

The interactions between the Turkish and Moroccan State actors and governments

LITERATURE REVIEW

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August 12, 2020

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3979254

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Preface

This literature review, prepared by Lalla Amina Drhimeur, is a comparative study on the history and political ideology of Turkey's Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) and Morocco's Justice and Development Party (*Parti de la justice et du développement*, PJD). It demonstrates how these two parties share similar ideological characteristics while evolving in two different political and social contexts. As such, this study provides an in-depth look into the AKP and PJD's political and religious ideologies, their political programs, and their policies towards the Turkish and Moroccan diaspora respectively. In doing so, this literature review reveals that these political parties represent the second generation of Islamic parties that maintain references to Islam while promoting a modern terminology on human rights and democracy.

This literature review was prepared in the scope of the ongoing EU-funded research for the "PRIME Youth" project conducted under the supervision of the Principal Investigator, Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya, and funded by the European Research Council with the Agreement Number 785934.

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Introduction

The analysis of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) in Turkey and the Justice and Development Party (*Parti de la justice et du développement*, PJD) in Morocco demonstrates how these two political parties share similar ideological characteristics while they have evolved in two different political and social contexts. Turkey is a multi-party democracy while Morocco is an autocracy in which the monarch possesses both political and religious powers. The comparison between the AKP and the PJD, when it comes to their ideologies and political programs, reveals how they represent what is commonly referred to as the second generation of Islamic parties, in other words, parties that still refer to Islam while promoting a modern terminology on human rights and democracy. The two parties have evolved out of Islamic movements and continue to make references to Islam in both their discourses and programs. They are the dominant political forces within their countries because they have learnt to become pragmatic to survive within their constraining political national and international contexts. They shifted their interest from the religious to the political while Islamic symbolism intends to reassure their conservative base. The need to rationalize their ideologies obeys the logic of political survival and political competition. It aims at broadening the parties' base while the emphasis on religious ethics serves to stand out in politics. The consolidation of a political party within national borders entails mobilizing the diaspora abroad especially if this one possesses political and economic powers. To mobilize this diaspora, a political party should have access to state institutions and should operate within a political system that enables it to draw both domestic and international policies. While the AKP has managed to consolidate its power in Turkey and therefore mobilize different resources to reach out to the Turkish diaspora abroad, the PJD continues to operate within a political system that reserves foreign policy and religious affairs to the king.

This literature review seeks to explore the interactions between the Turkish and Moroccan state actors and governments as far as the Turkish AKP and the Moroccan PJD are concerned focusing on the exportation of the Islamist ideology to the diaspora.¹ To do so, this review will first start with the examination of the evolution of the AKP and the PJD from Islamist movements to the dominant political parties in their countries. Both the AKP and the PJD are represented as the second generation of pro-Islamic parties that continue to refer to religion in their rhetoric while adopting a modern political terminology referring to governance, human rights and democracy. The second section aims to explain the two parties' understanding of Islam and the past and how their governmental evolution made them shift their interests from the religious to the political. In other words, the AKP and the PJD have sought to rationalize their ideology and rhetoric in accordance with their local and international context, institutional constraints and the interaction with other political actors. Their ideological considerations also obey the logic of political competition and what power represents in terms of economic and political interests. In other words, parties adjust their rhetoric depending on voters' preferences to compete in politics (Somer, 2014). The interaction with other political parties, which are also competing for power, and the necessity to appeal to a larger electorate usually entails an internal debate about what negotiations, compromises and concessions should be made (Tezcür, 2010). The third and last section aims to examine both the AKP's and the PJD's religious diaspora politics and what maintaining links with the Turkish and Moroccan communities abroad mean for the two parties in terms of political, economic and symbolic gains.

1. The evolution of the AKP and the PJD

The comparison between the AKP and the PJD reveals how these two parties are the typical examples of second-generation pro-Islamic parties that have evolved out of Islamic movements and continue to make references to Islam in both their discourses and political programs. As a matter of fact, the AKP evolved out the National Vision Movement (*Milli Görüş Hareketi*), which fiercely opposed Turkey's laïcité and Westernization. The PJD

¹ The literature reviews on "The Moroccan political system" (Drhimeur, 2020), and "The State of the Art on Moroccan Emigration to Europe" (Drhimeur, 2020) are available at <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/publications/archive/>

evolved out of the Movement for Unity and Reform (*Mouvement Unité et Réforme*), which claimed that Islamic law should be the source of all laws (Mohsen-Finan and Zeghal, 2006). Furthermore, both parties are the dominant political parties within their systems. The AKP is Turkey's governing political Party since 2002 while the PJD won two consecutive legislative elections, the first in 2011 and the second in 2016. In addition, although they claim they have abandoned open Islamic references in their platforms, they still resort to religious values and rhetoric to preserve their electoral appeal. As a matter of fact, both parties have sought to moralize public actions by calling for the establishment of a 'pious generation' by the AKP and for the construction of an 'ethical generation' by the PJD to define political life. However, these two pro-Islamic parties evolve in different socio-political contexts. Turkey is a multi-party democracy where the governing Party has access to state resources and can outline both domestic and foreign policy. Morocco, on the other hand, is an autocracy where the king preserves both political and religious powers being the 'Commander of the Faithful' and reserves the last word in policymaking.

1. 1 The Evolution of the AKP

The Turkish political system is a secular multiparty democracy in which the elite positioned themselves as the guardians of the Kemalist republic. Within this context, Islamist movements were officially banned, and the Turkish Constitutional Court voted to dissolve Islamic political parties on the ground that they threatened the secular values.

Although the AKP evolved out of the Islamist movement *Milli Görüş* (the National Vision), its members quickly underlined their separation and demanded the creation of a new party (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009). In the 1960s, the National Vision brought together several religious orders with the intention of reviving Islamic values to govern the Turkish political life (Bulaç, 2010). Disappointed with the ruling elites, this movement sought to create different political parties, including the *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party, RP) and the *Fazilet Partisi* (Virtue Party, FP). However, these parties were banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court on the basis their programs threatened the Kemalist values of the Republic (Ibid).

One of the significant figures of the National Vision was Necmeddin Erbakan. To lay the ideological foundation of the movement, Islam came to play a major role. The movement believed that the establishment of a new Turkish state could only be achieved

through respect for Islamic values (Bulaç, 2010). To revive Islam, the movement intended first to take control of the state and its institutions, and then initiate political, economic and social reforms from an Islamic perspective (Ibid). According to Erbakan, Muslim identity should govern policies because their ultimate duty is to consolidate Islamic faith (Hale and Özbudun, 2009). A fierce opponent of globalization and the European Union, he wanted to build an “ummah” or an “Islamic unity” based on religious identity, a unification of Muslim communities, and a break with the West (Özdalaga, 2002). Erbakan refused to accept the liberal economic system. Instead, he wanted to establish an international economic and trade organization between eight Muslim countries, known as the D8², to resist the G8 and to create a common Islamic market (Kuru, 2007).

However, frictions between the older generation of the movement and the younger one that was excluded from leadership led to divisions within the movement, and the creation of two distinct political parties (Kuru, 2007). The first, called the AKP, founded by the younger generation while the second, the *Saadet Partisi* (Felicity Party), by the older one. Although several AKP members had previously belonged to the religious movement, they soon highlighted their ideological differences. They emphasized how they embraced globalization and a particular type of secularism that would allow for religious public visibility (Ibid). They also emphasized democracy and how they abandoned the idea of establishing an Islamic state (Ibid). In 2002, the AKP won the Turkish general elections with an absolute majority and rose to power.

The Turkish Constitution of 1961 institutionalized the National Security Council³ (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*, MGK) as a body of control and surveillance. The army drew the broad lines of national and foreign policy. The role of the MGK was further strengthened by the 1982 Constitution, which designated the armed forces as the guardians of Kemalism, while foregrounding the secular character of the state. The Turkish Armed Forces were accountable to the Prime Minister rather than the Ministry of National Defense (Undaldi, 2008), which gave them great autonomy and an opportunity to intervene in policy-making

² The D-8 is an organization that would bring together Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey.

³ The National Security Council consisted of the Head of State, generals and ministers.

without any civilian control (Tezcür, 2010). The Turkish Armed Forces had a right of veto, and they carried out four coups leading to the closure of four Islamic political parties for having threatened the secular foundations of the Republic. In the midst of this political unrest, incessant military interventions and after having observed the fate of religious-oriented parties, the AKP leaders reformulated their language to mark a break with the Islamist parties of the past. They started to criticize the idea of an Islamic state and claimed to have accepted secularism (Yavuz, 2006). According to the AKP, secularism is a principle that “maintains peace between various beliefs, schools of thought and perspectives” (Ibid, p.142). It “guarantees freedom of religion and conscience” and cannot be understood “as an enmity against religion” (Ibid). The political use of religion can only be prejudicial to social order, political pluralism and religion itself (Kuru, 2007). The Party defined its ideology as a conservative democracy that aims at protecting important values while promoting progress (Heper, 2006).

In an attempt to avoid raising suspicion within the army, AKP leaders normalized their behavior, and adapted to the center. They sought to meet the Copenhagen criteria⁴, which determine a country’s eligibility to join the European Union and adopted several reforms aiming at consolidating civilian control over the military. Consequently, in July 2003, the Parliament ended the MGK’s executive authority and its power of control (Oscan, 2008). The MGK was instead assigned an advisory role (Ibid). Thus, the reforms removed the military tutelage of the presidency, the judiciary and the secret services (Ibid). A civilian is now appointed at the head of the Secretariat-General whose majority of members are civilians (Ibid). Its activities are now made public to achieve broader political transparency (Ibid). The AKP, therefore, managed to secure the autonomy of the government from the military, which positions itself as the guardians of the Kemalist values and in doing so consolidated its power.

⁴ The Copenhagen criteria are the rules that define whether a country is eligible to join the European Union or not. The criteria require that a state has the institutions to preserve democratic governance and human rights, has a functioning market economy, and accepts the obligations and intent of the EU.

