemical industry. The increased employment in service industries could not balance out this trend. Over the years between 80 to 70 percent of Cologne's labor migrants have worked in manufacturing jobs (Libor-Dörstel, 2001, pp. 39–40; Dietmar and Jung, 2009, p. 160; Schäfke, 2017, pp. 505–506). Even traditional industrial enterprises such as the Chemical Factory Kalk (1993) and the shrinking of company

Kölckner-Humboldt-Deutz (1987) to Deutz AG resulting in high unemployment (Dietmar and Jung, 2009, p. 161).

Figure 6 Turkish Labor Migrants' Strike at Ford in 1973



Source 1 Picture: Gernot Huber, Cologne/Historical Archive of the City of Cologne (in DOMiT e.V., 2001, p. 41)

Antecedents of the economic crisis and a trend towards deindustrialization also affected the work situation and unemployment of Turkish labor migrants in Cologne as the German automotive industry, in particular, was hit by the weakness of economic growth. In August 1973, the workers of the Ford plant in Cologne Niehl went on strike⁶ after the general management decided to fire 500 Turkish workers who returned late from the summer holidays. Exposed to

⁶ For a detailed account of the strike see Huwer, 2013

bad working conditions, such as high speed and noise of assembly lines, heat, and few breaks, Turkish workers were disadvantaged in comparison to their German colleagues. In comparison to their German colleagues who earned between 8.98 and 10.59 German Marks, most workers from Turkey only earned between 7.15 and 8.24 German Marks. After only the demands of German workers were met, Turkish workers⁷ continued to strike while German workers went back to work. German workers did not solidarize with the Turkish workers; some were even in favor of the layoffs. After confrontations between German and Turkish workers the police and plant security violently interrupted the strike and arrested the organizers of the strike. Hundreds of Turkish workers were dismissed or left by choice (Huwer, 2007, pp. 237–240, 2013; Çınar, 2011, p. 95; Foerster, 2015, pp. 254–255, 263).

In 2000, the majority of people registered as ‘foreigners’ work in the service industry (59 percent) while the share of ‘foreigners’ working in the manufacturing industry constitutes 36,8 percent. This trend continues. In 2011, 27,5 percent of ‘foreigners’ work in the manufacturing industry, while 67,3 percent work in the service sector (Stadt Köln, 2012, p. 136).

⁷ The group of strikers was very heterogeneous including Turkish socialists, seculars, pious Muslims, Turks and Kurds (Huwer, 2007, p. 239)

2.2. Relative Deprivation in Neighborhoods with Migrant-origin Residents

The proportion of people with migration background varies from district to district. In 2017, only 32,34 and 24,75 percent of the population in the districts of *Rodenkirchen* and *Lindenthal* have a migration background (Köln, 2019, pp. 39, 47; for the different districts see figure 1). Therefore, is not astonishing that the Turkey and Morocco-origin population's proportion is much lower in Rodenkirchen (0,52%/4,76%) and Lindenthal (0,3%/2,47%) (own calculations based on Köln, 2019, p. 39; Stadt Köln, 2020b).

The percentage of the population with migration background is much higher in the districts of *Chorweiler* (41,2%), *Kalk* (64,3%) and *Mülheim* (63,3%) (Köln, 2019, p. 47; for the different districts see figure 1). All these districts are also located close to the industrial areas. The dormitories labor migrants initially settled in – often under adverse circumstances – were located in the center of Cologne and the north. The dormitories of Ford were mostly located in Mülheim and Nippes (DOMiT e.V., 2001, p. 22).

The highest proportion of people with of Morocco- and Turkey-origin can be found in the districts Mülheim and in Kalk. Other significant neighborhoods for citizens with Turkey-origin are Nippes, Chorweiler and Ehrenfeld (Stadt Köln, 2020f). In 2017, 12,4 percent of Mülheim's total population, and 29,5 percent of the total immigrant population in Mülheim were Turkey-origin migrants or postmigrants. Meanwhile, Morocco-origin people

constitute nearly 1% of the total population and 2,29% of the immigrant population in Mülheim. In Kalk, nearly 14 percent of the total population and 26,4 percent of the immigrant population are from Turkey or descendants of immigrants from Turkey. 1,6 percent of Kalk's citizens and are 3 percent of Kalk's immigrant citizens are of Morocco-origin (own calculations based on: Köln, 2019, p. 39, 47; Stadt Köln, 2020b).

Statistics for 2017 substantiate a structural trend: neighborhoods with a high proportion of people with migration background are socially more disadvantaged and more likely to suffer from poverty. Unemployment rates⁸ and the share of people depending on social welfare and means of social subsistence is higher in Chorweiler, Kalk⁹ and Mülheim in comparison to other districts in Cologne. In addition, the share of more vulnerable groups, receiving social welfare and means of subsistence (for example single parents, children and elderly) is comparatively high in Chorweiler, Kalk and Mülheim (Stadt Köln, 2019, pp. 82, 86, 92, 94, 109).

3. City Politics and Participation

Changes in the governing body of Cologne's municipality during the 2000s occurred with the rise of the populist party *pro Köln* and need to be contextualized with the

⁸ The unemployment rates of Chorweiler (8,9%), Kalk (12,2%) and Mülheim (10,8%) are higher than in Rodenkirchen (5,9%) and Lindenthal (3,9%).

⁹ For a detailed account of poverty in two neighborhoods in Kalk see Blasius, Friedrichs and Symann, 2007

construction plans and eventual construction of Cologne's central mosque. The initiation of the construction of a representative mosque in 2009 was preceded by an Islamophobic discourse that reached the middle of society. The rise of the right-wing populist party pro Köln and a racist discourse about Muslim immigrants and their descendants initiated and exploited and the discussion about the construction of the mosque. Another right-wing discourse revolved around the sexualized assaults against women during New Year's Eve 2015/2016 that had not only a major impact on refugee policies and but also on gendered resentments against Muslim people and refugees.

A chronology starting in 2000 contextualizes events and violence connected to radicalized Islamists, right-wing populists and right-wing radicals is followed by an overview on Islamophobic right-wing nativist organizations and by Islamist and other radical organizations.

To understand the way Islam is organized in Cologne, the German capital of Islam, the last section gives an overview of the existing Muslim organizations.

3.1. Discourse on the Construction of the Cologne Central Mosque

The discussion around the construction of the Cologne Central Mosque in Cologne needs to be contextualized with Germany-wide and western discussions about Islam-related symbols. After the September 11 attacks in 2001, the train bombings in Madrid in March 2007 and the suicide

bombings in London in July 2005, Muslims have become “a shared ‘security’ concern for Western governments” and been made the object of securitization policies (Humphrey, 2009, pp. 136, 138). Not only have the different groups of Muslims been homogenized into one monolithic crowd. Even if born and raised in Germany, since the label Muslim has served to for a civilizational us-them discourse in which migrants categorized as Muslims are repeatedly represented along gendered paradigms of difference.

