Migration, Integration, Citizenship in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2018: The State of the Art

Country Report: Netherlands

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Introduction

This literature review provides a discussion of the significant developments in the Netherlands’ immigration and integration policies between 1990 and 2018. The paper is written within the framework of the ERC Advanced Grant Project titled “Nativism, Islamophobism and Islamism in the Age of Populism: Culturalisation and Religionisation of what is Social, Economic and Political in Europe” (ISLAM-OPHOB-ISM).

This paper focuses on the Muslim-origin migrants as there is a long history of emigration from Turkey and Morocco to the Netherlands. This review follows significant developments such as elections, new discourses, the rise of populism and the rising terrorist threats in the country in a chronological manner. However, it does not assess the impact and reception of these elements from the perspective of the migrant communities. It rather constitutes a study into the context which has shaped the experiences of migrants and their descendants.

As we will discuss in this literature review, there are two contrasting discourses in the Dutch debate in regards to integration: one is pro-multicultural or pluralistic, and the other is pro-assimilation. The pluralistic discourse promotes a multicultural society, and the discourse of pro-assimilation promotes a monocultural society (Landman 2002). This contrast stems from the left-right political, the country’s experiences with the migrant flow in recent years, as well as the experiences and structures of the Muslim-origin communities, mainly the Turkish-origin and Moroccan-origin migrants. As such, there are various developments in terms of framing of Muslim-origin migrants, integration policies, particularly in regards to youth integration and acculturation.

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1 I would like to thank Ayhan Kaya, Merel Zuurbier, and Ayşenur Benevento for their support, suggestions and remarks during the writing of this report.
2 This project with the acronym of “ISLAM-OPHOB-ISM” has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme grant agreement no. 785934. This research analyses the current political, social, and economic context of the European Union, which is confronted by two substantial crises, namely the global financial crisis and the refugee crisis. These crises have led to the escalation of fear and prejudice among the youth who are specifically vulnerable to discourses that culturalise and stigmatize the “other”. Young people between the ages of 18 to 30, whether native or immigrant-origin, have similar responses to globalization-rooted threats such as deindustrialization, isolation, denial, humiliation, precariousness, insecurity, and anomia. These responses tend to be essentialised in the face of current socio-economic, political and psychological disadvantages. While a number of indigenous young groups are shifting to right-wing populism, a number of Muslim youths are shifting towards Islamic radicalism. The common denominator of these groups is that they are both downwardly mobile and inclined towards radicalization. Hence, this project aims to scrutinize social, economic, political and psychological sources of the processes of radicalization among native European youth and Muslim-origin youth with migration background, who are both inclined to express their discontent through ethnicity, culture, religion, heritage, homogeneity, authenticity, past, gender and patriarchy.
3 All State of the Art reports are available at: https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/publications/archive/
4 In the scope of the “ISLAM-OPHOB-ISM” project, Lalla Amina Drhimeur (2020a, 2020b) has provided an extensive literature review on the Moroccan-origin migrants in France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. See https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/publications/state-art-moroccan-emigration-europe/
1. Background

Before proceeding with an overview of the Netherlands’ experiences with migration, it is important to note that after WWII, similar to France and Britain, the Netherlands experienced migration flows stemming from its colonial history. For instance, Hans van Amersfoort and Mies van Niekerk (2006) argue that there were four post-colonial migration flows into the Netherlands, two from the East Indies—the Eurasian population known as the ‘Indische Nederlanders’ and the Moluccans—and two from the West Indies—the Surinamese and the Antilles. As van Amersfoort and van Niekerk (2006) argue, while all of these immigrants may be labelled ‘post-colonial immigrants,’ the term suggests homogeneity among these communities. Nevertheless, as illustrated in this literature review the composition of the immigrant population/social class, ethnic origin and cultural background; the pace of migration and the immigrants’ perceptions and expectations; as well as the socio-economic circumstances of the host country at the time, influences their reception.

The Netherlands moved from migration to immigration at the start of the 1960s, and increased prosperity reduced emigration, triggering new immigration flows. Post-war immigrants comprised of three major groups: immigrants from former colonies, those recruited for unskilled jobs (so-called guest workers), and more recently refugees. Politicians have responded to the steadily excess of migration through restrictive immigration policy and at the same time, have attempted to boost the status of immigrants that have already arrived. Nevertheless, restrictive immigration policy focuses on select groups of immigrants that are actually to impose a strain on the social safety scheme in the Netherlands. Immigrants from top managers and developed countries from everywhere can enter the Netherlands relatively easily. Despite the restrictive immigration policy, increasing labour shortages in some sectors sometimes trigger new debates about the need for immigrants, and this debate has been intensified due to ageing of the host population (Zorlu and Hartog, 2001: 2).

After the 1960s, the flow of large numbers of “guest workers” developed an immigration surplus in the Netherlands. The need for workers for unqualified jobs increased during the long post-war boom, while the supply of unqualified Dutch workers decreased. Mediterranean workers’ inflow compensated for the shortage of workers, or unskilled labourers from nations such as Italy, Morocco, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia were actively hired or perhaps spontaneously arrived (Vriend and Hartog, 1979). In the 1960s, the Netherlands government regulated recruitment practices through bilateral agreements with the countries. The recruitment policy stopped during the first oil crisis in 1973. Still, immigration from the recruiting countries continued as chain migration, first in the form of family reunification throughout the 1970s and later in the form of family formation in the 1980s and 1990s (Zorlu and Hartog, 2001: 5).

Beginning in 1983, the Netherlands emerged as a vital destination for asylum seekers escaping centres of violence and oppression. In the 1980s, a large group of asylum seekers came from Turkey, Sri Lanka, Surinam, Iran, Poland, Ghana, Somalia while in the 1990s, most
of the asylum seekers came from Iraq, Sri Lanka, Iran, Bosnia Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and Somalia (Lucassen and Penninx, 1997).

Van Meeteren et al. (2013: 116) note that in 2012, there were 392,923 first and second-generation migrants from Turkey in the Netherlands (197,107 born in Turkey, 195,816 born in the Netherlands with a minimum of one Turkish parent). In the same year, there were 362,954 first and second-generation migrants from Morocco in the Netherlands (168,214 born in Morocco, 194,740 born in the Netherlands with at least one parent born in Morocco). Moreover, over the years, asylum seekers arrived primarily from countries like the former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, Somalia, Angola, Sri Lanka, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Sierra Leone. Between 2008 and 2012, the number of asylum requests rose again to approximately 15,000. Only some asylum requests have been granted (Van Meeteren et al., 2013: 116).