1. 2 The evolution of the PJD

Unlike Turkey, Morocco is a parliamentary monarchy which grants the king both political and religious legitimacy being the “Commander of the Faithful”. If the regime allows the opposition to participate in formal politics, the political system remains autocratic allowing an elite close to the palace to influence the decision-making process through technocrats appointed to important positions (Zerhouni, 2014). This elite, called the *makhzen*, monopolizes key sectors through clientelist networks (Ibid).

The creation of the PJD goes back to the Islamic Youth Movement, which was created in 1969 by young activists who wanted to deliver society from the oppression of the regime (Wegner and Pellicer, 2009). According to the movement, the use of violence was legitimate to establish an Islamic state (Ibid). The Movement quickly was radicalized and involved in the assassination of Omar Benjelloun, a known leader from the left-wing (Ibid). Consequently, the Movement was banned, and its leader fled to Libya (Ibid). Dissidents demanded official recognition of the regime and formed a new movement called the *Jama'a al Islamiya* (Islamic Community) in 1982 (TelQuel, 2007). They renamed their movement *Al Islah wa Attajdid* (Reform and Renewal) to get rid of any Islamic connotations (Tozy, 1999). Other small Islamist movements joined, and the Movement was renamed *Al Islah wa Attawhid* (Unity and Reform Movement, MUR) (Ibid). The Movement became convinced of the necessity to recognize the legitimacy of the king to survive (El Othmani, 2007). Its members declared that their objective is no longer to establish an Islamic state but to initiate reforms (Wegner and Pellicer, 2009). They also declared that the movement aims at renewing the understanding of religion and consolidating the unity of Muslims through education (Ibid). They announced that the agenda is no longer revolutionary but targets initiating reforms through policy-making and governance (Raissouni, 2006). The Movement concluded that forming a party and participating in politics were necessary to initiate societal reforms under the leadership of an Islamic elite (El Othmani, 2004). After several attempts to form their own party, the movement finally joined formal politics under the banner of the Popular Constitutional and Democratic Movement (MPCD) in 1996 (Ottaway and Riley, 2006).

The inclusion of the Party meant for the regime a possibility to monitor an Islamist tendency. At the same time, it was an opportunity to use political Islam as a way to contain the rise of the left in Morocco (TelQuel, 2007), and it meant for the MUR the possibility to participate in political life and influence policy-making (Holger and Wegner, 2006). In 1998 the Party was renamed the Justice and Development Party (PJD). Shortly after its creation, the PJD underlined the distinction between the political party and the religious movement (MUR) that forms its popular base. This functional separation was a condition made by the regime. After the suicide bombings in Casablanca on May 16, 2003, the monarchy stressed the necessary separation between politics and religion. The close ties between the PJD and the MUR were severely criticized by the political elite and the state which blamed the anti-Western discourse of the PJD for opening up the way to radical Islam (Perekli, 2012).

Thus it was agreed that the Party would deal with political issues while the MUR has the right to manage missionary activities or what is commonly called *da'wah* (Mohsen-Finan and Zeghal, 2006). According to this institutional differentiation, the MUR deals with issues of identity, including the revival of Islamic values and morals in society (Ibid). It focuses on civil society while the Party focuses on public policy (Ibid). The separation did not occur only at the organizational level, but also at the operational level (Tamam, 2007). The political party and the religious movement are thus institutionally independent and manage their own decision-making bodies (Ibid). Because of this institutional and functional differentiation, PJD members began to downplay their emphasis on religion in their speeches and to adopt a modern political terminology referring to human rights and democracy. However, this separation is difficult to maintain on the level of membership when nearly 30 percent of the Movement are members of the Party (Wegner, 2011). In local elections, the PJD often uses the MUR's newspaper (*à-tajdîd*) to publish the profiles of its members and their programs (Ibid). Some PJD officials are very active within the MUR and use its resources to organize social and charity activities (Mohsen-Finan and Zeghal, 2006). They often cooperate with the Movement and its network of associations to use their volunteers, donors and public finances to provide services in education, employment, health or even the legal sector (Ibid). This cooperation makes the "association network" effective and helps promote close and privileged links between the party and civil society

organizations (Berriane, 2009). The party base is therefore broadened to include potential activists or voters necessary for political mobilization (Ibid).

The PJD's wish to participate in formal politics led the Party to form alliances with the most unlikely political actors. These alliances are not based on any ideological affinities. The Party no longer positions itself within the "critical" political opposition but within a "constructive, positive and consultative" political elite. The PJD seems to have opted for political pragmatism which helped it to make political gains. It won the legislative elections in 2011 and has remained in power since then.

2. The AKP's and the PJD's understanding of Islam and the past

Religious movements and political parties are complex and should not be understood independently from their local and international context. Like any other political party, parties with an Islamic reference are political actors that obey the logic of political competition. They evolve according to their context, constraints and possibilities of political and economic gains. They also adapt the other actors with whom they interact. They are not fixed nor have a fixed set of ideas. Rather they adjust their rhetoric for political survival.

Similarly, the AKP and the PJD have evolved according to their context and the objectives they want to achieve. These are political actors, and so they are interested in obtaining and preserving power. This political pragmatism made them shift their interests from the religious to the political (Seniguer, 2012). The Parties have reviewed and rationalized their ideology, speeches and rhetoric according to their institutional context, their environment but also according to the logics of power and political competition (Ibid).

2. 1 The AKP's understanding of Islam and the past

Islamist thought in Turkey, which has been heavily influenced by nationalism, has been critical towards the country's secular practices for having failed to protect freedom of faith (Ceran, 2019). It is a local phenomenon in the sense that it does not bear major influences from Islamist movements elsewhere like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Ibid). However, the failure of Islamist political parties to maintain power raised questions about the ability of the Islamists to have a clear political aim and an intellectual paradigm. What followed was a period of self-criticism and debate about the compatibility of the revolutionary

representations of Islamism and the challenges of politics and the real world. Islamists in Turkey understood that Islamism does not really offer political opportunities and would not make it possible to mobilize voters beyond their conservative base. As a consequence, they sought to revive their narrative and create a new political platform, one that is more inclined towards the center-right without excluding religious voters (Ibid).

In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has established itself as the dominant political force since it rose to power in 2002. The literature on the evolution of the AKP generally differentiates between two major periods. The first when the party rose to power in 2002 (Kaya, 2015). The second started after the 2007 presidential elections that ended the term of the secular President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer and replaced him with Abdullah Gul, a member of the AKP (Ibid). This differentiation takes into account the discourses and the practices of the AKP and how it uses them to position itself at the national and international level.

During the first trend, the AKP presented itself as a moderate Muslim political party that aimed at aligning Turkey with the norms of the European Union and implementing neoliberal economic policies. In doing so, it attempted to differentiate itself from the National Vision Movement from which it emerged. This movement used Islamic morality to address socioeconomic problems and positioned modernity in contradistinction to Islam (Çınar and Duran, 2004). It also used Islamic values to conceptualize society, beliefs and politics and at the same time, to mobilize voters (Ibid). Within the movement, Turkish national identity was defined in terms of Islamic civilization and in opposition to the west and Europe (Burhanettin, 2004). Because the Movement referred to religion, it incurred the wrath of the military, and thus the Constitutional Court banned its parties on the basis they violated secular values (Ibid). Islamists started changing their discourse by underlining human rights and democratization in an attempt to avoid repression and allow for religious practices (Ibid). With this change of tactics and strategies, the AKP rose to power in 2002. It adopted a new discourse that focuses on democratization and the rule of law (Ibid). According to scholars, the recognition of democratization was deemed necessary because it would allow pious people to lead a Muslim life and to practice their faith (Çınar and Duran, 2004). The AKP rejected the label of 'Islamist' insisting that the Party did not intend to

establish an Islamic state nor did it reject democracy or secularism (Ibid). On the other hand, party leaders claimed they forged a new understanding of the relationship between politics and religion (Ibid). The objective was to form a new society that balances between modernity and respect for traditional values, in other words, a society open to the world but preserving its Muslim identity (Insel, 2017). Because for the AKP Islam is what unites the Turkish society, the Party thinks it represents every Turkish citizen (Ibid). To become an inclusive party, the AKP proposed to “transport the center of society to the center of politics” and tried to bring the peripheral identities, mainly the Muslims, to the center of the political system (Ibid). The AKP believed that the implosion of the political system was the failure of the state to include different political and religious sensitivities (Ibid). Thus the Party moved towards the center of the political spectrum, towards conservatism in an attempt to appeal to different segments of society (Ibid). It enlarged its constituency by highlighting the need to preserve and strengthen national moral values based on Islam and by presenting itself in opposition to the Westernized elite (Ibid).

The AKP’s discourse remained vague in its references to Islamism or Islamic civilization (Burhanettin, 2004). According to scholars, abandoning the Islamist vocabulary, the concept of the Islamic state or the Islamic ideology was a pragmatic choice to avoid repression (Ibid). This political pragmatism would facilitate Turkey’s accession to the EU and what it entailed in terms of political gains since the adoption of European political norms would lead to political autonomy from the military tutelage (Ibid). The focus was then shifted to the Islamic civilization and the importance of the universal values of modernity that were considered compatible with Islam (Ibid).

When the AKP came to power in 2002, it made no reference to Islamist political elements. It positioned itself as a center-right political party that avoided the traditional Islamist anti-secular, anti-western and anti-market economy discourse (Ceran, 2019). This position is what is commonly referred to as the “second phase of Islamism” (Çınar and Duran, 2008). This new generation of Islamists abandoned their Islamic ideological rigidity in favor of an Islamic cultural program because they understood the Turkish context and its political specificities (Ibid). Though the AKP decided to remove religious symbols from the name of the party, it kept some Islamist sensitivities for the sake of political mobilization

since, according to the party, the secular elite failed to debate political questions relating to one's religious practices (Ibid). Hence, AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's statement "my reference is Islam" (Ibid, p.33) was not clear to what level he was referring to or whether he was referring to Islam in politics, society or only the personal level (Ibid).