After long-lasting discussions about a mosque for all Muslims, the institution responsible for building the mosque, DİTİB (*Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği*) selected a heterogeneous jury¹⁰ which appointed the architects Gottfried and Paul Böhm as winners of the architecture competition for building the mosque in Cologne. The mosque is – other than most mosques in Cologne – located in the center in Ehrenfeld and presents a visible example of architecture in Cologne’s urban landscape.

After the initial construction plans had been changed to a larger architectonic plan due to regulations in line with obtaining a construction permit the local committee of the CDU in Ehrenfeld blocked the construction plan. Therefore, the plan was not passed by the municipality. In addition to that, the right-wing extremist party *pro Köln* became active in 2002 and 2007 by collecting signatures for so-called “citizens’ initiatives” against the construction of the mosque. Due to many invalid signatures, the 2007 initiative

¹⁰ The jury was for the most part Non-Muslim including church leaders, politicians and important public figures (Gerrens, 2013, p. 337)

failed (Killguss, Peters and Häusler, 2008, p. 64; Gerrens, 2013, p. 337). The mentioned “Neighborhood Initiative against the Central Mosque” however, was not only employing pro Köln’s right-wing populist propaganda and successfully managed to attract broad sections of the population. The initiative also managed to put pressure on established politics. Contrary to the CDU major Schramma, the CDU’s local committee in Ehrenfeld openly supported the “neighborhood initiative” of 2007 (Bozay, 2008, p. 202; Killguss, Peters and Häusler, 2008, p. 68).

This seemingly polarized debate was fueled and triggered by the local newspaper *Kölner Stadtanzeiger* that was responsible for making the construction of the mosque as a political issue. While advocates for the mosque’s construction had a say, opponents were given more space (Gerrens, 2013, pp. 340–341). Andreas Lindner’s discourse analysis reveals that although adopting a critical attitude towards pro Köln, the newspaper made itself “an advocate of the diffuse fears and racist resentments by the ‘ordinary population against the majority of democratic parties” (Lindner, 2008, p. 214). The newspaper gave much space to criticizing “Islam” in general, and DiTiB was extensively criticized under often under reference to Islamism (Ibid). Accordingly, the Islamophobic statements by Ralph Giordano, a prestigious elite intellectual were published by the *Kölner Stadtanzeiger* and circulated widely. Bozay notes that the fact that his statements gained so much attention shows that repetitive public debates about headscarves, integration and delinquency among migrants have also left a mark in elite circles (Bozay, 2008, pp. 205–206).

According to a survey conducted by the newspaper *Kölner Stadtanzeiger* in 2007, 35,6 percent of the citizens were in favor of the construction, 27,1 percent wanted a design with a smaller building and smaller minarets, and 31,4 percent were against the construction of the mosque (Frank, 2007).

Municipal and local political discussions the CDU moved between pro Köln's right-wing populist views and the consensus among the other parties within the municipality, that supported the construction plan (Bozay, 2008, pp. 203–204). However, the established parties in the municipality were successful in ignoring some of the CDU's representatives' drift to the right-wing and the emergence of pro Köln. A 'lacking debating culture' regarding the rise of pro Köln in the municipality was paralleled with lacking communication to the public by the builder DiTIB and Cologne's civil society unions and integration policy bodies. Killguss, Peters and Häusler note that "preventive, public-oriented and professionally accompanied debate on mosque construction projects, in which fears in the citizenry are taken seriously, and prejudices are reduced through open debate and the initiation of intercultural and interreligious exchange" could have prevented this form of right-wing populism (2008, p. 64). While some of the opponents identified with pro Köln, the moderating voice of Navid Kermani underlined that peoples' "concrete" objections mostly revolved around "traffic routing, the many one-euro-shops on the shopping street of Ehrenfeld, construction noise and the far too scarce information by the

builder, the height of the minaret, but not the minaret itself” (Quoted in Gerrens, 2013, p. 339).

After discussions in the municipality, the architectonic design was revised in line with “more symbolic” minarets in order to counter the impression that the mosque would “represent a demonstration of political or religious power”. Additional demands were to hold sermons, courses, and youth events in German language¹¹. DiTİB was asked to and renounce the call for prayer by the muezzin and the display of the Turkish flag (Gerrens, 2013, p. 343).

Finally, in 2009, the previous mayor Fritz Schramma – who was always an advocate for the project and the mayor in office at that time - lay the foundation stone. After new personnel was appointed in DiTİB discussions the architect Paul Böhm and the construction company were dismissed, and the construction was stopped (Gerrens, 2013, p. 344; Schäfke, 2017, pp. 314–315). Finally, in September 2018, the mosque was inaugurated by president Erdoğan. Due to political tensions between DiTİB, Diyanet and the German government, representatives of the city council, the mayor and the architect Paul Böhm did not participate in the inauguration (Dpaö, AFPö and Jul, 2018).

¹¹ In addition, DiTİB was asked to demonstrate its dedication for equal rights for men and women and joint participation of boys and girls in sports and swimming lessons (Gerrens, 2013, p. 343). The stereotypical assumptions about generalization of Islam as propagating unequal gender relations in these demands cannot be discussed here.

3.2. The Right-wing Populist Party Pro Köln

The first right-wing populist party that was gaining momentum in Cologne was the so-called “citizens’ movement” (*Bürgerbewegung*) pro Köln. Established in 1996, pro Köln emerged from the *DLVH*, the German League for the People and the Homeland (*Deutsche Liga für Volk und Heimat*). Several top officials of pro Köln came from the *DLVH*. The *DLVH* was an extreme right-wing party (with functionaries formerly active in the parties of the *NPD* and the *Republicans*) whose members became known for racist agitation against Sinti and Roma people. The *DLVH* cooperated with extreme right-wing groups from Belgium, the Netherlands and France. In 1992 they organized a meeting on “Foreigners and Asylum-related Problems” in a Hotel in Cologne together with those groups.¹² Pro Köln’s later cooperation with *Vlaams Belang* at that time the *Vlaams Blok* can be traced back to these times. Some members of the *DLVH* had close ties to the militant Neo-Nazi scene. In 1996 the *DLVH* dissolved and continued to organize as the association “Citizens’ movement pro Köln” (*Jugendclub Courage Köln e.V.*, 2008; Killguss, Peters and Häusler, 2008, pp. 55–57).

Pro Köln had numerous local branches and attempted to win the middle of society with a right-wing populist political style by representing itself as “non-compliant, politically

¹² Some members of the Solingen martial arts school *HAK-PAO* attended the meeting as hall bodyguards. Two of the assassins involved in the arson attack on a Turkish family in Solingen in 1993, in which five people died had trained in *HAK-PAO* (Killguss, Peters and Häusler, 2008, p. 56).

incorrect” party from the right-wing feeding from role-models, for example, the Austrian FPÖ (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*) (Killguss, Peters and Häusler, 2008, p. 57).