2. Integration Policies

As Christian Joppke (1998, 2007) argues, there has been a transformation of immigrant integration policies in Western Europe beginning in the mid-1990s. This transformation entailed a move away from distinct “national models” and toward convergent policies of “civic integration” for newcomers and “anti-discrimination” for settled immigrants and their descendants. This transformation has significant consequences in the Netherlands in which integration displaced the multiculturalist paradigm in the late-1990s (Vink, 2007; Van Oers et al., 2010; Prins and Saharso, 2010) with the institution of strict inburgering (citizenisation) classes starting a “testing regime” for integration (Extra and Spotti, 2009; Spotti, 2011).

The literature on integration in the Netherlands focuses mainly on Turkish immigrants and Moroccan immigrants. For instance, Van Oudenhoven and Eisses (1998) study the consequences of integration and assimilation of Jewish Moroccans in Israel and Islamic Moroccans in The Netherlands as well as the reactions of the majority group to these immigrants. They anticipated that, based on the concept of social identity and the hypothesis of similarities attraction, the immigrants that integrate would feel more prejudice and feel less respected but that their nationality would be evaluated more favourably than immigrants that assimilate. As such, given the Jewish background that Moroccans share with the dominant group in Israel, they anticipated a more favourable trend in Israel than in the Netherlands. Significantly, while the majority of employees in the Netherlands respond more favourably to immigrant assimilations than to foreign integration, Israel’s assimilation or integration made little distinction.

Van Oudenhoven and Eisses (1998) note that concerning the majority group’s affective reactions to integration and assimilation, Byrne’s “the similarity attraction hypothesis” is important (Byrne, 1969). Based on this empirically founded theory, similarity leads to attraction. Humans are a lot more attracted to similar than to dissimilar others since others that are similar confirm that the attitudes of ours, opinions, or perhaps behaviours are right. This validation constitutes a rewarding element in developing a relationship. Dissimilar others do not validate the ideas of ours and, consequently, offer a less fulfilling relationship.
Following this theory, Van Oudenhoven, and Eisses (1998: 295) find that the dominant group is going to feel more sympathy towards assimilating minority members than towards integrating minority members, since assimilating individuals are attempting to reduce differences with the dominant group in different areas like religion, language, and cultural habits.

Integration is also discussed in relation to political representation and national allegiance. To this end, Bot and Verkuyten (2018) consider that countries with multiparty political structures give minority or conceivably migrant communities the ability to participate in democratic politics through an ethnic or religious minority political party (group representation). Representation of the political group can be essential in the integration of Muslims into the host society and in enhancing the legitimacy of the national democratic system (Bloemraad 2013; Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013). Muslims, however, still face majority opposition and skepticism about their national allegiance and the right to participate in the policy process (Bloemraad and Schoenwälder, 2013; Petruševska, 2009; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007). Such a negative approach can affect democracy and add to the sense of alienation and oppression in the Western community among Muslims with severe negative feelings (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008).

According to Nermin Aydemir Çavuş (2015: 77) who studied political representation in the British and Dutch political systems between 2002 and 2012, migrant representation in the Dutch case has become more inclusive as Netherlands emerges as the most proportional country within the western World. Aydemir-Çavuş’s study also highlights that in the decade between 2002 and 2012, 35 MPs of minority origin served in the Dutch national parliament in total. Out of 35 Dutch MPs of minority origin, 21 were female and 14 were male. The Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) had 14 minority representatives, The Green Party (GroenLinks) has 8 minority representatives, as well as 3 MPs from the Dutch Christian Democrats (CDA), 3 from the Dutch Social-Liberal (D66), 3 from the Socialist Party (SP) and 4 from the liberal-conservative People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), showing that even conservative and far-rightist parties allocate seats for MPs with migratory backgrounds (Aydemir-Çavuş, 2015: 78). Nonetheless, the author found that prevalent public and media discourses also play a role in the representation of migrants in the political sphere as political presence alone does not necessarily indicate representation of interests. To that end, Aydemir-Çavuş notes that supportive representation (reference to any content supporting cultural and/or religious rights and freedoms of ethnic and religious groups) and suppressive representation (acting against those rights and freedoms) are deployed by MPs with migrant origin as well as “restrictive framings” which include framings such as the anti-Islamic stance of Ayaan Hirsi Ali. To that end, this study highlights that the framings of the media as well as the public, and political discourses on topics related to cultural and religious freedoms also influences MPs’ framings which have moved towards an integrative understanding of Dutch citizenship.5

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5 For a detailed discussion of nationalism, citizenship and Islam in the Netherlands, see Sunier, 2020c, 2020d, 2020e.
Bot and Verkuten (2018: 365) also illustrate that the Dutch system is based on proportional representation, which permits various cultural groups within the society to be represented in the political institutions of society. Indeed, currently, 13 political parties are represented in the Dutch Parliament, including small orthodox Christian parties and one-issue parties such as the party for the elderly. Therefore, the Dutch political system provides the opportunity for Muslims to organise themselves politically, like one-issue and Christian parties. In reality, and much like, for instance, Spain, Denmark and Belgium, there are and have been many political parties in the Netherlands that partake in politics by explicitly depicting themselves as Islamic, or perhaps inspired by Islam. Several of these political parties have secured seats in municipality councils in the last Dutch local elections (2018; e.g., “NIDA” in Rotterdam, and “Islam Democrats” in The Hague) and in the national Parliament in the national election of March 2017 (“DENK”).