Many members of the AKP used to be members of the National Vision Movement, which had a strong anti-Western stance (Çayır, 2008). An understanding of the secular nature of the country and learning from the past, from parties that used the Islamic discourse and could not remain in power, the AKP's politicians distanced themselves from this discourse and they emphasized "new Islamism" that would work to reconcile the East and the West (Ibid). While the literature explains how the National Vision Movement wanted to reach power and seize state institutions to transform society, it explains how the AKP aimed for consensual politics that would reconcile Islam and democracy from a conservative angle (Ibid). According to the literature, the Party did not believe that Islamization would happen through the state but at an individual level by "liberating social dynamics and allowing them to be reflected in politics" (Yıldız, 2008). For the Party, politics should enable opening new spaces and assuring basic rights and liberties, and liberal values would allow freeing the Party from the state, and thus change becomes possible (Ibid). This rationalization of Islam aspired to abandon Islam as a political program and focused on Islam in terms of social issues (Ibid). Democratic values were deemed necessary by party leaders to guarantee basic religious rights, the Party's legitimacy and respite from the Kemalist elite (Ibid). In its program, the Party insisted on liberalism and free-market economy. This did not mean that the Party broke with the tradition of its religious movement (Ibid). It simply meant that the Party was looking for new economic opportunities for the bourgeoisie that supports it (Ibid).

An analysis of the party members, program, discourse and practices helps to understand the Party's ideology better. Party members, including its grassroots, have an Islamic past and are sensitive to questions relating to Islam. However, this inability to clearly define what the Party meant by its Muslim democrat identity is considered a power strategy and an opportunity to be flexible (Çınar, 2017). The Party insisted on the concept of conservative democracy to define its ideology (Ibid). According to the party, this ideology

was not based on religion but sought religious freedom as they are enjoyed in the West (Ibid). The AKP's conservative democratic identity tried to use Westernization discourse in a more credible and effective way (Ibid). It accepted democracy, the rule of law and human rights while at the same time, it remained committed to the conservative Islamic roots (Duran, 2004). The concept of conservative democracy was vaguely defined which intended to reassure the Kemalist forces about the AKP's commitment to democracy and reflected a need to overcome its legitimacy deficit to survive in power (Çınar, 2017). Thus these ideological considerations seemed to have been driven by power, by a desire to remain in power and to boost the Party's legitimacy (Ibid). While the AKP promoted the values of neoliberalism in the economy, it promoted religious, nationalist, familial, traditional and moral values when it comes to its social policies (Marcou, 2004). According to scholars, religion and identity politics were used to give a voice to the marginalized and to have access to power (Ibid) while conservative democracy was used to remain in power (Çınar, 2017). It was a synthesis of modern and traditional values (Turunç, 2007). Modern values related to human rights, secularism and free-market economy while traditional values referred to Islamic and traditional lifestyles (Ibid). Islam was used to express the grievances of the marginalized underprivileged and bring them to the center (Ibid). With conservative democracy, the party explained how it wanted to offer Turkish citizens the possibility of embracing modernity without rejecting their traditions (Ibid). To do so, it became necessary to make references to Islam, to an understanding of Islam rooted in national and cultural values (Çınar and Duran, 2008). As explained by Abdullah Gül, one of the founding members of the AKP and its former foreign minister: "Islam has been one of the major motives of the society and the culture" (Ibid, p. 33). These politics of identity reflected the AKP's Islamic sensitivity as it has been trying to meet Islamic demands and problematize the Kemalist understanding of secularism within these demands (Ibid). For the party, politics should answer popular demands that relate to religious questions (Ibid). In other words, the Party intended to bring religious issues to the political sphere (Ibid). Thus party members believed that reconciling secularism/modernism and Islam should recognize the need to make Islamic identity and ethnic, cultural and religious specificities visible in public (Ibid). For the literature, however, the Party favored revitalizing the old divide between the secular and the Islamic in an attempt to appeal to voters beyond its traditional constituency (Kaya,

2015). By referring to conservative democracy, the Party pretended to represent the excluded societal and Islamic values (Ibid). The purpose was to appeal to those masses by creating identification tools between the Party and the nation (Ibid). By capitalizing on the discourse of victimization, of how Muslims in Turkey have been victims of the secular elite, the Party wanted to mobilize the masses (Ibid).

AKP's definition of conservative democracy thus focused on the issue of compatibility between Islam and democracy and the place of Islam in democratic politics. For the party, it was a wish to build an Islamic democracy, different from the Western understanding of democracy, but one which would allow the discussion of religious matters from a nationalist perspective (Ceran, 2019).

To support its conservative discourses and policies about gender, political economy and daily life practices, and to represent itself as being a "moral leader" for society "in all walks of life" (Lord, 2018, p. 113), the Party resorted to *Diyanet*, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Öztürk, 2016). As an example, the *Diyanet* supported Erdoğan's stances on how motherhood should be the primary duty of women or on how social media in their way of portraying the Gezi Protests should be considered as Turkey's public enemy (Ibid). Thus the presidency plays an important role in supporting and legitimizing the AKP's discourses and actions, mainly those of Erdoğan (Ibid). The Turkish state had previously utilized *Diyanet* to represent official Islam and to control religious discourses and religious practices in line with state policies (Ibid). Once the AKP rose to power, it has sought to empower *Diyanet* and increased its budget (Ibid). More importantly, the Presidency was granted the right to express opinions on laws, statutes and regulations and to censor religious content on online platforms (Lord, 2018). It now has the possibility of establishing its own media sources and TV channels to inform and provide religious teaching (Ibid). The AKP has sought to increase both *Diyanet*'s budget and personnel in an attempt to increase both the visibility and presence of Islam in public space and state agency when it comes to the religious discourse (Bruce, 2019). *Diyanet* employs more theology professors and highly educated personnel than before to highlight the "religious authority" and "legitimacy" of its members in contrast to "unofficial Islam" (Ibid).

The Party thus used the Presidency to provide its policies with a religious justification (Öztürk, 2019). The Party has also delegated social provisions and services to religious movements, which reflects the return of religion to public space (Kaya, 2015). Thus, Islam has been used to incorporate and comfort the underprivileged, the marginalized and the forgotten in the suburbs (Ibid).

The AKP's had also previously allied with the Gülen movement because they seemed to share a common interest against the laic-Kemalist establishment (Öztürk, 2019). The movement enjoyed a vast network within the civilian bureaucracy, the media and the business world (Ibid). This network was deemed necessary for the AKP as an instrument to legitimize its policies in its fight against the laic-Kemalist tutelage (Ibid). The Gülen movement, which originated in Turkey in the late 1960s under the charismatic leadership of Fethullah Gülen, has been defined as a faith-based social movement committed to "education, interfaith dialogue, voluntarism and humanitarian service" (Watmough and Öztürk, 2018). The movement gradually crafted a complex transnational network and expanded to establish schools, businesses, trade associations, media companies and cultural centers both in Turkey and abroad (Ibid). While the movement claims it is not interested in active politics or political parties, it has been accused by both the secular elite and the AKP for wanting to control the state secretly since many students who went to its schools have held positions within different state institutions (Doğan, 2019).

While the Republic secular principles do not tolerate unions or cooperation between a political party and a religious organization, these alliances have helped to open public space for unofficial Islamic groups, for religious orders, groups and movements that operate within the private sphere without state control (Öztürk, 2019). This cooperation has also enabled these groups to have access to important decision-making positions (Ibid). This access would strengthen the position of the AKP in politics and pave the way for a change in state identity (Ibid).

Despite the apparent religiosity of its members, the AKP seems to have understood that religious identity or Islam would not make it possible to mobilize a great number of Turkish voters (Yıldız, 2008). Resorting to a conservative, democratic, reformist and pro-European identity offered an opportunity for the AKP to reassure the Kemalist Republicans

and to avoid military repression (Cizre, 2008). It intended to reassure the Kemalist elite that the AKP is oriented towards building a “new Turkey” based on a Western model (Ibid). However, adopting a conservative ideology that abandoned explicit Islamist ideology remained ambiguous. This position did not mean that the AKP had cut ties with the Islamic movement in Turkey (Ibid). The Party sought to preserve some Islamist links necessary to reassure its religious and Islamist constituency when needed (Ibid). This discourse that highlighted the importance of Islamic values and civilization served to create an idea of continuity in Turkish politics while talks about modernity and democracy appealed to those looking for change (Ibid). AKP’s conservative democracy was about being flexible and pragmatic. It was about presenting a ‘counter-elite’ discourse and a “counter-cultural model of modernity” to the Kemalist elites (Ibid) and a tool of political legitimacy to appeal to Turkish voters and their native sensitivities to survive (Yıldız, 2008).

The second period of the AKP rule, started after the 2007 presidential elections when Abdullah Gul, a member of the AKP, replaced the secular President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (Kaya, 2015). The latter, close to the secular army, vetoed many AKP bills on the basis they represented an Islamisation threat (Ibid). During this period, the AKP has aimed at redefining Turkey as a Muslim nation that should free itself from the effects of Westernization (Çınar, 2017). This discourse has been centered on the necessity of purifying the Turkish society from the contaminating effects of Western values (Ibid). Islam was contrasted with Western civilization and its corrupt, immoral and degenerate secular nature (Ibid). The AKP has ‘retooled’ itself and has resorted to new strategies of discourse and policies within the nationalist-conservative political framework (Ceran, 2019). The Party, mainly Erdoğan, started mixing religious references with nationalist, conservative, center-right and anti-establishment references (Ibid). Party leaders mobilized the social, cultural, nationalist and religious values to position themselves as the guardian of religious values (Ibid). For instance, empowering Islam meant lifting the ban on headscarves both in schools and civil services (Kaya, 2015). New concepts were introduced in schools such as the concept of human rights from an Islamic perspective and the presentation of marriage and family as the foundation of society (Ibid).