With the help of their appearance in the local parliaments, they aspired and managed to become a politically effective force. In the 2004 local elections of Cologne, they received the votes of more than 16,000 people. In the local elections of 2009, Pro Köln even received 5,36% of the votes (Killguss, Peters and Häusler, 2008, p. 64; Stadt Köln, 2020d). Basis of the election campaign was the politicization of the construction of Cologne’s central mosque (see above). Verbally, Pro Köln distanced itself from the extreme disguising itself as a “citizens’ movement” and “advocate of the little man” against the local establishment. Behind this, however, lies racism and the exclusion of social minorities. It was representing itself as ‘conservative’ the party, in fact, collaborated with neo-Nazis and right-wing extremists (Jugendclub Courage Köln e.V., 2008; Killguss, Peters and Häusler, 2008, pp. 60–64). With the export models of *Pro NRW* and *Pro Deutschland* the party attempted to establish itself in North-Rhine-Westphalia and throughout Germany. Central feature of their right-wing populism was a “campaign-oriented racism” disguised as “citizens’ movement” (Häusler, 2017, p. 63). In addition to petitions and demonstrations against the construction of the mosque, pro Köln also organized several street demonstrations and ‘pickets’ between 2003 and 2007, including anti-Ziganistic, anti-Semitic demonstrations and demonstrations against prostitution and drugs. Pro Köln did not succeed in attracting residents as demonstrators but

instead relied on supporters by the NPD and members of the neo-Nazi scene (Killguss, Peters and Häusler, 2008, pp. 59–64; Sager and Peters, 2008, pp. 123–124). The number of participants in demonstrations pro Köln organized during the last decade never exceeded 200 people.¹³ Shortly after the events of New Year’s eve in 2015 (see below) pro Köln organized a demonstration under the name *“Cologne and Germany are watching out: rapefugees not welcome”* (50 participants). The same year in July pro NRW and the Identitarian Movement against a demonstration of supporters of Erdoğan who at that time was Turkish prime minister. 330 members of the extreme right participated and the demonstration is dissolved by the police.

Although the Pro-movement has not had electoral success outside of Cologne they succeeded in establishing a discursive change by pushing debates about Islam and integration to the extreme political right (Häusler, 2017, p. 63). One of Pro Köln’s main strategies was the attempt to connect topics that are discussed in the public space, introduce extreme right positions into debates in society. The main topics of pro Köln have been Islam, Islamism and immigration. Pro Köln has instrumentalized the construction of Cologne’s central mosque for a campaign against Islam and Muslims and spread anti-Muslim racist rhetoric. Another topic has been the criminalization of

¹³ In May 2011 the “pro movement” organized a “march for Freedom”, a campaign against the leftist cultural center “Autonomes Zentrum” (200 participants). In 2014, pro NRW organized the demonstration “Freedom instead of Islam” (150 participants). Members of HoGeSa networks and the extreme right-wing participated (ibs, 2020).

immigrants. Pro Köln has constructed a cause-effect relationship between ethnic descent and crime and introduced right-wing positions into the public discussion about violent crime in of Colognes suburbs (Jugendclub Courage Köln e.V., 2008; Killguss, Peters and Häusler, 2008, pp. 62–63).

During the last municipal elections in 2014, pro Köln only won 2,59 percent of the votes. Pro Köln only had two seats in the city council and lost the rights connected to the status of a fraction. After internal quarrels with pro NRW, pro Köln dissolved itself in 2018 (ibs, 2020).

3.3. Public Discourse after the 2015/16 New Year’s Eve Events

Cologne became famous for the events of sexualized violence at the Cologne central station during New Year’s Eve 2015/16. The representation of the events and the public debate that followed had major political impacts. The allegedly “north African” and “Arabic looking” perpetrators and the deeds they were accused of dominated the headlines of the media for months (Kesinkılıç, 2018, pp. 63–65). While the implementation of a legal reform on governing sexual offenses as unlawful lasted eleven months, asylum and integration related debates and policies shifted very quickly away from a *refugees welcome* and *we can do it*-stance towards a policies of border closing policies. Right-wing populists around the globe used the sexual offenses on New Year’s Eve to fuel gendered resentment against Muslim refugees and bring tighter asylum and deportation policies on the political agenda

(Keskinkılıç, 2018, p. 62; Glaeser, 2019, p. 285). Keskinkılıç (2019, p. 65) states that “The prophecy of a sexual danger emanating from Muslim men seemed to have been fulfilled” as media instrumentalized the event to construct a homogenized group of male Muslim refugees to which sexism and violence could be attributed.

Similar as in the debate about the construction of the mosque, anti-Muslim propaganda circulated in the ‘middle’ of society. To promote her Islamophobic book, the famous Cologne-based feminist Alice Schwarzer was invited to political TV-talk shows (Herzog, 2016, p. 244). In her book “The shock - The New Year's Eve Night in Cologne”, Alice Schwarzer (2016) gave a platform to prominent voices somewhere between critical towards Islam and Islamophobic.

Dietze (2016), Glaeser (2019) and Keskinkılıç (2019) show how the event was exploited by right wing populists and media to construct the white German emancipated and enlightened woman as the only victims targeted by gendered violence of this particular group. Not only constructing a nationalist self-image along orientalist and racist paradigms of difference, but the debate has also overlooked intersectional violence against women of color and neglected the existence of the initiative like “Syrians against Sexism”.

3.4. Right-wing Nativist Organizations

AfD – The AfD was supported by 3,6 percent of the votes in the municipal elections of 2014 and has three representatives in the city council (ibs, 2020).

NPD and REP – The *NPD* (Nationalist Democratic Party Germany) and *Republicans* (REP for *Republikaner*) have managed to send one representative into a district department in 2004. However, both extreme-right wing parties have traditionally been rather weak in North Rhine-Westphalia (Jugendclub Courage Köln e.V., 2008; ibs, 2020).

The Neo-Nazi Scene – Activities by members of Cologne’s neo-Nazi scene mostly depend on single leading figures and regional networks. After 24 persons were held in custody in 2012 and the network “comradeship Walter Spangenberg” was prohibited by the minister of interior in the same year network was weakened (ibs, 2020).

HoGeSa – Hooligans gegen Salafisten (short form: HoGeSa) is a nationwide action group, mainly from the hooligan scene “against Salafism”. The group, which until then had been operating mainly on the internet, organized the violent street demonstration in October 2014 (see above; ibs, 2020).