The Netherlands has witnessed the emergence of political parties with a strong Muslim presence that embrace a pro-immigrant discourse: such as DENK, founded by Muslims of Dutch-Turkish origin, and NIDA, a local party in Rotterdam that sees itself as an Islam-inspired liberation movement. Both parties oppose the rising right-wing populist discourse by stressing ethnic and religious diversity as an advantage of the Dutch community (Loukili, 2019). DENK was established in 2015 by two Turkish-Dutch members of the House of Representatives, Tunahan Kuzu and Selçuk Öztürk. DENK acquired three seats in the 2017 parliamentary election, ensuring that the party leader Farid Azarkan, and the party founders Kuzu and Öztürk would remain in parliament (Azarkan and Kuzu have left the party in early-2020). The group claims to serve the interests of the Turkish people in the Netherlands, and it is frequently called Erdoğan’s long arm in the Netherlands media due to the allegations that it is funded by Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (Duke, 2017) with close ties to Turkey’s Diyanet (Presidency for Religious Affairs) (Öztürk and Sözeri, 2018). Nonetheless, its target electorate is comprised of “everyone who supports cultivation of a multicultural society, it particularly targets the country’s two largest immigrant communities, Turks and Moroccans” (Vermeulen et al. 2018: 434). DENK has presented itself as a solution to “the nativist and isolationist positions of the flamboyant far-right populist candidate Geert Wilders and his Freedom Party” (Siegal, 2016). DENK’s manifesto states that it was established to “combat rising intolerance, right-wing thinking, and xenophobia in the Netherlands” (Vermeulen et al. 2018: 434, DENK’s party programme is available at https://www.bewegingdenk.nl/standpunten). Nonetheless, DENK is often considered a populist party, which uses populist political strategies such as deploying social media to attract, communicate and mobilize its constituency (Loukili, 2020). NIDA, founded in 2013, is a national Islamist group headed by Nourdin el-Ouali, who is a former Green Party (GroenLinks) member in the Rotterdam Council. As it is the case with DENK, it counters right-wing populism, and it openly states that it is inspired by Islam (Loukili, 2020: 22, Klei, 2019). It received support from Turkey’s AKP’s Dutch affiliate, the ‘Union of European Turkish Democrats’ (UETD). NIDA has been represented in the Rotterdam City Council since 2014 and in the Hague since 2018 (NIDA’s political programme is available at https://nida.nl/). According to NIDA leader El Ouali, the political discourse in the last few decades presented Islam and diversity as the problem and NIDA’s “hopes that the next generation will grow up ‘in a politics with Islam as the inspiration for the solution’” (MBS News, 2020). Similar to NIDA, Islam Democraten (Islam Democrats, ID) has been present in the local elections. It was established in 2006 by Hasan Kucuk, and it presents itself as an Islamic party. According to its party programme, it is “A party that represents all residents of The Hague, and in particular the Muslim resident of The Hague. A party that proudly bears the word Islam in its name. With this party program we indicate what we stand for” (Islam Democraten’s party programme is available at: https://www.islamdemocraten.nl/). In 2006, it acquired 1 seat in the city council of The Hague in the spring of 2006, in 2014 it obtained two seats, in 2018 it acquired 1 seat in the city council. According to its official website, ID has activities in various areas including efforts for equal opportunities and anti-discrimination in education and employment, improving the safety of Mosques; expansion of Islamic schools, providing space for Islamic institutions and facilities. For an overview of Islam in the Netherlands, see Sunier (2020a, 2020b, 2020e).
Complementing this argument is the study of Sjoerdje van Heerden, Sarah L. de Lange, Wouter van der Brug, and Meindert Fennema’s (2014) study, which highlights that immigration and integration issues have become increasingly important in West European politics, partly because of the rise of anti-immigration parties. As such, van Heerden et al.’s work explores the effects of anti-immigration parties on the politicisation of immigration. After analysing the political party manifestos for the 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010 parliamentary elections in Netherlands, they find that immigration and integration issues receive increasing attention from parties; and that the parties replaced their socio-economic integration discourse by a cultural integration discourse; and that parties have adopted a monoculturalist position replacing their multiculturalist approach. Nonetheless, the authors assert that it is not only these findings that shaped this debate but rather the left-right political divide, with left-wing parties favouring more lenient, multiculturalist policies and right-wing parties favouring more restrictive, monoculturalist policies.

In line with the group representation possibilities, Bot and Verkuyten (2018) conducted two studies on political participation of Muslim citizens in the Netherlands and investigated among national samples of majority Dutch whether the level of resistance to the democratic political organisations of Muslim citizens is associated with political orientation and level of education. Also examining if these associations are mediated by the endorsement of multiculturalism, Bot, and Verkuten (2018) found that the higher educated and politically left-wing individuals are more supportive of Muslim political organisation And that this relationship is clarified (in part) by the endorsement of multiculturalism (for a comprehensive deconstruction of the rise and fall of multiculturalism in the Netherlands, see Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Hagendoorn, 2007; Entzinger, 2015).

Despite the country-specific variations due to the colonial history and the strength particular political parties have in influencing the political discourse, Netherlands moved in the similar direction as the rest of the EU countries in terms of integration and migration policies. Integration and migration are also debated in reference to the intensifying anti-terrorism discourse, which securitises migration legitimised through fear of radicalisation. Significantly, according to the Securitization theory, security is a signifier, and it is not used to justify exceptionalist politics. Based on the conceptualisations offered by Pierre Bourdieu and Michell Foucault, Critical Security Studies approach understand the term security as a ‘floating’ (Levi-Strauss, Introduction to the work of Marcel Mauss) or ‘empty signifier’ (Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy), that is to say, a word not actually referring to something in the real world (Fadil, de Koning and Ragazzi 2019: 5). This also relates to the relations between integration and radicalisation. For instance, Nadia Fadil, and Martin de Koning (2019: 53-79) argue that there are two phases in the construction of the radicalism discourse in Europe. The first phase between 1991and 2003 is the securitisation of integration in the light of the conflicts in Algeria in the 1990s, the Gulf War, and the conflicts Balkans. The second phase between 2003 and 2015 is the shift from radicalisation to Salafism following the Madrid Bombings in 2004, the murder of Theo van Gogh, and the London Bombings in 2005.

Even though the relations between counter-terror measures and radicalisation are not widely discussed, according to Pamela Irving Jackson’s study (2009), the European Monitoring Center on Xenophobia and Racism (established in 1997 by the Council of
Europe) warned that anti-terrorism security measures risk disrupting the integration of Muslim communities in EU Member States. Without reliable statistics, the consequences of these measures are challenging to assess. Fears of cultural conflict and Muslim radicalisation can subsequently be exploited to justify just these kinds of measures. Despite these concerns, research on the situation of Muslims in western democracies relies on mostly proxy data, referring to nationality and ethnicity. The European Commission has established an initiative to systematically generate harmonised Community statistics, with goal to raise awareness of immigrant socio-economic integration and push towards an EU-wide benchmarking framework. A study of Muslim data in the Netherlands, Germany, France, and Britain reveals that such data are far from being comparable among nations nor sufficient to measure Muslim integration based on European and national standards. Such statistics ignore essential issues relating to Muslims’ position in European societies, including provocative problems such as police tensions with Muslim youth, increasing inequalities that lead to violent crime. The references to national norms in terms of the state’s responsibilities to the society provide a reason for people against reform to undermine the efficacy of the EU Community statistic initiative in the pursuit of improving Muslim integration. Irving Jackson (2009: 223) notes that the concern that anti-terrorism measures risk disrupting the integration of Muslim communities was first mentioned in the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, prepared by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC, 2006).