The Party started highlighting Turkey's Muslim identity and its ability to challenge the Kemalist hegemony (Çınar, 2017). In fact, Western values have been considered as a threat to the Party's survival and a source of constraints (Ibid). In emphasizing the country's Muslim identity, the Party has intended to discredit other political forces and portray their Western paradigms and Islamophobia as being non-native (Ibid). The AKP has built its discourse on the idea that those who promote Westernization within Turkey are disconnected from the Muslim values of their own society (Ibid). Imposing an alien culture on the Muslims was presented as the leading cause of Turkey's underdevelopment (Ibid). Restoring and preserving Islamic identity and values through politics and within both the state and society was presented as the only way to progress (Ibid). Thus positioning itself as the guardian of the Muslim identity and emphasizing the Party's members' local patriotism served to discredit the Party's political opponents (Ceran, 2019). After the AKP consolidated its power and broadened its constituency base, it broke with the Gülen movement (Lord, 2018). The break happened after the 15 July 2016 attempted coup when the Gülen movement was accused of conspiring against the AKP and orchestrating the coup (Bruce, 2019). Since 2007, the literature explains that the Party has taken an Islamist and an authoritarian drive (Lord, 2018). It has expanded the power of the *Diyanet* and introduced religious education in schools (Ibid) such as instituting pro-Imam Hatip school (Islamic vocational schools) reforms. The re-construction of national identity and the use of *Diyanet* to support party politics reproduced religious authoritarianism (Ibid). Islam and the discourse on the victimization of the marginalized conservative and pious masses have been presented against the secular state and its hegemony (Ibid). Emphasis on national and Muslim identity are marketed as a democratization process that reflects the 'national will' of the 'Muslim Majority' (Ibid).

After the 2017 constitutional referendum and the shift to the Presidential system in 2018, Erdoğan has increasingly used religious symbols in its discourse to present the secular elite as being authoritarian and 'alcoholic' (Foreign Policy, 2016). This discourse is based on a dichotomy that opposes this corrupt elite to the "pious" ordinary Turkish citizen (Ibid). Within the same rhetoric, his political opponents are presented as being disrespectful towards Islamic values of the people and so religious symbols serve to discredit his political opponents and grant his party more legitimacy and credibility (Çınar, 2011). The AKP has

started calling for the necessity to re-examine and re-define laïcité⁵ (Çinar, 2008). The AKP's political discourse started portraying the Turkish society as being a victim of the laic and Kemalist elites and their top-down modernization process that imposed alien values and lifestyles on Turkish citizens (Yılmaz, 2017). Erdoğan has constantly criticized the opposition, mainly the CHP (Republican People's Party), for oppressing devout Muslims (Ibid). The AKP used the opposition to articulate its grievances by calling the CHP a "cruel actor that repressed the daily culture of 'the people,' and attacked their religious values" (Ibid, p.8). The CHP is the first political party of the Republic and is often associated with the Turkish Republic's founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Öniş, 2016). The party aimed at promoting modernization in social and political life (Ayan, 2010) and presented itself as the defender of the Republic and its secular values (Kiriş, 2012).

This victimization discourse has helped the party to promote strong emotional identification with voters and consolidate its power (Yılmaz, 2017) (see Appendix 1: the General Elections in Turkey). This form of populism⁴ that presents the "pious" ordinary Turkish citizen as a victim of the infidels and the secular, risks polarizing the society between believers and infidels, the pious and the corrupt, the religious and the secular (Kaya, 2019).

In its definition of the Turkish nation, the Party insists that it is a "homogeneous political entity" whose citizens share common interests, common values and a common past regardless of individual or sectarian interests (Saraçoğlu and Demirkol, 2015). For the AKP, Sunni Islam and the Ottoman heritage are the most important elements in its conception of the nation (Ibid). Islam became an essential part of Turkish identity and nationalism, especially at the popular level (Ibid). So Sunni Islam and its values have been playing a much important role for the Party in defining Turkish identity. In other words,

⁵ Since its creation in 1937, Turkey has been officially named a secular state (Öztürk, 2016). However secularism within the Turkish context is distinct. It is the product of the country's particular historical experience (Kuru, 2009, 162-195). The founding fathers of the Republic chose the term *laiklik* (laicite) to refer to their understanding of the relationship between state and religion (Davison, 2003). They banned the use of religion for political purposes, abolished the Caliphate and Sharia, activities of religious orders, and established Diyanet as an ideological state apparatus to help manage religion by the Kemalist elite (Ibid). Thus, the literature on Turkey's laïcité does not mention a separation between religion and state, rather the state oversees the management of religion for the purpose of limiting its influence and pacifying it (Öztürk, 2016). For the Kemalist elite, state's control of Islam would allow to transform and modernize the country (Ibid). To do so, all traces of religion within the public sphere should be eliminated (Ibid).

under the AKP government, Islam is more than cultural references and has become the essence of Turkish identity (Ibid). The centrality of Islam in nation-building is reflected in political practices and public speeches. Erdoğan has repeatedly referred to the importance of raising “a religious generation” and the importance of respecting “one state, one nation, one flag and one religion” (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 2015). Nationalism is used to mobilize certain segments of society for political ends. The AKP draws on nationalism as a symbolic and discursive instrument that helps to justify its neoliberal policies but also to build and strengthen ideological ties between the Party, the state and society (Saraçoğlu and Demirkol, 2015).

By highlighting the importance of Islamic values within the Turkish national identity, the AKP has won the support of the new ‘Islamic’ bourgeoisie for whom Islam holds a strong social position both as cultural references and religious beliefs (Haynes, 2010). It has also won the support of a new electoral base for which Islam is a reference for identity (Ibid). By bringing religious nationalism to power, the AKP has managed to appeal to the religious and nationalist sentiment (Armstrong, 2012). Furthermore, if Islamic values and Muslim identity are the key elements of the nation for the party, this conception is far from reflecting “a universalist Islamic perspective” or including the entire Muslim world (Saraçoğlu and Demirkol, 2015). It is limited to the Turkish people living within Turkish borders (Ibid).

The AKP’s understanding of the past is often linked to the image of the Ottoman Empire as being the cradle of civilization, and an Islamic Empire that is liberal and multicultural (Wastnidge, 2019). Turkey is then articulated as the guardian of this cultural legacy (Ibid). Davutoglu’s book called Strategic Depth emphasises that Turkey’s geopolitical location as a meeting place between different continents and its historical legacy as the “rightful heir” to the Ottoman Empire give it the potential to unify and lead the Muslim world (Davutoglu, 2001). It is a very nostalgic understanding reflected in both the Party’s domestic and foreign policies (Wastnidge, 2019). This representation of Turkey’s history and geography serves to portray Turkey as a country with an exceptionalist identity (Lerna, 2011). It has influenced foreign policy in a way to strengthen Turkey’s regional influence (Taşpınar, 2008). This perception of the Ottoman Empire enables to balance Turkey’s regional interests between the West and the East and counterbalance Kemalism (Ibid). This

nostalgic understanding of the Ottoman past influences its domestic politics as well. It is mainly about restoring lost great ancient values (Ibid). It is a source of pride for the AKP and an influence on its political and cultural identity (Ibid). This is reflected in its public discourse and practices (Ibid). It is about the appropriation of religious symbols within the past to conceptualize identity and “memory-based politics” that determine the way citizens conduct their relationship with the state (Ibid). The AKP has often claimed that its programs and policies are influenced by the Turkish past and most importantly are a continuation of the policies and programs adopted during the Ottoman Empire (Yavuz, 2016). Within this nostalgia, Islam bears a civic, moral and educational vision (Josseran, 2018). The AKP represents Islam as the common identity shared by all the Turks (Ibid). It bears a civilizational message that enables to include different ethnic backgrounds. For the AKP Islam is national and offers a moral order necessary for the state to help individuals and to ensure national solidarity and integrity (Ibid). Thus, the party believes young people must receive religious teaching within the public education system (Ibid). The revival of the Ottoman past is a strategic option to balance West and East relations and to appeal to nationalist and secularist voters who would like to see Turkey play a more significant regional role (Walker, 2009).

2. 2 The PJD's Understanding of Islam and the past

In Morocco the origins of the PJD date back to the Islamic Youth Movement, a religious movement that is generally considered as one of the most radical militant Islamic groups in Morocco (Munson, 1986). The movement presented itself as the “vanguard of an authentic Islamic revolution in Morocco, a revolution that enlightens the horizon of this country and liberates its people to bring them back to the Islam of Muhammad and of those among his people who have known how to follow him-not the Islam of the merchants of oil and the agents of the Americans” (Ibid, p. 268). It claimed to be the sole legitimate representative of the people and expressed a “confrontational attitude” towards the regime on the ground it was illegitimate (Buehler, 2013). It called for the application of Islamic doctrines and values in Morocco and for the use of violence to establish an Islamic state (Willis, 1999).

The PJD emerged from this radical religious movement and changed its name different times to get rid of any religious connotations (Tozy, 1999). At first, when the Islamic Youth

was banned, some splinters formed the Islamic Society and denounced violence (Kirdiş, 2015). Later they changed their name to the Movement for Reform and Renewal and finally altered their name to Mouvement Unité et Réforme (Movement for Unity and Reform – MUR) (Darif, 2010). In doing so, the movement got rid of religious connotations and wanted to avoid the repression of the regime that banned dissident movements. The Moroccan regime started tolerating religious movements as a strategic decision to help curb the political influence of Marxism (Bouyahya, 2015). The regime enabled these movements to spread Islamic values that would help to fight against the rise of Moroccan Marxism (Ibid). The goal was to weaken the political left that started gaining ground which was also known for its fierce criticism of the palace (Ibid).