KÖGIDA – KÖGIDA (Cologne against the Islamization of the Occident) was an offshoot of *PEGIDA* in Cologne. The first march in Cologne on January 5, 2015, was cancelled due to counter protests. Another attempt to reactivate KÖGIDA in May 2015, with only eleven participants failed (ibs, 2020).

Identitarian Movement – The Identitarian Movement (*Identitäre Bewegung*) is an organization with not more than a dozen supporters in Cologne, mostly organizing propaganda activities, mainly with pyrotechnics and banners (ibs, 2020).

“Escort Cologne”/ “International Center of Cologne” – A network of openly right-wing hooligans, rockers, neo-Nazis and people from the scene of doorkeepers and the fan scene of the football club *1. FC Köln* has been holding rallies in Cologne's city center since in 2018 and 2019 sometimes accompanied by assaults. The members of the group see themselves as a kind of “militia” (*Bürgerwehr*).

ATİB – Cologne is the center of supporters of right-wing Turkish nationalists. The nationalist party *MHP* is also known as Grey Wolves is organized as *ATİB* (Union of Turkish-Islamic Cultural Centers in Europe) with 100 member associations (Bozay, 2008, pp. 207–208; Lemmen, 2017, p. 317).

3.5. Muslim Organizations

Contrary to a unified representation in public, Islam is very heterogeneous. This is reflected in the variety of Muslim organizations in Cologne. Cologne is the ‘capital’ of Muslim organizations (Bozay, 2008, p. 208). All of them were founded with the immigration of labor migrants, and most of them represent a form of Sunni Islam. Some organizations are involved in politics, for example, because of ties to the state or political movements active in the

countries labor migrants originated from. Those organizations not only transform over time. It should also be underlined that of Muslim umbrella organizations' political infrastructures that are subject to change can never represent all the different congregations organized hereunder.

DİTİB – With approximately 900 member associations, *DİTİB* is the most significant organization and the largest Muslim organization in Germany. “Moderate” Islam in Turkey is controlled by the Turkish state authority for religion, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, short *Diyanet*). As a centralized state institution, *Diyanet* reports to the prime ministry and manages all religious affairs in Turkey from clerics to weekly sermons and religious education. *Diyanet* is furthermore in charge of the construction of mosques (Kiefer, 2008, p. 176). This is important for understanding that the 1985 founded organization *DİTİB* (*Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği*) is not a religious community and civilian body. Despite its organization as a civil association in Germany, *DİTİB* is in fact answering to the ministry of religion in Ankara and to the authority for religious affairs in the Turkish embassy in Berlin (Bozay, 2008, p. 208). Since *DİTİB* represented a liberal and controlled form of Islam in Turkey, the institution was chosen by the German state and local authorities as contact partner (Kiefer, 2008, p. 176).

IGMG e.V. – The second largest Muslim organization in Germany is the Islamic Community *Milli Görüş e.V.* (323 congregations). *Milli Görüş* has been active in Germany

since the 1970s. The organization's program has been oriented in line with the political convictions of the Turkish politician Necmettin Erbakan, who founded the Islamist *Saadet Partisi* and has led the party in Turkey under changing names. Federal intelligence agencies have observed the IGMG due to its connections to political movement around Necmettin Erbakan. Besides vague Islamist goals, some of Germany based members have anti-Semitic tendencies in line with Erbakan's ideology (Kiefer, 2008, p. 178; Lemmen, 2017, p. 53).

Brotherhoods – The most important organizations are the *Süleymanci* brotherhood under the Name of VIKZ (Association of Islamic Cultural Centers) including roughly 300 congregations and the *Nurcu* brotherhood under the Name of *Jama'at un Nur e.V.* Both brotherhoods are forbidden in Turkey (Lemmen, 2017, p. 53).

Roughly 100 Alevi associations are organized under the roof of the *AABF e.V.* (Alevi Community Germany). These organizations were mostly founded in the 1970s and 1980s (Ibid).

3.6. Islamist Organizations and Networks

Salafism – Since hubs of Salafist organizations and networks are active in cities next to Cologne and have attempted to recruit followers in Cologne's public sphere, they are included in the review. In November 2018 there are between 850 and 1000 mosque associations in North Rhine-Westphalia. Of these, about 70 are classified as extremist-Salafist by the intelligence agency of North Rhine-

Westphalia (Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2020, p. 27). Among the Muslim followers of the extremist Salafist scene the share of those who before joining the scene had little or no Islamic religious affiliation exceeds by far the proportion of those who were already strictly religious Muslims (Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2020, p. 16). As a federal state with many urban centers and one-third of Germany's Muslim residents, North Rhine-Westphalia is strongly affected by Salafist mobilization attempts. Extremist Salafist scenes form a basis from which individuals and groups continue to radicalize. The number of known followers of extremist Salafist scenes in NRW rose from 1,500 people in 2013 to 3,100 people in October 2019. Recently, more than ever before, jihadist propaganda has addressed and successfully reached people at a younger age (Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2020, p. 6).

Koran distribution Campaigns – The organization “The True Religion” was led by the Islamist Ibrahim Abou Nagie who lives in Cologne. The organization became known through the “Lies!” (Read) campaign launched in 2011. Members of the initiative distributed German Koran translations in German city centers. The association of “The True Religion” was prohibited in 2016. The distribution of the Koran for free is not a problem in itself. However, those and similar campaigns are used for missionary activities (“Da'wa work”) for recruiting new followers. In their missionary activities, the organization has actively promoted the Salafist ideology and successfully addressed and attracted young people and youth groups. Several individuals associated with “The True

Religion” propagate the legitimization of Jihadism (Bozay, 2017, p. 135). “The Seal of the Prophet” represented itself primarily as a network of a Koran distribution campaign and was a spin-off of the “Read!” campaign. The Seal of the Prophet started its activities in 2013 in Düsseldorf. “Jesus in Islam” was a widespread Koran distribution campaign that was founded in 2013 and was widely spread in North Rhine-Westphalian city centers. “Jesus in Islam” referred to the prophetic role of Jesus in Islam and served to recruit potential converts from Christianity (Bozay, 2017, pp. 135, 138).

Aid Organizations and Prisoners’ Support – Today, the Salafi scene has become increasingly fragmented. Due to the previous attention of security authorities and the public, mosque associations are less frequently used than before. Salafists are, therefore, increasingly withdrawing to the private realm and social media. Meanwhile, the so-called “street missionizing” ended due to the ban of the organization “Lies!” (Read) in 2016. In comparison to previous years, there has occurred a shift: While in the past, street mission campaigns and trips to jihadist combat zones presented dominant propaganda narratives, recently, self-proclaimed ‘aid organizations’ and networks for prisoners’ aid became active and successful in recruiting supporters collecting donations. Although these organizations and networks operate with more caution in public space, they involve a large number of followers and generate large amounts of funding for the scene (Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2020, pp. 6–7, 13).