Irving Jackson’s (2009: 242) study found that the EU’s attempts to nurture safety and inclusion of minority heritage have been undermined as member nations seek to defend the national identity. National historical conceptualisations of secularity have been pinned down, despite the reality that they clash with the social and economic objectives of EU membership. Talent’s deployment throughout the workforce, which is very crucial to the EU’s intervention in the economic sphere, is hindered by procedures that call for linear assimilation, which pressures individuals trying to establish a blended religious/ethnic identity to change their habits (see also Vasta, 2007; Entzinger 2006). M. Gates (2006) asserts that states have also been able to declare “historical institutionalist” legitimacy for pre-existing patterns of church/state relations to opt-out of some norms of minority heritage expression, and by refusing to recognise minorities either the descendants of religious groups or guest workers (except Jewish individuals) as deserving of special protections. This particular policy approach implies that the problems of cultural disidentification (the lack of identification) experienced by Muslims cannot be systematically dealt with. Furthermore, Irving Jackson (2009: 242) also addresses the fact that depending on the conflation of “Muslim” with “foreigner” in statistics, can be highly problematic. For instance, state support for ideological secularism can serve to reify Muslims’ public image as outsiders, as the source of public problems, and as a threat to “the system” but when they take on citizenship, making Muslim minorities “statistically invisible”

7 As noted in critical security studies, security is not a given, but rather as a process (Fadil, de Koning and Ragazzi, 2019: 5) which includes domination, marginalization, insecurity. For further information see Krause and Williams, 2002; Peoples, and Vaughan-Williams, 2014.
can reduce the practical salience of religious issues in these individuals’ true outsider status (ibid.).

3. Migration and Framing

Rens Vliegenthart and Conny Roggeband (2007) examine how the salience and framing of political issues in the press and Parliament influence each other and how these are affected by critical events outside the media and political realms focusing on the debate on immigration and integration in the Netherlands between 1995 and 2004. Vliegenthart and Roggeband (2007: 313-314) argue that different external events also modified the framing of this debate. They consider the outcome of the parliamentary election of 1998 and 2002 with electoral gains for the liberal right party, which lead to an increase in the use of the restriction frame in both the Parliament and the media. This was a shift towards the framing of Islam-as-threat, which came at the expense of the multicultural structure.

This line of reasoning was continued in the work of Sipco J. Vellenga (2008) which examines and analyses the frame of the Muslim immigrant debate in the Netherlands, which is characterised by five elements: culturalisation, Islamisation, rejection of Islam, ‘new’ nationalism and the plea for assimilation. Vellenga explains these elements as culturalization, Islamisation, rejection of Islam, new nationalism and a plea for assimilation. Culturalisation, that is the debate’s ‘cultural turn’ is reflected in an ever-greater focus on the protection of social standards and values, the significance of Dutch history in school curricula, the introduction of the naturalisation procedures and the establishment, the New Comers Integration Act of 1 January 2007 (Vellenga, 2008: 29; Kaya, 2012, 2019). Islamisation is an outcome of the increasing role of religion in classifying immigrant cultures. The immigrants’ way of life is not seen as an attempt to create a meaningful life by putting together elements from their cultures and aspects of Dutch hegemony, but rather as a result of their Islamic religion (Vellenga, 2008: 29; Sunier, 2005). Rejection of Islam presumes that Western culture is enlightened, and Islam is backward; Western culture is supportive of tolerance, and Islam is intolerant; Western culture promotes democracy, and Islam oppresses people; Western culture advocates for equality and Islam promotes inequalities; Western culture is democratic and Islam primarily undemocratic; Western culture tends toward secularism, and Islam is authoritarian (Vellenga, 2008: 30). Against these juxtapositions, ‘new’ nationalism, assumes that there is a sharp distinction between ‘autochthones’ and ‘allochthones,’ as such between ‘the Dutch’ ‘self’ and ‘the Muslim’ ‘other.’ Furthermore, this new nationalism is formulated through the opposition between the Netherlands and the EU (Vellenga, 2008: 30-31). On these issues, Thijl Sunier similarly wrote:

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8 Yanow, and Van der Haar (2013) provide that the Netherlands has no overt “race” discourse; however, the state categorizes its population along “racial” lines through its public policy and administrative procedures, using one’s own or one’s (grand) parent’s birthplace as the deciding factor. Until 1999, the operating taxonomy was binary: autochthon (of Dutch heritage) and allochthon (of foreign birth), then it was extended to demarcate between ‘Western’ allochthon and ‘non-Western’ allochthon, with the latter being further subdivided into first and second-generation.
Towards the end of the 1990s, a growing number of intellectuals started to argue for a deepening and wider dissemination of national awareness and the protection of Dutch cultural identity, both in opposition to the presence of minority ‘ethnic’ groups and the issue of European unification (Sunier, 2005:93).

Furthermore, many participants in the public debate have called for assimilation and require immigrants to respect and internalise the core values of Dutch public culture. They consider Islam to be irreconcilable with Western values such as democracy, freedom, equality, and tolerance (Vellenga, 2008: 31).

Vellenga (2008) also ascribes these to developments among Muslims in the Netherlands and the Islamic world, the rise of charismatic right-wing politicians such as Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF)’s founder Pim Fortuyn;\(^9\) and Ayaan Hirsi Ali,\(^10\) Somali-born Dutch American activist, and politician advocating that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with Western democratic values, especially women’s rights; as well as the Dutch population’s mechanisms of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ (see also Kaya, 2009, 2019). Most significantly, in 1997, Pim Fortuyn published a book called Against the Islamization of our Culture: Dutch Identity as a Framework (Tegen de islamisering van onze cultuur: Nederlandse identiteit als fundament), which rejected the ideology of cultural relativism and cautioned against the growing impact of a threatening Islam. To highlight the centrality of this argument, Fortuyn asserted that

In our so-called multicultural society, we can observe daily encounters between the (fundamentalist) Islamic culture and our traditional Dutch culture. These encounters are threatening to destroy our way of life because we are ourselves disinterested in our own identity and the essence of our society. We must fight this with might and main. (....) It is of vital importance to understand the difference between the (fundamentalist) Islam and the traditional Judeo-Christian humanistic culture (Fortuyn 1997:7-8; translation by Vellenga, 2008).

Furthermore, 9/11, the rise and killing of Pim Fortuyn on May 6, 2002, and the assassination of filmmaker Theo van Gogh on November 2, 2004 by Mohammed Bouyeri, born in a Moroccan-Dutch family, culminated in an unparalleled division of the discourse. While the anti-Islamic tone of the debate has softened slightly since 2006, the debate is continuing and has exposed a strong division of integration problems within Dutch society (Vellenga, 2008: 21-22; Buruma, 2006, see also Kaya, 2016, 2017, 2019). This then shed light on the constructions of Muslim immigrants as the “suspect” other.