Within this context, the PJD learnt the necessity to downplay references to religion to survive (Drhimeur, 2018). However the fact that the party uses the lamp as a symbol and makes references to justice in its name are a continuous reminder of the intersection between what is political and what is religious (Seniguer, 2013). The Party seems to be committed to internal democratic processes (Mohsen-Finan and Zeghal, 2006). It is even presented as a modern structure that publishes a newspaper and runs a website (Ibid). However the symbol of the lamp would like to reflect how the party is committed to radiating knowledge, transparency, and development through respect for traditional social values (Buehler, 2013). Party leaders often resort to a Quranic verse to explain this choice (Seniguer, 2013). They believe their responsibility is to carry the lamp that would light the darkness in society (Ibid). Without being openly religious, the PJD uses references to justice and the symbol of the lamp to preserve its religious ideology and to distinguish itself from other political parties (Willis, 1999). It is a pragmatic choice and doing politics is a question of rationality, of weighing the costs and the benefits. In Morocco, the king has a religious legitimacy. The regime made it possible for the Islamist party to participate in formal politics on the condition that they do not challenge this legitimacy and recognize the king as the sole power with religious authority (Shadi and McCants, 2016). Islam is the religion of the state, a shared identity, and every political party has some degrees of religiosity therefore using direct references to Islam would not enable the Party to clearly distinguish itself from others (Ibid). Playing on religious symbolism would, however, enable the PJD to entertain implicit links to religion while reassuring the regime, the secular and its conservative base

(ibid). Downplaying the religious references, which were never made in opposition to the state or the king, obeyed the logic of political survival (Shadi and McCants, 2016).

Hence the leaders of the PJD, who once called for the establishment of an Islamic State, started expressing their wishes to participate in public life and to “participate in the edification of the country, sharing the precepts close to our identity: Islam” (Willis, 1999, p. 47). The PJD defines itself as a “party with an Islamic reference” (El Othmani, 2006) and promises “to revive and to renew the political system in line with authentic Moroccan values” (PJD, 2011 Party Programme). The PJD’s political program stresses the importance of authenticity, justice and development and the need to respect the cultural specificity of Moroccan society and religious identity (Willis, 1999). In its Rules of Procedures, the PJD explains that the objectives of the Party are to initiate democratic reforms that would respect the Islamic values of the country (Seniguer, 2011). Party leaders present “closer adherence to Islamic values” as a way to solve problems within society (Buehler, 2013, p. 143). However, they do not present Islam as the solution to all socio-economic problems because the “Islamic frame of reference is one thing, while the measures to implement it are something else” (ibid). The party insists it has a strong economic and social program that would enable it to address these issues (ibid). When it comes to social issues, the party adopted a moralistic and conservative tone that called for respect of religious values (Willis, 1999).

In its references to religion, the Party insists that Islam is what makes national identity since not only the king is the “Commander of the Faithful” but also the constitution stipulates clearly that Islam is the religion of the state (Seniguer, 2011). The Party argues that “Shari’a law ought to be informed by the context of the times in which the community lives, not by literal hasty interpretations of sacred texts” (Daadaoui, 2017). Its understanding of Islam is an understanding, according to the Salafiya tradition (Mohsen-Finan and Zeghal, 2006). Islam here is nationalist and “authentic” in a sense that Quran and Islamic traditions should be interpreted and understood according to the Moroccan historical context away from Wahhabism or the Saudi-Arabian model (ibid).

The PJD decided to secularize its speeches to adapt to the context in which it operates and to broaden its electoral base (Drhimeur, 2018). The Party’s speeches are

intended to be political, and the PJD states it believes that debates within the parliament and with other political actors should be about politics (Seniguer, 2011). For the PJD it is question of developing “the political discourse of the Islamic movement, and going beyond the phase of general positions and major slogans to that of operational and detailed proposals” (Belal, 2011, p. 258) to fight any prejudices against the Islamic movement, normalize its participation in politics and contribute to the development of the country (Ibid). Highlighting or downplaying references to Islam depends on the context and the environment in which the PJD operates and on where the speech is given. For the Party the political and the religious are separate (Belal, 2011). Within the parliament, PJD members do not preach but use a political discourse different from the religious discourse they use in the private sphere of their houses or within the movement (MUR) (Ibid). This strategic and selective use of words intends to broaden the Party’s base beyond the traditional conservative one. Minimizing references to Islam was necessary to spare the party from the regime’s repression but also to reassure other political actors (Drhimeur, 2018). As a matter of fact, the PJD was accused of spreading radical ideologies after the 2003 terrorist attacks (Catusse and Zaki, 2009). It then decided to replace references to Islam with integrity and morality (Ibid). These, along with fighting corruption, were the watchwords of the PJD’s electoral campaign in 2011 (Ibid). Party officials claim to have articulated a new “moral, socially-conscious new discourse of honesty and transparency” (Daadaoui, 2017, p. 13). However, making references to integrity is itself an implicit reference to Islamic ethical principles (Seniguer, 2012). It is a political argument that downplays religion in the rhetoric but, at the same time, a reminder that the Party wants to respect and preserve its ideological principles, that is to say, Islam as the principle and the objective for every action (Ibid).

During the 2003 local elections campaign, no references to Islam were made in the PJD’s leaflets, slogans or meetings (L’Economiste, 2003). Rather the Party relied on opening direct communication channels with citizens (Ibid). These direct communication channels refer to opening offices to receive complaints, using social media platforms to interact with people and visiting different neighborhoods answering questions and offering help (Ibid). Minimizing the Party’s links to Islam was also important in the way the PJD run local management. The rhetoric was more about efficiency and governance (Catusse and Zaki,

2009). The PJD that once called for ending interest rates for microcredits or usury, in general, is now calling for the necessity to fight all forms of corruption (Ibid). According to the literature, framing and controlling references to religion in the party's behavior and speeches is very strategic. Besides preserving the loyalty of the PJD's religiously conservative base, it has helped to portray other political parties, mainly the secular, as being unethical (Shadi and McCants, 2016). It is a flexible understanding of religion for political gains since the Party has never ended relying on its religious movement, The Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR), for organizing social activities and providing services to the most underprivileged (Berriane, 2009). Within the MUR, in which many party members originate from and continue to be active, the principle of Islamisation requires institutional and legislative reforms (Mohsen-Finan and Zeghal, 2006). Reforms, democracy and human rights should be defined within the Islamic tradition, should preserve religion and be free from any secular influences (Ibid). According to the MUR, the fact that Islam is the religion of the state is above the constitution, and it should influence every political reform and determine if a law or a bill are constitutional (Ibid). For the movement, it is because Islam is the religion of state that *shari'a* should be the source of every legal text, and any text that contradicts *shari'a* should be banned (Ibid). The Movement came to realize that political action is necessary to influence public policy formulation and decided it was high time to join formal politics. However, soon after the 2003 terrorist attacks, the Party started claiming that it made a distinction and a separation between the Party itself and its religious movement. While the Movement will focus on preaching, the Party will focus on politics. This distinction remains difficult to grasp sometimes as they continue to cooperate. Indeed, the PJD uses the MUR's resources to provide services but also to mobilize the youth. Deploying the religious units to provide social services also helps to broaden its base (Shadi and McCants, 2016). The religious movement also helps to recruit and mobilize (Ibid). The PJD capitalizes on references to Islam within the MUR and Quranic study sessions offered by the MUR to attract people interested in religion (Ibid). This cooperation makes "associative networking" efficient and promotes close and special ties between the Party and its civil society organization (Berriane, 2009).

The Party seems then to delegate religious matters to its movement and focus more on political matters. This does not mean that religion is no longer important to the Party. It

only means that the Party will manage to preserve its religious logic away from regime repression and political opponents' criticism. Doing politics in Morocco entails some degrees of religiosity for all political parties since the Constitution itself refers to Islam as the religion of the state (Seniguer, 2012). By controlling its links to the religious movement, the Party thus decides when or when not to deploy its religious units while modern terminology about efficiency and governance helps to broaden the Party's base (Kirdiş, 2015).

Within the Party itself, the distinction between what is political and what is religious is sometimes unclear. In the party's manifesto Islam does not separate between religion and public concern (PJD's manifesto issue 7. P 28- 29). Islam is both a religion and a law (Bouyahya, 2014). It is a set of rituals and practices and also principles and rules (Ibid). Thus the religious should act as the guiding principle for politics (Ibid). For the Party leaders doing politics is similar to preaching and Islam remains important to define the ethics that would determine the way politics are understood and done (Seniguer, 2011). The party does not call for a rigid separation between the religious and the political. Rather, it believes that politics and ethics are interlinked in order to frame and moralize the political action according to Islamic principles (Benbounou, 2018).

For the literature, the objective of this 'simplistic' distinction is to preserve both the religious aspect of the Party and its leaders, distinguish them from other political parties and at the same time spare the Party any criticism about 'instrumentalizing' religion for political purposes (Ibid). Thus, this understanding of Islam and this 'simplistic' distinction between the religious and the political serve to simultaneously reassure its traditional base and the most secular (Drhimeur, 2018). For its leaders, to claim their Islamism is a way of showing their integrity, honesty and ethical responsibility in doing politics better than anyone else (Seniguer, 2012). Thus the PJD seeks to moralize political life according to Islamic values that at the same time serve to distinguish its leaders from other parties (Catusse and Zaki, 2009).

PJD's understanding of religion influences the way it perceives how public life should be managed. For the party, public life should allow reforming society in accordance with the Islamic objectives of preserving human life and property (Seniguer, 2011). Its political

programs emphasize democracy, proximity with citizens and dialogue (Ibid). They highlight the importance of political, economic and social development. However, they also highlight how their religiosity makes the Party's leaders more credible because they are pious and respect religious principles (Seniguer, 2012). The Party does not hesitate to use references to Islam to criticize and discredit its political opponents, mainly from the left (Mohsen-Finan and Zeghal, 2006). Moreover, the fact that the PJD keeps referring to Islam as the religion of the state and that the Party has no monopoly over Islam, which is shared by all including political parties, reflects a willingness to remind these actors of the necessity of building an "ethical civil society" (Ibid).