The collection of funds and donations by so-called aid organizations from the extremist-Salafist scene present themselves under a humanitarian label and constitute an important and rapidly growing field of action. These organizations are mainly located in the cities of Düsseldorf and Neuss, next to Cologne. Statements testifying the financing of Salafist and Jihadist structures could only be made in single cases. The intelligence NRW identified some of the individuals active in these circles as former activists of the “Lies!” campaign (Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2020, pp. 20–21). Among the aid organizations are *Ansaar International e.V.* in Düsseldorf and the association *World Wide Resistance-Help e.V.* in Neuss. Both organizations have organizational and kin-related ties. Two other associations are *Helfen in Not* (help in need) in Neuss and *Blue Springs LTD* an organization with ties in the city of Dortmund. Among the prisoners’ aid networks, the organization *Al Asraa – Die Gefangenen* constitutes a network that attending to prisoners from the extremist Salafi scene and their relatives. Another network is organized around the convert Bernhard Falk who openly sympathizes with Al-Qaida. Falk provides detained members of Salafist networks with lawyers (Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2020, pp. 20–26).

Islami Cemaat ve Cemiyetler Birliği/ ICCB: The Caliphate State – The spiritual leader of the movement, Cemalettin Kaplan (1926-1995), formerly an imam hired by *Diyanet* transferred to *Milli Görüş* in 1985 (see above). Over the years he became convinced that a reconciliation of state

and Islam could only be realized by carrying out an Islamic revolution. Cemalettin Kaplan split off from *Milli Görüş* with a group of followers and proclaimed the ‘Caliphate State’ (*Hilafet Devleti*). He proclaimed himself as the ‘Caliph of Cologne’. His son and successor Metin Kaplan shared his father’s goals of establishing a caliphate state. Metin Kaplan became known for his call to murder a rival calif in 1997. The rival calif was murdered a couple of months later, and Kaplan was sentenced to four years of prison. The association with roughly 1100 supporters was banned by the minister of the interior in 2001, and many of Kaplan’s followers returned to Milli Görüş. Metin Kaplan managed to prevent his deportation to Turkey in court until 2004 and unsuccessfully appealed against the ban of the “caliphate state” at the European Court of Human Rights in 2006 (Ceylan and Kiefer, 2013, p. 72; Schäfke, 2017, pp. 320–321). Since many of the movement’s followers returned to Milli Görüş such structures may still be active within the organization. The North Rhine-Westphalian ministry of interior currently observes 250 ‘Islamist’ members of Milli Görüş congregations (Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2019).

IZK e.V. – The Islamic Center Cologne German *IZK e.V.* was founded in 1978 and organized as an association in Cologne until 2001. It had twelve Islamic centers and cooperated with 50 mosques. (Steinberg, 2010, p. 150; Lemmen, 2017, p. 317) *IZK e.V.* was controlled by the *IGD e.V.*¹⁴ an umbrella

¹⁴ A head of the organization had connections to the Switzerland-based Al Taqwa bank. The bank was accused of financing of terrorist organizations, such as the Palestinian Hamas, the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front and al-Qa’ida. The organizations head the German-

organization in Munich that is associated with the Muslim brotherhood. Ibrahim al-Zayat, who was head of the center since 1997 had established close ties with the Milli Görüş leadership in Germany, especially with his Necmettin Erbakans brother, Akgün Erbakan who was also IZK board member and with Mehmet Sabri Erbakan the nephew of Necmettin Erbakan (see above). The IGD e.V. is structured as an umbrella organization of Arab mosque associations in Germany and has gained influence among the German Muslims since the end of the 1990s (Steinberg, 2010, pp. 150–151).

3.1. Chronology of Issues Pertaining to Radicalization

January 2001 – NSU Bomb attack in a grocery store: The NSU terror cell placed a Christmas cake tin with more than one kilogram of black powder between the goods in an Iranian grocery store. More than three weeks later, the owner's 19-year-old daughter opened the can and suffered severe burns (Dpa, 2014; ibs, 2020).

June 2004 – NSU Nail Bomb Attack: A nail bomb terrorist attack on *Keupstraße* in Mülheim left 22 people wounded and by sheer chance no dead. The racially motivated attack was committed by the NSU (National Socialist Underground) in 2004. Until the NSU revealed itself in 2011, the nail bomb attack became known for German authorities' investigation failures by criminalizing the victims and an unwillingness to identify a racially motivated motive behind the deed. The NSU assassinated ten people

Egyptian Ibrahim Faruk al-Zayat has connections to the Muslim brotherhood (Steinberg, 2010, pp. 150–151)

in different cities all over Germany. Eight victims are of Turkey-origin, one person of Greek origin and one person was an ethnic German police officer. *Keupstraße*¹⁵ in Mülheim is a famous street that is known for the high density of Turkish shops, restaurants and mosques that gained worldwide attention (Gräfe, 2017, pp. 213–215).

July 2006 – Detention of the “suitcase bombers”: On July 31 in 2006, an explosive device placed in regional trains in Cologne was found. Due to technical errors, the explosives produced by the perpetrators did not detonate. The two Lebanese perpetrators were arrested in Kiel in Germany and in Lebanon. In the verdict, it was stated the crime was triggered by the publication of the “Mohammed cartoons” (Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2020, pp. 80–81).

September 2008 – Assault against police officers: In September 2008, three youngsters into an ambush in the district to disarm them in the district of Rondorf. During interrogation, the young people testified that they wanted to bring the “Holy War” to Cologne. After the theft of the police officers’ service weapons, attacks on US facilities were planned (Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2020, p. 81).

September 2008 – the boycott of pro Köln’s “anti-Islamization congress”: Pro Köln announced an “Anti-Islamization Congress” under the motto “No to Islamization

¹⁵ Examples of authors providing academic information about the street *Keupstraße* see Bukow and Yildiz, 2002; Jonuz and Schulze, 2011

- No to the Grand Mosque of Cologne” with famous political leaders of European right-wing populist political parties and initiatives such as Jean Marie Le Pen, at that time chairman of the *Front National* from France, Heinz-Christian Strache from the Austrian *FPÖ*, Filip Dewinter from the Belgium *Vlaams Belang* and Mario Borghezio from the Italian *Lega Nord*, as well as representatives from right-wing parties from the US, Spain and Hungary. However, Congress could not take place. An action alliance was successful in blocking the ‘congress’ from taking place. The alliance included hotels and restaurants that did not accept right-wing populist guests, taxi drivers, the mayor and massive demonstrations against the Congress. Because the central station of Cologne was blocked, a group of right-wing populists was stuck at the airport, not able to get a taxi. Others were stuck because the center was blocked by demonstrators (Gerrens, 2013, p. 344).