In a similar vein, Masja van Meeteren and Linda van Oostendorp’s (2019) study analyses if and how Muslim-origin individuals are also constructed as a ‘suspect community’ in Dutch

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\(^9\) For further information on Pim Fortuyn’s discourse, see Van Holsteyn and Irwin, 2003; Koopmans and Muis, 2009; Van der Veer, 2006; Vossen, 2010; De Lange and Art, 2011.
\(^10\) For further information on Ayaan Hirsi Ali, see Ghorashi, 2003; Snel, and Stock, 2008; Leeuw, and Wichelen, 2005.
political discourse on terrorism in the period 2004-2015. This analysis shows that political discourse in the Netherlands has shifted significantly in this period. In this sense, the authors deconstruct the ‘2007 Action plan Polarisatation and Radicalisation’ (Actieplan Polarisatie en Radicalisering)\textsuperscript{11} applied between 2007 and 2011.\textsuperscript{12} Significantly, the phrases were carefully worded, and both ‘polarisation’ and ‘radicalisation’ were carefully defined. Furthermore, this document states that the threat of radicalisation “is not primarily the ideas or ideology, but the expectation that the ideology will increasingly influence actions. This concerns actions with negative consequences for individuals and the democratic state” (2007:20). In this sense, the Action Plan articulated radicalisation as a global threat that was not reserved exclusively for Muslim-origin groups.

Van Meeteren and Van Oostendorp (2019: 527) also show that political discourse that constructs Muslims as a ‘suspect community’ have three types of unintended consequences. The first type relates to a negative effect on interactions between police and the community. The ‘hard’ approaches adopted by counter-terrorism policy, such as the release of the most suitable information to contribute to the discussion of religious strands used in terrorist propaganda. ‘Soft’ strategies aim at community engagement, such as community policing, to deter radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. The second type relates to suspicion and resentment felt by Muslims towards authorities as a result of the discursive formulation of Muslims as a “suspect community” which increases grievances thus the likelihood for terrorist organisation recruitment. The third type is the political debate’s suspicious tone towards Muslim cultures, which also permits the public to express suspicion and hate towards these communities while legitimising their stance (Van Meeteren and Van Oostendorp, 2019: 527).

Van Meeteren and Van Oostendorp (2019: 537) conclude that ‘terrorism’ is used as a primary term in political discourse, similar to words such as ‘freedom,’ ‘democracy’ and ‘justice.’ They also illustrate - an important discursive change - Dutch political discourse on terrorism vis-à-vis Muslims. Although the discourse between 2004 and 2011 was labelled as ‘communicative coexistence,’ the discourse in 2014 and 2015 was classified as ‘jihadist enemy.’

Van Meeteren and Van Oostendorp (2019: 537) show that both policy documents and Chamber debates represent a parallel discursive shift in which responsibility for terrorism is transferred from society as a whole to the Muslim community. In order to avoid the labels associated with Islam, “Muslims are required to explicitly state that ‘their Islam’ is different from the ‘radical Islam,’ which implies that for as long as a Muslim does not state so, s/he remains a legitimate suspect” (ibid.).

Similarly, Wasif A. Shadid (2006) argues that immigration and integration have become one of the most critical issues in the Netherlands’ political arena, in the Parliament, school

\textsuperscript{11} For the full text see https://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/E9353925-A523-41C6-94F1-643EACF826CC/0/minbiz007_actieplanukv3.pdf

\textsuperscript{12} This Plan was produced as a part of EU harmonization efforts on radicalization, see Kaya 2020 and Tecmen 2020.
administrations, the corporate world, and the media, especially with respect to Muslims in the Netherlands. The joint debate on Islam and the situation of Muslims in Parliament, school administrations, the corporate world and the media. Following various debates and developments both domestically and internationally in the last decade, the Netherlands administration has shifted its multicultural perspective on Dutch society with far-reaching effects on education policy. The government has also tightened its rules for access to the country and promoting programs aimed at protecting immigrants’ native cultures.

Shadid (2006: 18-19) finds that due to the intensifying suspicion toward Muslim communities, the Dutch National Security Service has increased the surveillance of Muslim groups and their associated institutions. Simultaneously, the stigmatisation and exclusion process was irrevocably influenced by the public debate about radical Islam in Muslim communities. In the media, for instance, an imam from Rotterdam has made negative statements that homosexuality is an infectious disease, and must be cured, which received extensive media coverage. Such comments were not significantly different from the standard views of some conservative Christian religious leaders in various EU countries. The media also extensively covered the negatives of other imams in the Netherlands recorded by a hidden camera, discussing the position of women in Islam and the treatment of deviant women. Similarly, the National Security Service studied religious education teaching and material in Muslim schools, which were accused of radicalism and of promoting texts that incite hate. Many Islamic groups were charged, arrested and interviewed about their affiliation with terrorist organisations. While the accusations were not legally substantiated, the public debates remained antagonistic with increasing suspicion toward Muslim communities.

Furthermore, despite the official separation of Church and State, the Netherlands government began to interfere in Muslims’ religious affairs and tried to establish a system for the imam of education, which was triggered by fear of Muslim fundamentalism. After 2008, the Parliament adopted a resolution banning the import of foreign imams. Notably, these acts did not meet with social or Muslim demonstrations. There are few resources for protests, and opposition provided the ethnic and religious heterogeneity of Muslim communities in the Netherlands and the absence of any representative body to protect Muslim rights and to organise collective action. The government supported a group named Islam en Burgerschap (Islam and Citizenship), which led to the establishment of the Contactorga Muslims en Overheid (Contact Body of Muslims and Government) in 2004 to create a representative negotiating body for the groups concerned. The Islam Contact Group was also set up due to the diversity of the groups involved.

Recent quantitative studies among the second generation in Western European countries have shown relatively high levels of religious involvement (Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Güngör, Fleischmann, and Phalet 2011; Fleischmann, Phalet, 2018). By the same token, Mieke Maliepaard, Mérove Gijsberts, and Marcel Lubbers’ (2012) study focuses on Muslim minorities living in a secular context in the Netherlands. Authors focus on the Turkish- and

13 For Muslim cultural infrastructure development in the Netherlands, see Kloosterman, Van Der Leun and Rath, 1999; and Shadid and van Koningsveld, 1997.
Moroccan-Dutch as they are the two largest Muslim groups. They explore how Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch mosque attendance changed between 1998 and 2006, to measure religious decline and religious vitality. They illustrate that while previous research has observed a linear trend towards secularisation over time and generations, this trend has become more complex. For instance, Phalet, Gjiberts, and Hagendoorn’s (2008) study of religious change among Dutch Muslims between 1998 and 2004 found that it is primarily the second generation and the higher educated Muslims who are less religious. However, compositional changes in these factors do not explain the secularising trend. Conversely, for Maliepaard et al., the revival of religious attendance among the second-generation is a significant find, which shows that forces of secularisation such as educational attainment and generational replacement gradually lose their predictive power. Maliepaard et. al. (2012) therefore argue that secularisation is not inevitable.