When the PJD presented itself during the 2011 elections, it claimed its societal project aims at restoring the country's value system "within a Muslim reference and a Moroccan identity in all its diversity" (Desrués and Molina, 2013). Within this discourse, the Moroccan people are presented as pious and victim of the institutional and political elite (TelQuel, 2014). The religious is used to differentiate the PJD from other political parties and to convey the message of an honest party (Tomé-Alonso, 2018). The PJD defines itself as a party with an "Islamic reference" and not an "Islamic" party, in order to protect itself against any accusation that it wants to monopolize religious symbols or to instrumentalize religion for political ends. However, the religious and the political coexist in order to preserve the specificity of the Party and to underline the virtues that Islam confers on its leaders (Seniguer, 2013). Through the religious, the PJD intends to make use of a strategy of "differentiation" from other political parties and to promote a sense of ethics unique to its leaders (Tomé-Alonso, 2018). This is reflected through the promotion of traditional values and public morality (Shadi and MacCants, 2017). Thus, the promotion of teaching in Arabic within the educational system, Zakat, authenticity and a social system based on virtue and solidarity are promoted (Wegner, 2011). The religious is also reflected in the moralization of political and public institutions and the promotion of a work ethic (Ibid). The aim is to position PJD as an incorruptible parliamentary group defending the Moroccan population against the "secular" and therefore immoral politicians (Shadi and MacCants, 2017). Islamic ethics are used to seduce, attract but most importantly to criticize and delegitimize the governing elite or the status quo (Bouyahya, 2014). By claiming their devotion to Islam, party members want to express their seriousness, their moral responsibility and

how their Islamic values are an added value to public action (Seniguer, 2015). Because they are pious, then they are more credible than any other candidates (Ibid). Probity then became a political argument, which serves to distinguish the PJD from other political parties (Smaoui, 2009). The PJD also resorts to a discourse of victimization to discredit other political opponents. When the Authenticity and Modernity Party (*Parti de l'Authenticité et de la Modernité*, PAM) started gaining ground in the local and regional elections of 2015, Benkirane accused the party of being an imposter political party “without a clear ideology, without strong leadership, without a coherent discourse and without a historical trajectory, whose sources of funding and the funds available to its mentors are suspect” (Cited in Desrues, 2017) (See Appendix 2: Morocco General Elections). The PJD presents itself as a victim of other political parties that seek to undermine what the party has accomplished in terms of political, economic and social reforms. Thus party members denounce a conspiracy against the PJD that aims at “ending electoral competition and returning to absolutism” (TelQuel, 2016). References to religion serves to “unify a desperate group of individuals who are primarily unified through their opposition to the current elites” (Bouyahya, 2014, p. 153). They serve to rally the marginalized and the alienated members of society (Ibid).

By referring to religion, the PJD refers to a moral and an ethical discourse that would guide its “political action of good” (Seniguer, 2012). By Islamic references, the Party understands that “if you came to practice political activity, you do not forget that you are Muslim, that your religion has warned about a certain number of things” (Ibid, p 15). So it is this Islamic reference that would guarantee the honesty of party members and the fact that they will not fail in their duty. Islam thus became important for a politician to be considered serious. In this sense Benkirane, former PJD leader and former Head of Government, declared:

“What we have brought from our religious ideology, it is above all the good values which will help us to propose serious things, serious men [...] (Islam) remains the reference, the strength of faith is important. In politics, this is where you most need faith and religion; how religion helps a politician to be serious. Remember that we are Morocco. In Morocco, values are linked to a central core, which is how you are towards God and towards society. And that,

until proven otherwise, there is nothing better than religion to guarantee it”
(Benkirane, Cited in Seniguer, 2012).

Thus, Islam or religious values serve to distinguish the PJD from other political parties, grant its programs, policies and rhetoric legitimacy while preserving its traditional electoral base and appealing to those sensitive to the religious discourse. The Party followed a strategy of differentiation to present itself as an alternative political party and present its members as the « good Muslims » because the values of the party are inspired by Islam (Tomé-Alonso, 2018).

The PJD that once called for forbidding selling alcohol and closing casinos seem to have diluted its religious ideology. Its flexible religious discourse is strategic and obeys the logic of survival. Surviving means downplaying religious references in order not to challenge the king’s religious authority, not to trigger criticism from the secular but also to broaden its base. Preserving a religious rhetoric when needed and close ties with its religious movement are intended to reassure its conservative traditional base and to mobilize and recruit the youth. This flexible ideology and flexible understanding of Islam was once again clear when the party leaders shifted their vision of the economy. They called for the establishment of an economic system based on *shari’a* and the introduction of Islamic modes of financing. The terrorist attacks of Casablanca in 2003 made them change their rhetoric to align with the official discourse (Mohsen-Finan and Zeghal, 2006) and focus on what is political (Mohsen-Finan, 2005). The party’s opponents had used the terrorist attacks to hold the party morally responsible for what happened (Wegner and Pellicer, 2010). In order to distance itself from the attacks, the party ended up endorsing the law on terrorism and the reform of the family code at the parliament (Ibid)⁶. The party previously criticized these reforms on the grounds that they were un-Islamic and immoral (Ibid). To further distance itself from the terrorist attacks and criticism, the party has also sought to replace

⁶ The reform on the family code introduced measures to enhance women’s equality in marriage, divorce and child custody (Zoglin, 2009) while the law on terrorism gives the government the right to hold journalists criminally liable for publishing any material its considers a “moral justification for terrorism” (Maghraoui, 2008)

its traditional topics of identity with new topics relating to management and development (Wegner and Pellicer, 2010).

According to the literature, the moralization of public life is an important tool for the PJD to keep in touch with its traditional base, and to avoid confronting the monarchy but most importantly to incorporate the religious discreetly (Mohsen-Finan, 2005). Because the PJD considers Morocco as a Muslim country, it believes it is not necessary to Islamize the country, but it is necessary to defend its Islamic identity through institutional and legislative reforms, through probity, religious morality and the moralization of public life. The Party advocates for more emphasis on Islam in education and civic culture to defend not only the country's authenticity but also to help moralize public life in Morocco (Willis, 2004). As a consequence, the PJD focuses on Islamic revival and morally-based policies. It pushed for having the call for the prayers broadcasted on national TV and refused to reform the law on blasphemy and eating in public during Ramadan (Kirdis, 2018). Because the Party is pragmatic its ideology is flexible, and its political programs remain vague. They are pragmatically constructed allowing the Party to endorse policies necessary for its political survival while rejecting others to appease its traditional base. The division between the Party and its religious movement is more of a showcase nature. There is a significant overlap in the membership of the two organizations. It is risky for the PJD to openly claim its Islamism because it will also aggravate the regime because asking for the establishment of an Islamic state would undermine the king's religious power as the "Commander of the Faithful" (Seniguer, 2012). Remaining in the good graces of the king are important to survive.

In addition, the PJD builds the concept of the nation around the values of Sunni Islam. While the king is the only legitimate actor who has religious power, the PJD mentions Islam as the essence of identity (Seniguer, 2011). The party represents Islamic identity as the religious reference to all Moroccans (Desrues and Molina, 2013). Religion and ethics serve to stand out in politics but also to emphasize the privileged relationship that PJD members have with their voters (Seniguer, 2012). The PJD seems to draw on "naturalized identity rhetoric" and on the religious element to get closer to the people and seduce (Ibid). The PJD's nationalist discourse is not only based on religious affiliation to Islam but also on

the Arabic language:

[...] Moroccans are not afraid of us. Moroccans when they see us, they see their faces in the mirror. We are like Moroccans, all Moroccans, most Moroccans, the majority of Moroccans, because our state, in its constitution, the kingdom of Morocco is an Islamic state. Our history [...] is built on the fact that our state is an Islamic state [...] Today, that there is a segment of society which has another logic, another thought, it is acceptable, of course, but it should not impose itself on the Moroccan people at the expense of what they want [...] The PJD is modest, it does not speak about religion, it speaks about the Islamic reference [...] You believe that just by removing religion from its official status, you believe that religion will go away. Religion is rooted in the minds of Moroccans, in the brains of Moroccans [...] the latter remain attached to their religion and they are not ready, whatever the circumstances, to drop it. (Benkirane, Cited in Seniguer, 2012, p. 14, 15).

Thus the PJD claims to bring together all social groups because first of all Islam is the state religion and then because Moroccans are Muslim (Seniguer, 2013). Through this “legitimation strategy”, the Party claims to represent and protect both the identity and the Muslim religion, as Benkirane explains: “There are things that we read every day, which bring together hundreds of thousands of people, in prayers [...] And these words (the Coran), to ensure that religion remains in society that it can play its role” (Benkirane, Cited in Seniguer, 2012, p. 15). The PJD’s understanding of Islam is commonly described as ‘legitimized Islam’ or ‘state Islam’ close to that of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and which is under the supervision of the monarchy (Amghar, 2007).

3. The AKP’s and the PJD’s Islamist ideology and diaspora politics

In 2015, Turkey had sent over 1800 state-employed religious officials to provide religious services to its diaspora abroad while Morocco had sent both hundreds of imams, and over 10 million euros to help finance Moroccan mosques and religious associations in Europe (Bruce, 2019). Both countries have promoted state and institutional governance of Islamic

affairs within their diaspora either under *Diyanet* (Presidency of Religious Affairs) in Turkey and *Ministère des Habous et des Affaires Islamiques* (Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs) in Morocco (Ibid). This ministry is under the direct supervision of the king, who is the “top religious authority” in the country (Ibid). These two institutions are portrayed as the representatives of “official Islam”, the type of Islam that only the state can promote or sanction (Ibid). This “official Islam” evolves depending on the interests of the political elite (Ibid). The governance of religious affairs within the diaspora constitutes an important policy instrument for both Turkey and Morocco in their diaspora politics (Ibid). In their attempt to maintain close links with their emigrants, the Turkish and Moroccan state actors would like to benefit from economic, social, cultural and most importantly political gains (Ibid). However, there are differences between these countries when it comes to how their governing political parties (AKP in Turkey and PJD in Morocco) have access to state institutions and resources. While the AKP has the power to outline both domestic and foreign policy, the PJD in Morocco evolves within a constraining political system in which the king has both religious and political powers.