May 2009 – pro Köln’s “anti-Islamization congress”: The so-called ‘anti-Islamization Congress’ was rescheduled for May 2009. Besides representatives of the ‘pro-movement’, actors and supporters of several foreign parties of the extreme right were present, including members of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and *Vlaams Belang* from Belgium (ibs, 2020).

October 2014 - Street demonstrations of right-wing hooligans: In October 2014, the nationwide hooligan network HoGeSa (Hooligans against Salafism) organized a violent street demonstration in Cologne. Between 3,000 and 5,000 people participated in the demonstrations

among them neo-Nazis and sympathizers of the NPD. Demonstrators chanted neo-Nazi slogans such as “Foreigners out!”, “Free, social, national” or “Here marches the national resistance”. Journalists were attacked, and in a street fight with the police, the hooligans threw bottles and stones, damaged several police vehicles and hurt 59 police officers (ibs, 2020; taz, 2020).

October 2015 –Assassination Attempt on Mayor: The assassination attempt on Henriette Reker on October 17 in 2015, one day before her election as mayor of Cologne, was carried out by the right-wing extremist Frank S. He severely injured Reker and another woman with a knife. Three people were slightly hurt (Pfahl-Traugher, 2015; ibs, 2020).

October 2015 – HoGeSa Rally: In October 2015, a second planned HoGeSa demonstration under the motto “Cologne 2.0” was only permitted as a street rally. Around 900 participants attended (ibs, 2020).

January 2016 – PEGIDA demonstration: After the sexual assaults during New Year's Eve 2015 (see above), PEGIDA NRW held a demonstration on January 9 under the motto “PEGIDA protects”. 1500 people participated in the demonstration. Due to the demonstrators’ extremely aggressive behavior, police stopped the demonstration after a few meters (ibs, 2020).

January 2016 – Attempted arson attack on refugee accommodation: In the night from 1st to the 2nd of January

2016, two people attempted an arson attack on the accommodation of refugees in the district of Mülheim. The arson attack only failed by chance. The used flares were labelled with “PEGIDA-NRW” stickers (ibs, 2020).

June 2018 – prevented poison attack: In June 2018, a man was arrested because he was suspected of producing the biological toxin ricin for a planned attack. In 2019, his German wife was held in custody because she was suspected of assisting in the crime. The man had been in contact with operators of the so-called “IS” abroad (Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2020, p. 83).

April 2019 – Car attack on demonstrators: The “Alliance Cologne against the Right-Wing” reported a possible attack with a car on counter-demonstrators after an AfD event in Cologne Kalk. On April 7, 2019, a rental car drove into a group of people after the AfD event, leaving one person slightly injured. The driver committed hit and run. A parliamentary inquiry by Green Party confirmed a few months later that the police assumed a right-wing motive (ibs, 2020).

4. Literature

Blasius, J., Friedrichs, J. and Symann, S. (2007) 'Armut und Lebensführung in einem benachteiligten Wohngebiet Kölns', in *Die Stadt in der Sozialen Arbeit: Ein Handbuch für soziale und planende Berufe*, pp. 188–203.

BMI (2020) *Migrationsbericht 2018 - Zentrale Ergebnisse (Kurzfassung)*. Available at: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/suche/migrationsbericht-2018-zentrale-ergebnisse-kurzfassung--1710940>.

Bozay, K. (2008) 'Kulturkampf von rechts — Das Dilemma der Kölner Moscheedebatte', in Häusler, A. (ed.) *Rechtspopulismus als „Bürgerbewegung“: Kampagnen gegen Islam und Moscheebau und kommunale Gegenstrategien*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 198–212. doi: 10.1007/978-3-531-91119-9_14.

Bozay, K. (2017) 'Islamfeindlichkeit und politischer Islamismus im Blickfeld der Ungleichwertigkeitsideologien', in Bozay, K. and Borstel, D. (eds) *Ungleichwertigkeitsideologien in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft*. Edition Ce. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 125–150. doi: 10.1007/978-3-658-14245-2_8.

Bukow, W.-D. and Yildiz, E. (2002) 'Der Wandel von Quartieren in der metropolitanen Gesellschaft am Beispiel Keupstraße in Köln oder: Eine verkannte Entwicklung?', in Bukow, W.-D. and Yildiz, E. (eds) *Der Umgang mit der Stadtgesellschaft*. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, pp. 81–111.

doi: 10.1007/978-3-663-09639-9_5.

Ceylan, R. and Kiefer, M. (2013) *Salafismus: Fundamentalistische Strömungen und Radikalisierungsprävention*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. doi: 10.1007/978-3-658-00091-2.

Çınar, S. (2011) 'Gewerkschaften und Migration in der Bundesrepublik', in Eryılmaz, A. and Lissner, C. (eds) *Geteilte Heimat: 50 Jahre Migration aus der Türkei – Paylaşılan Yurt*. Essen: Klartext Verlag, DOMiD – Dokumentationszentrum und Museum über die Migration in Deutschland e.V., pp. 87–99.

Didero, M. and Pfaffenbach, C. (2013) 'Neue Heimat NRW – wo marokkanischstämmige Migranten zu Hause sind', in Schneiders, T. G. (ed.) *Die Araber im 21. Jahrhundert: Politik, Gesellschaft, Kultur*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 367–389. doi: 10.1007/978-3-531-19093-8_23.

Die Bundesregierung (2020) *Leiter International Office der Uni Köln 'Wichtig ist das Leben einer Willkommenskultur'*. Available at: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/suche/interview-uni-koeln-1712860> (Accessed: 6 May 2020).

Dietmar, C. and Jung, W. (2009) *Kleine illustrierte Geschichte der Stadt Köln*. Köln: J. P. Bachem Verlag. doi: 10.7788/gik.1997.41.1.126.

Dietze, G. (2016) 'Das „Ereignis Köln“, *FEMINA POLITICA – Zeitschrift für feministische Politikwissenschaft*, 1, pp. 93–102. doi: 10.3224/feminapolitica.v25i1.23412.

DOMiT e.V. (2001) *40 Jahre Fremde Heimat – Yaban, silan olur: Einanderung aus der Türkei in Köln*. Köln.

Doppelfeld, O., Kellenbenz, H. and van Eyll, K. (1975) *Zwei Jahrtausende Kölner Wirtschaft. 2. Vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*. Köln: Greven.

Dpa, E. (2014) 'Der erste NSU-Anschlag in Köln: Das Opfer leidet bis heute', *Deutsche Welle*, 5 June. Available at: <https://www.dw.com/de/der-erste-nsu-anschlag-in-köln-das-opfer-leidet-bis-heute/a-17684018>.

Dpaö, AFPö and Jul (2018) 'Präsident Erdoğan hält Rede zur Eröffnung der Ditib-Moschee', *Zeit Online*, September. Available at: <https://www.zeit.de/politik/2018-09/staatsbesuch-recep-tayyip-erdogan-rede-koeln>.