In search of the influence of school upon Muslim immigrants, Fenella Fleischmann and Karen Phalet (2018) explored the inclusiveness of European national identities of Muslim minorities and the explanations for cross-cultural variation in inclusiveness. By doing so, they relied on large-scale, school-based surveys of Muslim minority and non-Muslim majority and other minority youth by five European countries (Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey [CILS]; Belgium, England, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden). Comparing national identification across groups and countries by Fleischmann and Phalet revealed that national identities are less strongly endorsed by all minorities compared to majority youth, but that national identification among Muslims is the lowest. Authors claim that this is reflecting public anxiety about the inadequacy of European national identities in incorporating ethnic communities in general, and Muslims in particular (ibid.: 50-52). Using an intergroup approach to the inclusiveness of national identities for Muslims, authors also demonstrated that, beyond religious commitment, positive intergroup contact, such as majority friendship, plays an important role in explaining differences in national identification in multi-group models of mediation, whereas school experiences of discrimination do not contribute to this explanation.

![Figure 1. Path model of national identification. Source: Fleischmann and Phalet, 2018: 53.](image-url)
4. Migrant Organisations

Muslim immigrants’ integration is crucial to the discussion of European immigration and integration and various studies explore how the native populations see and assess Muslim immigrants and their social and political integration (e.g., Hindriks, Verkuyten and Coenders 2015; McLaren 2003; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Sunier, 2005). Nonetheless, there are relatively few studies that have been focused on the perception and organisation of Muslims themselves (for example, Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Michon and Vermeulen 2013; Verkuyten 2011).

In regard to the establishment of migrant organisations, Penninx and Schrover (2001) argue that in general there are three main phases, which are a) a phase in which the first immigrants found organisations that focus mainly on their country of origin; b) a phase in which organisations support the growing infrastructure of the new community and; c) a phase in which organisations direct themselves more to the specific needs of the second generation.

In the case of Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands, the first phase began in the 1960s, with the arrival of ‘guest labourers’ and Moroccan organisations focused on the improvement of the legal position and living conditions of migrants. Political organisations that were aligned with parties in Morocco also emerged and tried to influence the political situation and human rights in Morocco. In the second phase of the migration process, the number of women and children increased through family reunification and a need developed to offer courses and organise activities for women and children. Migrants brought along their culture and habits and in the case of the Moroccans, their religion, Islam. As Penninx and Schrover (2001: 55) state, the first-generation immigrants were organised to recreate the world they have left, also because it is easier to encounter the new society from a familiar environment. In the 2000s, however, the third phase began as the composition of the Moroccan community in the Netherlands changed with the second-generation migrant youth. In turn, organisations also increased and diversified to include theatre- and sports clubs, music, language, and literature groups. As such, “[t]he second generation tends to have a dual orientation: first to their community and by extension to their country of origin and second, towards the Dutch society of which they are a part” (van Heelsum, 2002: 3-4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Attacks in the Netherlands since 2000</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004. Dutch filmmaker an political activist Theo van Gogh was assassinated by Mohammed Bouyeri, a second-generation Moroccan-Dutchman, Islamist and member of the Hofstad Network.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• On 27 February 2016, five men attacked a mosque full of visitors in Enschede with molotov cocktails. The perpetrators were later jailed.</td>
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<td>• On 31 August 2018, a man randomly attacked two people in Amsterdam Centraal station with a blade weapon - both victims were American-Eritrean tourists who were injured. The attacker was a 19-year-old from Afghanistan under the name Jawad S. who held a German residency permit and was denied asylum there. The suspect was aggrieved at the Netherlands for insulting Islam, directly referring to politician Geert Wilders.</td>
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Aligned with the studies on migrant organisations, Maykel Verkuyten (2017) uses data from three survey studies to examine the support for the democratic political organisation of Muslims among Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands and Germany. Using a social psychological perspective, Verkuyten examines support for the democratic political organisation in relation to religious group identification, Muslim linked fate, perceived discrimination,fundamentalist religious belief, and host national identification. The study demonstrated support for Muslim political organisation and show that higher religious group identification and higher linked fate were associated with stronger support. Verkuyten (2017: 138) also argues that several political organisations and parties in countries, such as Spain, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands, have been attempting to take part in (local) political host society by explicitly representing themselves as Islamic or claiming to draw inspiration from Islam. In the Netherlands, the local elections of 2014, provided some of these political parties, such as ‘NIDA’ in Rotterdam and ‘Islam Democrats’ in The Hague, with seats on municipal councils. This form of political organisation is similar to small Christian Orthodox parties, which are specific sectors of the population and seek to achieve their particular goals within the democratic system.

Laure Michon, and Floris Vermeulen (2013), on the other hand, note that political integration and recognition of ethnic minority groups can occur in different ways. Examining the case of Amsterdam, they explore Turks who have taken the group-based strategy of integration, evidenced in the dense organisational facilities of the group, and Moroccans, who have followed a more individualistic strategy of assimilation. Michon and Vermeulen illustrate that whereas the electoral system’s characteristics determine which opportunities exist for immigrants to participate in the political process, the structure of an immigrant group influences the ability of members to seize such opportunities. In turn, these distinct trajectories produce a relatively high proportion of Turkish-origin elected officials, while Moroccan-origin individuals are more prominent in the executive offices, making critical day-to-day decisions.

5. Youth-focused studies

Paul Vedder, Erlijn Wenink, Mitch van Geel’s (2016) study explores the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslim youth in the Netherlands, which is characterised by 
*segregation* and negative intergroup attitudes. Integration policies also merit a discussion of the segregation of minorities. To that end, David Varady’s (2008) review of the academic literature and the popular press showed that there is considerable support for the concerns of politicians about Muslim segregation in European cities. First, segregation levels in many cities remain high, and the boundaries of residential concentrations are expanding. Second, segregation is primarily voluntary, reflecting strong ties to Islam, which makes government intervention difficult. Third, although the terrorism/rioting link to segregation is weak, Muslim residential clustering does appear to be retarding cultural integration through the absence of social networks connected to the economic mainstream and peer pressure to retain religious customs antithetical to the new host society. Finally, policies to reduce ethnic segregation through housing allocation—benign quotas and ethnic dispersal—are as unpopular in Europe as they are in the US.
Most notably, Varady (2008: 59-60) states that Muslim segregation is primarily a product of self-segregation, that really is, a desire to stay close to family, friends, mosques, and other Muslim-oriented institutions, regardless of geography. However, other factors are involved in terms of segregated housing patterns, such as actual and perceived discrimination in housing, low income and dynamics of housing including “the fact that Muslim immigrants arrived at a time when large public housing estates were being built on the urban fringe, the tendency for ethnically mixed housing estates to reseregret” (ibid).