In the previous section, we have seen the importance of Islam for both the AKP and the PJD, and how religious symbolism is used to stand out from other political forces and to appeal to voters. This section analyzes if these two parties export their understanding of Islam abroad. This requires the use of different actors and processes both within the sending states and the receiving states to reach out to diaspora citizens. Political parties need to establish longstanding networks overseas to influence the diaspora and consequently discern potential political benefit. However, these actors and the processes they resort to diverge from one party to another depending on the political context in which they evolve. In other words, whether or not the AKP and the PJD export their Islamist ideology to the Turkish community and the Moroccan community abroad depends not only on their access to state institutions but also on their ability to form both formal and informal religious links with their diaspora.

3. 1 The AKP's Islamist ideology and diaspora politics

As mentioned earlier, Turkey is a multi-party democracy where the AKP is the dominant political force that has managed to consolidate its powers. It managed to expand its

constituency base and diminish the military's political role in outlining both domestic and foreign affairs. Thus, the Party has been able to pursue policies in line with its ideology.

Traditionally Turkish foreign policy was based on four principles, Westernization, laïcité, a stable international order and commitment to international law (Öztürk and Sözeri, 2018). Foreign policy was the reflection of the secular elite's conception of state identity (Ibid). Under the AKP, Ahmet Davutoglu conceived Turkey's foreign policy within his doctrine of strategic depth (Özkan, 2014). Davutoglu was the AKP's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Prime Minister between 2014 and 2016, who argued that Turkey could become a global power if it followed a foreign policy that respects the country's Islamic history (Ibid). Thus his conception rejected the westernization of Turkey in favor of ethno-religiously oriented foreign policy (Ibid). For Davutoğlu, the strategic depth of Turkey lies in its geopolitical position and its identity that would enable Turkey to unite Islamic countries and create a common front against the Western hegemony (Ibid). Islam and the Ottoman-Islamic identity would enable the country to easily incorporate countries spreading from the Balkans to the Middle East and beyond (Öztürk and Sözeri, 2018). It is no surprise that within this conception of foreign policy *Diyanet* came to play an important role.

As mentioned earlier, *Diyanet*, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, has served under the AKP to endorse the Party's discourse, actions and policies and grant them religious legitimation.⁷ When *Diyanet* was established as an administrative unit in 1924 before the endorsement of laïcité in the Constitution, it was mainly in charge of managing religion, regulating Islamic faith and practices, overseeing religious education and building and maintaining places of worship (Ozturk, 2018). Once laïcité was established, *Diyanet* came under the regulation of the state within a secular structure (Ozturk, 2019). As a government body, it sought to control Sunni Islam on behalf of the state and became a legitimizing mechanism for state laïcité (Lord, 2018). It was the sole administration in charge of the

⁷ While *Diyanet* and DITIB are influential in organizations in shaping AKP's diaspora policy, there are also other organizations such as the Presidency of Turks Abroad (*Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı*), Yunus Emre Cultural Centers, as well as the Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD, renamed the Union of International Democrats (UID, *Uluslararası Demokrat Birliği*), which serves as the AKP's liaison in Europe.

religious field and representing “official Islam”, that is to say, the Sunni Hanafi School, thus assuming that all Turkish people belonged to the same sect of Islam and excluding the Alevi minority for example (Bruce, 2019). Other religious orders (the Sufi order) and public expressions of Islam were prohibited in an attempt to differentiate between “official Islam” and “impure”, “politicized” Islam and to deter any religious opposition to the state (Ibid). *Diyanet* was also under the supervision of the office of the prime minister who decided its budget (Ibid). The purpose was to ensure that the institution did not have the financial and administrative autonomy that would enable it to conduct its own activities or gain “political authority” (Ibid).

The AKP has continued the long tradition of state control of Islamic religious activities and using the Presidency to determine who has the legitimate religious authority as opposed to the “deviant radicals”. Now *Diyanet*, which serves to legitimize state religious authority, has been expanded to see its reach go beyond the borders of Turkey (Lord, 2018). It is given a “global vision” and plays an essential role in AKP’s foreign policy (Bruce, 2019). To that end, within his vision of strategic depth, Davutoglu positions Turkey as a Muslim country within the global order and structured the role of *Diyanet* around the concept of the “heart hinterland” (*gönül coğrafyası*) in the way it would help Turkey become a ‘pivotal country’ and regain its appeal within the global Muslim community (Öztürk and Sözeri, 2018). It should become the “flotation ring” and the reference for Muslims around the world to “deliver the eternal call of Allah and the Prophet to humanity, which is endangered by secularism and nihilism” (Öztürk and Sözeri, 2018, p.9).

With its 61 branches in 36 countries, *Diyanet* has become a religious diplomacy actor (Öztürk and Sözeri, 2018). The Presidency reflects state identity and seems to have substituted secularism with Sunni Islam in foreign policy (Ibid). Within the Turkish-Islamic Association of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği*, DİTİB), *Diyanet* has been active in providing religious services in Europe, the Balkans and Central Asia, in building mosques, delivering religious teaching, sending *Imams* and even putting in place educational institutions to train religious personnel (Ibid). It is also in charge of promoting Turkish Islam abroad with a focus on countries with a high number of Turkish immigrants to prevent the emergence of radical discourses (Ozturk, 2016). In order to compete for

regional influence with Saudi Arabia and Iran (Lord, 2018) and maintain Turkish Muslims loyalty to the Turkish state (Öztürk, 2016), *Diyanet*, through mosques and religious classes, started diffusing Sunni Islam with a focus on human rights, ethics and an explanation of citizen's duties towards their state (Ibid). *Diyanet* serves to establish and maintain links between the Turkish state and Turkish emigrants in Europe, mainly France, Germany and the Netherlands (Ozturk, 2018). Significantly, European host countries welcomed the Presidency because they were afraid that the religious void could lead to a rise in radical Islamic groups and disrupt their societies (Ibid).

Within this conception of foreign policy, demonstrating loyalty to *Diyanet* is synonymous to loyalty to the Turkish state, and the Presidency has become an "international symbol" of the state's religious identity (Ibid). Thus, the Presidency has sought to get a monopoly on who represents "official" and "legitimate" Islam both within the borders of Turkey and abroad (Bruce, 2019).

Turkish foreign policy has always been an extension of domestic politics, and this has not changed with the rise of the AKP to power in 2002. However, under the AKP *Diyanet's* responsibilities and activism in foreign policy has been expanded to include providing scholarships (Lord, 2018) and building more mosques in Germany and the Netherlands for example (Öztürk, 2016). It is now responsible for spreading the AKP's understanding of Islam, secularism and nationalism and promoting Islamic moral values both inside and outside Turkey (Ibid). *Diyanet* became a major instrument in foreign policy in charge of publishing and distributing the Quran and religious books in different languages to increase the visibility of Sunni Islam (Öztürk, 2018). In other words, it has tried to spread the "identity change of the state to society" both domestically and internationally (Öztürk and Sözeri, 2018). Thus the Turkish-Islamic Association of Religious Affairs (DİTİB) became "a parallel diplomacy machine" in charge of representing European Islam according to the Turkish model (Ibid). As such, it has become the representative of the AKP's understanding of Islam and an institution responsible for promoting and maintaining the Turkish identity abroad (Ibid). The *imam* has become the intermediary between the Turkish state and the Turkish citizen abroad and the carrier of identity and normative politics (Ibid). The AKP's foreign policy has acquired an ethno-religious identity in charge of "exporting domestic

matters” aboard, for instance, the tensions between the AKP and the Gülen movement (Öztürk and Sözeri, 2018). As a matter of fact, when the AKP ended its partnership with the Gülen movement after it was accused of being behind the 2016 coup, some *Diyanet* imams were dismissed from their posts in Germany where they were accused of being close to the movement (Bruce, 2019).

Thus AKP has sought to form alliances with the Muslim community abroad as part of its strategy to preserve its control over the religious affairs abroad and what it entails as economic, symbolic and most importantly political gains (Ibid). The way the AKP shifts its alliances in Europe is also a reflection of how it shifts its alliances and builds its domestic policies (Ibid). In addition, the AKP ended the long-lasting state tradition of cooperating only with non-Islamist movements operating in Europe within its diaspora. Thus, the AKP started cooperating with the *Milli Görüş* movement, which runs mosques and provides religious services mainly in Germany (Foreign Policy, 2019). Indeed, the boundaries between *Diyanet* and the movement are blurred as *Diyanet* religious officials often attend *iftar* organized by the movement in Europe and accept their requests when they ask for *Diyanet* imam to be appointed at their mosques (Bruce, 2019). This cooperation is seen as an intention to bring together the different Turkish religious communities in Europe (Ibid) in attempt to seek influence and convince Turkish citizens in Europe to vote for the party (Foreign Policy, 2019).

The *Diyanet* also organizes conferences, workshops aboard (the Religious Assembly and the *Diyanet’s* Services Abroad Conference, for example), publishes magazines, and organizes meetings with religious attachés, European businessmen, civil society leaders, which means that *Diyanet* have the necessary financial and logistical resources to develop strong networks outside Turkish borders (Bruce, 2019). The fact that Turkish AKP state officials often visit *Diyanet’s* mosques aboard demonstrates how effectively the Turkish state monitors the institutional framework that regulates religious activities (Ibid).