Foerster, L. (2015) 'Zwischen Integration und Rückkehrförderung – türkische Arbeitnehmer bei den Kölner Ford-Werken 1961 bis 1983', *Geschichte in Köln*, 62(1), pp. 237–270. doi: 10.7788/gik-2015-0112.

Frank, J. (2007) 'Kölner gegen Moschee in geplanter Größe', *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, 19 June.

Friedrichs, J. and Blasius, J. (2016) *Gentrifizierung in Köln: Soziale, ökonomische, funktionale und symbolische Aufwertungen*. Edited by J. Friedrichs and J. Blasius. Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich.

Gerrens, U. (2013) 'Der Islam sucht seinen Platz: Der Moscheebaukonflikt in Köln', in Barz, H. and Jung, M. (eds) *Gehört der Islam zu Deutschland? Fakten und Analysen zu einem Meinungsstreit*. Düsseldorf: düsseldorf university press, pp. 335–367.

Giebler, G. and Buschmann, W. (2020) *Industriekultur in Köln. Einführung, Via Industrialis*. Available at: <http://www.rheinische->

industriekultur.com/seiten/objekte/orte/koeln/einfuehrung_industriekultur_koeln.html (Accessed: 30 April 2020).

Glaeser, H. (2019) 'Die Konstruktion von fremden Männlichkeiten in der Berichterstattung über die Kölner Silvesternacht: Eine Diskursanalyse', in Böttcher, A. et al. (eds) *Migration bewegt und bildet: Kontrapunktische Betrachtungen*. Innsbruck: innsbruck university press, pp. 285–300.

GmbH, F.-W. (2011) *80 Jahre Ford-Produktion in Köln: Vom A-Modell zum Ford Fiesta*, *Presseportal*. Available at: <https://www.presseportal.de/pm/6955/2035908> (Accessed: 22 April 2020).

Gräfe, S. (2017) *Rechtsterrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Zwischen erlebnisorientierten Jugendlichen, „Feierabendterroristen“ und klandestinen Untergrundzellen*. Baden-Baden: Nomos. doi: 10.1515/srsr-2019-0017.

Häusler, A. (2017) 'AfD, Pegida & Co. Die Formierung einer muslimfeindlichen rechten Bewegung', in Antes, P. and Ceylan, R. (eds) *Muslime in Deutschland: Historische Bestandsaufnahme, aktuelle Entwicklungen und zukünftige Forschungsfragen*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 59–74.

Herzog, F. (2016) 'Kriminalitätsfurcht – Kulturrassismus – rechte Kriminalpolitik. Ein Kommentar', *Neue Kriminalpolitik*, 28(3), pp. 243–250. doi: 10.5771/0934-9200-2016-3-243.

Hillen, C. et al. (2013) *Kleine Illustrierte Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Stadt Köln*. Köln: Bachem.

Humphrey, M. (2009) 'Securitisation and Domestication of

Diaspora Muslims and Islam: Turkish immigrants in Germany and Australia', *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, 11(2), pp. 136–154.

Huwer, J. (2007) "'Gastarbeiter" im Streik: die spontane Arbeitsniederlegung bei Ford Köln im August 1973', *Geschichte im Westen*, 22, pp. 223–249.

Huwer, J. (2013) *Gastarbeiter im Streik: Die Arbeitsniederlegung bei Ford Köln im August 1973*. Köln: edition DOMiD.

ibs (2020) *Mobile Beratung gegen Rechtsextremismus im Regierungsbezirk Köln, Info und Beratungsstelle gegen Rechtsextremismus im NS-Dok der Stadt Köln*. Available at: <https://www.mbr-koeln.de/vor-ort/koeln/> (Accessed: 8 May 2020).

IHK Köln (2014) *Wirtschaftsregion Köln 2014: Statistischer Überblick*. Köln. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20140710190214/http://www.ihk-koeln.de/upload/IHK_Wirtschaftsregion_2014_D_Endfassung_9161.pdf.

IHK Köln (2017) *Die geschäftigstärksten Unternehmen/Institutionen im IHK Bezirk Köln 2017*. Köln. Available at: https://www.ihk-koeln.de/upload/Top_Arbeitgeber2017_Haupttabelle_final_15630.pdf.

Jonuz, E. and Schulze, E. (2011) 'Vielfalt als Motor städtischer Entwicklung. Das Beispiel der Keupstraße in Köln', in Bukow, W.-D. et al. (eds) *Neue Vielfalt in der urbanen Stadtgesellschaft*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für

Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 33–48. doi: 10.1007/978-3-531-93082-4_3.

Jugendclub Courage Köln e.V. (2008) *Köln ganz Rechts: Die extreme Rechte und die Braunzone in Köln*. Available at: <http://koelnganzrechts.de/index.html> (Accessed: 30 April 2020).

Kagermeier, A. (2004) 'Marokkanische Migration Nach Deutschland: Charakteristika Und Perspektiven', in Meyer, G. (ed.) *Die Arabische Welt Im Spiegel Der Kulturgeographie*.

Keskinkılıç, O. (2018) "'Der orientalische Mann" vor|nach Köln. Zur sexuell-kulturellen Dynamik des antimuslimischen Rassismus in der Fluchtdebatte', in Römhild, R. et al. (eds) *Witnessing the Transition: Moments in the Long Summer of Migration*. Berlin, pp. 61–73.

Keskinkılıç, O. Z. (2019) *Was ist antimuslimischer Rassismus? Islamophobie, Islamfeindlichkeit, Antimuslimischer Rassismus – viele Begriffe für ein Phänomen?, Herausforderung Salafismus: Herausforderung Salafismus Infodienst Radikalisierungsprävention*. Available at:

<https://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/radikalisierungspraevention/302514/was-ist-antimuslimischer-rassismus> (Accessed: 21 March 2020).

Kiefer, M. (2008) 'Muslime und Zuwanderungsgesellschaft — Beidseitige Versäumnisse und Fehlentwicklungen', in Häusler, A. (ed.) *Rechtspopulismus als „Bürgerbewegung“*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 170–182. doi: 10.1007/978-3-531-91119-9_12.

Killguss, H.-P., Peters, J. and Häusler, A. (2008) 'PRO KÖLN — Entstehung und Aktivitäten', in Häusler, A. (ed.) *Rechtspopulismus als „Bürgerbewegung“*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 55–70. doi: 10.1007/978-3-531-91119-9_4.

Klekamp, J. (1980) 'Vom Zusammenbruch zum "Wirtschaftswunder"? Die Kölner Industrie in den Jahren 1945-1948', *Geschichte in Köln*, 8(1), pp. 119–149. doi: 10.7788/gik.1980.8.1.119.

Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen (2019) *Rückfragen zur Antwort der Landesregierung auf die kleine Anfrage 2128 (Drs. 17/5600) – Moscheen in NRW im Fokus des Verfassungsschutzes*. Düsseldorf. Available at: <https://kleineanfragen.de/nordrhein-westfalen/17/6127-rueckfragen-zur-antwort-der-landesregierung-auf-die-kleine-anfrage-2128-drs-17-5600-moscheen-in-nrw-im-fokus-des.txt>.

Lemmen, T. (2017) 'Muslimische Organisationen in Deutschland. Entstehung, Entwicklungen und Herausforderungen', in Antes, P. and Ceylan, R. (eds) *Muslime in Deutschland: Historische Bestandsaufnahme, aktuelle Entwicklungen und zukünftige Forschungsfragen*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 309–324. doi: 10.1007/978-3-658-15115-7.

Libor-Dörstel, T. (2001) *Industrie und Stadt im Umbruch Industrieunternehmen und städtische Wiederaufbauplanung nach 1945 als Faktoren für die Stadtentwicklung im rechtsrheinischen Köln*. Universität of Cologne.

Lindner, A. (2008) '„Wo, wenn nicht in Köln?“ Zur Moscheebau-Berichterstattung des Kölner Stadtanzeigers', in Häusler, A. (ed.) *Rechtspopulismus als „Bürgerbewegung“: Kampagnen gegen Islam und Moscheebau und kommunale Gegenstrategien*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 213–223. doi: 10.1007/978-3-531-91119-9_15.

Martin, P. L. (2002) *Germany: Managing Migration in the 21st Century*. Stanford.

Mattenklodt, H.-F. (1981) 'Territoriale Gliederung — Gemeinden und Kreise vor und nach der Gebietsreform', in Püttner, G. (ed.) *Handbuch der kommunalen Wissenschaft und Praxis*. 2nd edn. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 154–182. doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-11967-9_12.

Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (2020) 2. *Lagebild Salafismus NRW*. Düsseldorf.

Pfahl-Traughber, A. (2015) *Eine Auseinandersetzung im Lichte der Terrorismusforschung: Der Anschlag auf Henriette Reker*, hpd. Available at: <https://hpd.de/artikel/12310> (Accessed: 8 May 2020).

Rheinische Industriekultur (2020) *Rheinische Industriekultur e.V., Via Industrialis*. Available at: <http://www.via-industrialis.de/> (Accessed: 30 April 2020).

Rundschau, K. (2010) 'Historisches Rathaus Empfang für die Millionenbürger', *Melfert, Jens*, 29 September. Available at: <https://www.rundschau-online.de/historisches-rathaus-empfang-fuer-die-millionenbuerger-11251946>.

Sager, T. and Peters, J. (2008) 'Die PRO-Aktivitäten im Kontext der extremen Rechten', in Häusler, A. (ed.)

Rechtspopulismus als „Bürgerbewegung“. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 115–128. doi: 10.1007/978-3-531-91119-9_9.

Schäfke, W. (2017) *Buch: Köln nach 1945 – Die Geschichte unserer Gegenwart*. Rheinbach: Regionalia.

Schwarzer, A. (ed. . (2016) *Der Schock - die Silvesternacht in Köln: Mit Beiträgen von Rita Breuer, Kamel Daoud, Alexandra Eul, Marieme Hélie-Lucas, Necla Kelek, Florian Klenk, Alice Schwarzer, Bassam Tibi*. Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch.

Stadt Köln (1959) *Statistisches Jahrbuch Köln*. Köln.

Stadt Köln (1974) *Statistische Berichte Nr. 18: Die Ausländer in Köln. Entwicklungen und Strukturen*. Köln.

Stadt Köln (2012) *Statistisches Jahrbuch 2012*. Köln. Available at: https://www.stadt-koeln.de/mediaasset/content/pdf15/statistisches_jahrbuch_k__ln_2012.pdf.

Stadt Köln (2013) *Statistisches Jahrbuch Köln 2013*. Köln. Available at: <https://www.stadt-koeln.de/politik-und-verwaltung/statistik/statistische-jahrbuecher/statistisches-jahrbuch-archiv>.

Stadt Köln (2015) *Wohnungsbau in Köln 2014: Fast 3.700 neue Wohnungen – Weiter steigende Preise – Pegel Köln 5/2015*. Köln. Available at: Amt für Stadtentwicklung und Statistik der Stadt Köln.

Stadt Köln (2016) *Einwohnerentwicklung 2015: Das Wachstum hält an – Neue Höchststände durch Zuwanderung – Pegel Köln 2/2016*. Köln. Available at:

https://www.stadt-koeln.de/mediaasset/content/pdf15/statistik/pegel_köln_2_2016_einwohnerentwicklung_2015.pdf.

Stadt Köln (2019) *Statistisches Jahrbuch Köln 2018*. Cologne: Stadt Köln. Available at: <https://www.stadt-koeln.de/politik-und-verwaltung/statistik/statistische-jahrbuecher>.

Stadt Köln (2020a) *Cologne Business Guide: Im Zentrum des europäischen Binnenmarktes*. Köln.

Stadt Köln (2020b) *Industrie*. Available at: <https://www.stadt-koeln.de/wirtschaft/entdecken-sie-den-wirtschaftsstandort-koeln/industrie> (Accessed: 14 April 2020).

Stadt Köln (2020c) *Kölner Statistische Nachrichten Kurzinformation Bevölkerung, Ausgabe 3/2020*. Köln. Available at: <https://www.stadt-koeln.de/politik-und-verwaltung/statistik/bevoelkerung-und-haushalte>.

Stadt Köln (2020d) *Kommunalwahlen*. Available at: <https://www.stadt-koeln.de/politik-und-verwaltung/wahlen/kommunal/> (Accessed: 8 May 2020).

Stadt Köln (2020e) *Special Evaluation: Time Series - Turkey-and Morocco-origin citizens of Cologne with and without German Citizenship 2005-2019*. Köln.

Stadt Köln (2020f) *Special Evaluation: Time Series - Turkey and Morocco-origin citizens of Cologne, according to district 2005-2019*. Köln.

Stadt Köln (2020g) *Special Evaluation Time Series - Inhabitants of Cologne since 1945*. Köln.

Steinberg, G. (2010) 'The Muslim Brotherhood in Germany', in Rubin, B. (ed.) *The Muslim Brotherhood*. The Middle. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 149–160. doi: 10.1057/9780230106871_11.

taz (2020) *Schwerpunkt HoGeSa*, *taz.de*. Available at: <https://taz.de/Schwerpunkt-HoGeSa/!t5016663/> (Accessed: 8 May 2020).

Winternitz, A. (2017) *Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz (KHD)*, *rottenplaces*. Available at: <http://www.rottenplaces.de/main/kloeckner-humboldt-deutz-khd-28634/> (Accessed: 30 April 2020).