Vedder et al. (2016)’s study draws on previous studies conducted in the 2000s, which demonstrated that relations between the native Dutch and Muslims in the Netherlands are problematic. Authors draw on the works of Gonzalez, Verkuyten, Weesie, and Poppe (2008), who reported that 54 percent of Dutch youth have negative feelings towards Muslims. Similarly, Van der Noll and Dekker (2010) showed a negative to a very negative attitude towards Islam and Muslims among native Dutch youth. Vedder et al. (2016), on the other hand, note that earlier studies focused on Dutch majority attitudes towards the Muslim minority and ignored Muslim migrants’ attitudes towards the native majority. To understand the intergroup attitudes, they follow Rohmann, Florack, and Piontkowski (2006) and explore the dynamics of these attitudes in both directions. In turn, testing Integrated Threat Theory, Vedder et al. analysed a sample of 671 native Dutch and 303 Muslim adolescents; they found that Dutch natives scored higher on Negative Outgroup Attitudes, Intergroup Anxiety, Negative Stereotypes, and Negative Experiences, and lower on Contact and Multiculturalism than Muslims.

Another important study on the youth dynamics is that of Francis Pakes (2010) which argues that global forces upon youth justice are apparent in the Netherlands, either through policy transfer or policy diffusion as well as through a process of ‘otherisation’ of ethnic minority youngsters of Moroccan-origin who are overrepresented in police encounters and detention rates. The study explores youth crime and youth justice to deconstruct the forces of globalisation. He contends that starting in the early-2000s, particularly after 9/11, a radical change in public and political discourse focused on immigrants, Muslims, and Moroccan youngsters. Similarly, as Fadil, de Koning, and Ragazzi (2019: 4) state in the post-9/11 era, “[w]ar on terror has come to produce its discourses, vocabularies, and policies which particularly target Muslim populations in the diaspora.” 9/11 also marked the Islamization of security and the growing popularity of the term Islamophobia. The term “Islamophobia” was first used by French anthropologists working for the colonial administrations in West Africa in the early 20th century to describe a differential mode of treatment of Muslim subjects based on a view that Islam was fundamentally other.

In the case of the Netherlands, Pakes (2010: 115) attributes this shift partly to the increased media attention to the misbehaviours of “misbehaving youngsters of ethnic minority descent, in the nightlife, run-down areas, swimming pools, shopping centres, football matches, and cultural events and so on.” The author contends that this shift worsened by the rise of Pim Fortuyn and Geer Wilders, whose anti-Islamic views deploy the Muslim youth as a source of social, cultural and political disruption (Kaya, 2015, 2017, 2019). Yağmur, and Van de Vijver (2012: 1114) similarly note that “issues of integration, unemployment, school dropouts, and criminality are associated with immigrant groups in
the media in the Netherlands...with the Turkish and Moroccan groups getting the largest share” although these representations are usually flawed (Brands, Crone, Leurdijk, and Top, 1998). To that end, Pakes (2010: 117-118) also shows that Moroccan youth crime in the Netherlands is considered a pivotal example of the failure of a multicultural society. In this reasoning, globalisation has created groups, which aim to disrupt and over time, destroy the Dutch way of life. As such, the Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom, PVV), led by Geert Wilders, that is defined through its anti-Islam discourse is an example of such reasoning. To illustrate, Party proposals in the 2000s include a stop on immigration from Morocco and Turkey for five years, a stop on the building of Mosques for five years, the abolishment of dual nationality, and a change to the constitution to emphasise in article 1 that a Judaic/humanistic/Christian culture should remain dominant (Pakes 2010: 115; see also Aas, 2005).

Aligned with the emphasis on the second-generation Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands, Maurice Crul, and Jeroen Doomernik’s (2003) study compares the socio-economic and socio-cultural status of the second-generation Turkish-origin youth and their Moroccan-origin counterparts. Crul and Doomernik (2003: 1045) highlight that there is an abundance of research promoted directly and indirectly by the public authorities assessing and explaining the socio-economic status of migrants and their descendants. These include PRIMA, CBS, and the Social Position and Use of Facilities by Ethnic Minorities Survey (SPVA), conducted in the every three to four years since 1988 to assess migrant educational status. As the authors underline ethnic origin in these surveys is determined based on the place of birth of one or both parents, thus it also includes second-generation offspring with one immigrant parent. Crul and Doomernik’s findings (2003) illustrate that the educational status of both groups is still considerably low, especially compared to the native Dutch population. This is a result of the obstacles faced by second-generation youth stemming from within their groups and through institutional structures and other forces within the Netherlands. The latter includes a delay in the introduction of second-language vocational training, resulting in Dutch language deficits and poor primary school results. Unemployment among second-generation migrants with limited educational backgrounds is also extremely high, and discrimination in the labour market has a major impact on the community.

Most importantly, Crul and Doomernik’s study found that (2003: 1060) in the Netherlands, the educational status of second-generation Turks and Moroccans is still low relative to the children of ethnic Dutch parents. Many Turk and Moroccan-origin students enrol in short, vocationally-focused educational tracks, or do not complete their education. In addition, unemployment among second-generation young adults with restricted educational tracks is very high, and labour market discrimination is widely experienced. However, there are also those among the second-generation who are excelling at education and the job market.

14 There also some studies on Turkish satellite television and its implications on the young immigrant-origin viewers. For instance, Milikowski (2000) argues that in the context of the Netherlands, satellite television has an unexpected effect of de-ethnicizing young Turkish’ migrants’ perceptions of cultural difference.

15 For further information on Geert Wilders’ political discourse, see Vossen, 2010, 2011; De Lange and Art, 2011; Poole, 2012.
Karen Phalet and Ute Schönpfug (2001) also conducted a comparative study researching the similarities and differences between the Turkish families in Germany and Turkish and Moroccan families in the Netherlands, in defining “acculturation.” The scholars argue that acculturation usually entails a change in the cultural transmission process as individuals’ social environments shape their culture. As such, acculturation in a migration situation requires some discontinuity with vertical transmission from parents to infants (Phalet and Ute Schönpfug, 2001: 186). Comparing 404 Turkish parent-child dyads in Germany were compared with 190 Turkish and Moroccan parent-child dyads in the Netherlands, they find that despite notable ethnic and national differences in the meaning of collectivism values, in the mediating role of conformity goals, and the transmission of achievement values, the combined cross-ethnic and cross-national comparisons yield convergent results, which sustain the intergenerational transmission of core collectivism values across acculturation contexts (Phalet, and Schönpfug, 2001: 197).


As in the cases of Germany, France, and Belgium, language proficiency is a key element of the literature on migrant integration and particularly in regards to access education and the labour market. For instance, Hyltenstam and Stroud (1996: 569-570) argue that minority communities with a publicly stigmatised identity are not likely to maintain their native language when they have limited legislative means to protect their interests, living within an assimilatory culture, and being economically and educationally marginalised. Drawing on such assumptions, Kutlay Yagmur and Fons van de Vijver (2012) study acculturation and language orientations among Turkish immigrants in Australia, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. They argue that four clusters of state ideologies shape immigrant-receiving societies’ integration and language policies. These ideological clustering models are a) pluralist ideology in which the state supports language classes and cultural activities with second language skills to encourage mother tongue preservation (i.e., Australia); b) civic ideology which expects immigrants to adopt the mainstream society’s public values and the state neither interferes with its citizens’ private values nor makes safeguards for the protection or promotion of minority linguistic or cultural values (i.e. The Netherlands); c) assimilation ideology expects the language and culture to be incorporated in the mainstream society, and assimilationist language policies are aimed at speeding up language shifts (i.e., France); d) ethnic ideology shares many elements of assimilation ideology, but cultural and structural obstacles prohibit immigrant communities being recognised as full members of mainstream society legally or socially. Naturalisation laws help to differentiate ethnic ideologies (i.e., Germany) (Yağmur, and Van de Vijver, 2012: 1113; see also Baubock, Heller, and Zolberg, 1996; Brubaker 1992, 2001).

After a long period of support for integration both among policy-makers and the public, the Dutch policy-makers’ approach is currently identified as “assimilationist” (Arends-Toth and Van de Vijver, 2003; Van Oudenhoven, Prins, and Buunk, 1998; Van Oudenhoven et al., 2006). This is also evidenced even in the 1990s when multiculturalism was the common approach to maintaining linguistic plurality, and ethnic minorities were expected to leave their native language and spend their resources on learning Dutch (Extra and Verhoeven, 1993: 22-23). Arends-Toth and Van de Vijver (2003) further studied this focus on
multiculturalism and acculturation. The study examined the psychological aspect of immigration in the Netherlands by contrasting views between the Dutch majority and members of the Turkish-Dutch minority on multiculturalism and the acculturation orientation of Turkish migrants. Arends-Toth and Van de Vijver (2003) found that the Dutch had a neutral attitude towards multiculturalism in the Netherlands on average, while the Turkish – Dutch attitude was more positive. In addition, they asserted that Dutch adults favoured assimilation above the integration of Turkish migrants in all realms of life. Turkish-Dutch individuals made a distinction between the public and private spheres and in the public domain integration was preferred, but in the private domain separation was preferred. All cultural groups consented that Turkish-origin migrants need to adapt to the Dutch culture while there was not a consensus in regards to the private domains.

Furthermore, Kutlay Yağmur and Fons van de Vijver’s comparative study found that (2012: 1125), while Turkish immigrants in France strongly identified with the Turkish group, they did not value Turkish highly and did not have a strong preference to use the language in their interactions. Educated Turks showed solid linguistic and cultural integration patterns in Australia, whereas educated Turks in France showed strong signs of linguistic assimilation in the public domain integration was preferred, but in the private domain separation was preferred. All cultural groups consented that Turkish-origin migrants need to adapt to the Dutch culture while there was not a consensus in regards to the private domains.

Sara Wallace Goodman (2011), who examines why some states in Western Europe have adopted integration from-abroad requirements that include tests and language courses administered as a condition for immigration, discusses another aspect of migration, integration, and language. Goodman argues that mandatory language and country knowledge training is a methodical and effective tool for controlling immigration-specifically family unification and training. She notes that the most significant impact of pre-entry integration and high barriers to pre-entry is exclusion by self-selection, cost, and inability to meet requirements. While a citizenship applicant may be adequately prepared to demonstrate his/her integration at the time of naturalisation after residing in the host country for a period of time, integration criteria at entry evaluate immigrants without any cultural or linguistic experience. If there are not any preparatory schemes, then solely, the migrants are responsible for preparation and integration (Goodman, 2011: 236).

Goodman (2011: 236) states, “despite the perception that states are experiencing wholesale convergence of immigrant integration practices and what Christian Joppke (2007: 1) describes as the ‘weakening of national distinctiveness’”, states have enduring and substantive differences. Goodman also concludes that this new instrument in immigration policy-making reveals strategic thinking by policy-makers to use the positive, politically acceptable language of integration and inclusion to achieve potentially objectionable and discriminatory outcomes of exclusion.
As such, Goodman (2011: 252) argues that requirements of language and country awareness are presented as necessary instruments for migrants’ integration, facilitating early training to prevent future problems. However, pre-arrival assessment discourages and restricts family migration. In contrast to other categories of migration, such as asylum, usually seen as a misused category or as highly qualified migration in which countries often compete, family-based migration gives rise to mixed opinions. On the one hand, people are entitled to family life, including the choice of a spouse. On the other hand, the strategy of liberal entry, which makes it possible for unresolved migration, exacerbates the current problems of refugees, not least the public perception that countries are burdened with immigrants and governments are unable to handle migration.

**Conclusion**

In the last decade, migration and integration policies have become more nationalised and more diverse. Nonetheless, as is the case of the Netherlands and other European countries, such policies are accompanied by certain discursive constructs which “frame” the perception of immigrant and immigrant-origin individuals. In this case, an important frame is the rise of terrorist activities in Europe in the past decade. Combined with the frames identified by in the literature, the Netherlands has witnessed the growing Islamisation of radicalisation, which refers to the exclusive association of radicalisation with Islam and Muslim-origin individuals. Moreover, up until the early-2010s, terrorism was framed as a social problem that had to be addressed by society at large. In recent years, Islam has been presented as the root cause of terrorist activities. As stated above, the fact that Muslim-origin social groups are constructed as a “suspect community”, which also defers the responsibility for radicalisation to the Muslim community.

This is a result of the fact that in dominant discourses about citizenship and national belonging, citizenship is mainly formulated in culturalised terms. To become a member of the national community; one has to internalise the ‘dominant norm and values’ and show their loyalty towards the country of residence. As a result, Muslims, mainly citizens from Turkish and Moroccan descent, are scrutinised. Their belonging is most explicitly questioned on the grounds of culture and loyalty to the nation (Slootman and Duyvendak 2016).

Furthermore, in mid-2020 the Dutch Parliament has opened an investigation on “unwanted interference from unfree countries” and a committee was formed to investigate what unwanted influence is taking place from social and religious organisations in the Netherlands, such as mosques, from unfree countries and how can this influence be broken? Witnesses and experts have focused on Islam, particularly on mosques, and framed Islam as a matter of security. Inviting two experts; Mr. D. Schoof, Director General, General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD); Mr. R. Sandee, terrorism expert, also legitimised this securitisation through a fear of radicalisation. Chairman’s of various mosques who were asked to clarify flows of money from countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and if the mosques were influenced by these countries in exchange for money. The secretary of Diyanet Holland was invited to talk about influence from Turkey. This investigation and the
Parliament’s framing of mosques via their transnational ties have also confirmed the issues surrounding the perception of Muslim-origin individuals as radicalised “suspects”.


Fleischmann, F., and Phalet, K. (2018). Religion and National Identification in Europe: Comparing Muslim Youth in Belgium, England, Germany, the Netherlands, and

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