In the Netherlands, *Diyanet* was established in 1982 to counterbalance the influence of political dissidents seeking asylum by insisting that Turkish nationalism is not an obstacle to the integration of Turks in their host countries and emphasizing the values of national solidarity and loyalty to the Turkish state (Yükleyen, 2009). Now it controls most of the

mosques and it is divided into two separate institutions: the Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation, (*Turkse Islamitische Cultureel Federatie*, TICF) and the Islamic Foundation Netherlands (*Islamitische Stichting Nederland*, ISN) (Ibid). Recently, *Diyanet* has been criticized in the Netherlands for enabling a foreign institution to exert influence on the Dutch Muslim community and which impedes their effective integration since it employs imams who do not necessary speak the Dutch language nor are familiar with the local culture (Öztürk and Sözeri, 2018). Furthermore, critics argue that the *Diyanet* mixes religion and politics since it endorsed the Dutch political party DENK that was founded by the Dutch-Turks and the Dutch-Moroccans (Ibid). This party is known for its close ties with the AKP (Ibid). Also, imams within the Dutch *Diyanet* were accused of gathering intelligence within supporters of the Gulen movement after the coup of 2016, which exacerbated the debate about the political mission given to *Diyanet* (Ibid). When the Dutch government decided to launch its own imam-training programs that would be in charge of training Islamic preachers familiar with Dutch values and the European context, *Diyanet* refused to support the decision (Ibid). These programs mean that the *Diyanet* would lose its control over appointing Turkish imams in the Netherlands and as a consequence, lose its control over which message is given within the mosques (Ibid).

In Austria, *Diyanet* was accused of collecting information about the anti-AKP Turkish immigrant groups in an attempt by the AKP to monitor its electoral body in the diaspora (Ozturk, 2018). Thus, the DİTİB helps the party to promote Sunni Islam among Turkish and Muslim minorities abroad to consolidate its socio-economic leverage both within the Turkish borders and in host countries (Ibid).

Diyanet is in charge of promoting Sunni Islam among Turkish communities in Europe but also of consolidating the links between the Turkish diaspora and the AKP (Öztürk and Sözeri, 2018). The point is to diffuse the idea that religious allegiance equals national allegiance, in other words, allegiance to the AKP (Ibid). Every opponent of the party is hence called a “national traitor” (Ibid). Thus it hasn’t only been used to impose the AKP’s understanding of Islam but also to legitimize its policies both domestically and internationally by using a religious discourse (Öztürk, 2018). For the AKP, Turkish Sunni Islam should play the lead role within Muslim communities in Europe (Akgönül, 2019). This

Sunni Islam has always reflected Turkish internal issues (Ibid). Islam promoted by the AKP abroad is presented as the official Sunni Islam (Ibid), a more tolerant and moderate Islam and an alternative to Saudi Arabia Wahhabism, in an attempt to establish and consolidate Turkey's position as an International Islamic leader (Foreign Affairs, 2019). In Turkey, religion and culture are interlinked and to meet the diaspora's religious needs includes meeting its cultural needs (Bruce, 2019). Thus *Diyanet* offers language classes, organize sports events, festivals during which "Islamic music" is played, and attendees watch whirling dervishes (Ibid). Other events bear nationalistic characteristics and commemorate national historic events, such as the Battle of Gallipoli or organize national anthem recitation competitions (Ibid). The responsibility of *Diyanet* goes beyond religious services to the transmission of customs, traditions and language. The *Diyanet* hence connects the religious, to the cultural, to the nationalistic in an attempt to create a distinct Turkish community abroad and manages to control religious affairs within the diaspora (Ibid).

3. 2 The PJD's Islamist ideology and diaspora politics

As noted before a political party needs to have access to state institutions and to influence decision-making to be able to form both formal and informal networks and reach out to the diaspora. Thus before we determine if the PJD has sought to export its Islamist ideology or its understanding of Islam to the Moroccan citizens in Europe, we need first to determine if this political party can outline the main lines of the country's foreign policy and has access to religious state institutions. Through state and formal institutions, a political party can diffuse its ideology and exert influence on a particular segment of society. But a party can also resort to indirect channels of influence through social media platforms, the choice of language and discourse to imply their ideology or through the establishment of associations to reach out to Moroccans abroad.

3. 2. 1 The monarch's religious and foreign policy prerogatives

An examination of the monarchy's religious and political prerogatives is necessary to determine the power balance between the king and the PJD and if this Islamist party can exert any influence on foreign policy and religious matters. Morocco is defined as a Muslim state by the constitution. The king is not only 'head of state' but also *amir al mouminin* (Commander of the Faithful) who ensures respect for Islam and the religious compliance of

laws (Madani et al., 2013). He chairs the Council of the Ulama, the only body empowered to issue fatwas (religious views) and thus monitors the conformity of laws and acts to the Islamic identity (Ibid). The Moroccan regime positions itself as the only authority that can manage the religious field. The king has also initiated reforms of religious affairs that would help to diffuse the idea of a 'Moroccan official Islam' based on the Maliki legal school and counter the influence of other religious groups or Islamic doctrines (El-Katiri, 2013). These reforms, including bringing all Moroccan mosques under the supervision of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and determining which sermons are given within mosques, also aim to consolidate the authority of the king and his religious legitimacy as the Commander of the Faithful (Ibid). In Morocco, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs (the Ministry of Habous) controls the religious field since it is in charge of Islamic education, training religious personnel and supervising religious complexes including shrines (Bruce, 2019). It is also the only authority responsible for appointing religious personnel, and the legitimacy of the Ministry is based on the monarch's religious authority (Ibid). It has seen a succession of Ministers loyal to the palace (Ibid). The aim is to determine the framing of "official Islam", who are the "competent religious" personnel as opposed to "unofficial" Islam (Ibid). Thus the Ministry of Habous ensures the protection of what is considered ideologically safe by the monarchy and makes it impossible for "unofficial" religious movements or associations to find a mosque where they can express their opinions or dissident voices (Tozy, 1992). In addition, the Ministry makes it illegal for imams to join unions or political parties. It also asserts that the contracts of religious scholars can be terminated anytime they are suspected or accused of spreading an Islamic vision different from the official state Maliki Islam (Bruce, 2019). The Moroccan state also oversees the distribution and publication of the Quran in the country in an attempt to eliminate any version that does not correspond to the "Moroccan Islam" ensuring greater control over religious content (Ibid). The mechanisms of state control affect the way the religious discourse spreads beyond national borders and the way it is governed outside Morocco. The elaboration of the Moroccan state of religious diaspora politics started in the 1980s when Moroccan religious movements transplanted their activities to Europe and mainly France (Bruce, 2019). Before that the state's involvement in religious affairs of the Moroccan diaspora was limited to sending imams during Ramadan (Ibid).

The Moroccan authorities would like to represent the kingdom as an “Islamic model” for the region and the West (Abouzzohour and Beatriz Tomé-Alonso, 2019). At the center of this model is the monarch, the Commander of the Faithful, who portrays Morocco’s brand of Islam as being moderate and thus should become a reference to build peace, stability and tolerance (Ibid). To meet the religious needs of Moroccans in Europe, the monarchy has sought to establish a network of Moroccan Islamic associations and institutions to meet the need for clerical staff who are well-trained but also aware of the European cultural specificities (El-Katiri, 2013). It was also intended to help portray the image of Morocco as a model for “European Islam” (Bruce, 2019). In fact, in 2008 King Mohammed VI founded the European Council of Moroccan Ulama (CEOM) with the goal of “extending the state’s vision of religious tolerance and spiritual security to the members of the Moroccan diaspora”⁸ (Ibid). The Council aims at promoting religious dialogue and cultural openness among Moroccan youth residing in Europe by providing spiritual guidance to fight against radicalism and to raise awareness about moderation, tolerance and peace (Bilgili and Weyel, 2013). CEOM participates in the training of imams in Europe according to the values and laws of receiving countries (Ibid) and it is entitled to issue fatwas exclusively for the Moroccan community abroad and not to all Muslim communities (El-Katiri, 2013). The Council is also in charge of coordinating and providing financial and diplomatic support to the Moroccan Islamic associations across Europe in their efforts of building mosques or providing religious teaching (Bruce, 2019). Providing financial help to these associations, organizing conferences, and distributing religious publications mean for the Moroccan authorities an opportunity to exercise ideological influence and diffuse their national form of Islam (Ibid). Thus, the Moroccan state tries to monitor and control the religious discourse both domestically and internationally. As a matter of fact, when the monarchy started suspecting that the Rally of French Muslims (*Rassemblement des Musulman de France*, RMF) was developing close ties with the PJD in 2012, it soon replaced it with the Union of French Mosques (UMF) thus ensuring control over the rhetoric within mosques in France (Ibid). The Moroccan diaspora represents more than 10% of the Moroccan population. Framing the religious discourse within this diaspora is considered important to the security

⁸ See the European Council of Moroccan Ulama (CEOM) (<https://www.ccme.org.ma/en/the-council>)

of Morocco (El-Katiri, 2013). Many of the Moroccans based in Europe return home during the summer holidays. They are increasingly aware of their economic power since remittance transfers are an important source of hard currency for the Moroccan government. They are also increasingly aware of their political powers in influencing both the political and economic change in Morocco (Ibid). Thus controlling the religious discourse within the Moroccan community through governmental intermediaries serves to avoid any “clashing perceptions” or dissident voices within this diaspora (El-Katiri, 2013).

The same applies to Africa where, in 2015, the king created the Mohammed VI Foundation of African Ulemas in order to spread and reinforce “the values of a tolerant Islam” and promotes the creation of religious institutions (Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs 2015). Through the use of religious diplomacy and a moderate discourse of Islam, the monarch designs the main lines of foreign policy to build new political and economic ties (Tadlaoui, 2015). The king has sought to promote regional cooperation on religious matters by helping to train imams, build mosques and distribute copies of the Quran (Ibid). Not only does the king assert his position as a regional religious leader, but he also controls and monitors the religious discourse (Ibid).

Most importantly the king founded Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, Morchidines and Morchidates in 2014 to train local and foreign imams according to the values of tolerance and moderation and establishing cooperation with national and foreign religious institutions (Mohammed VI Foundation of African Oulema, 2015). The Institute, owing to an agreement between the French President François Hollande and authorities in Morocco, started welcoming French students from Moroccan origins to receive religious teaching and become religious leaders once back to France (Bruce, 2019).

When it comes to religious matters, the monarchy has always sought to institutionalize its religious authority abroad through its representatives, though mosques and Islamic associations or federations. By providing training or sending imams, the monarch aims at keeping control and monopoly over the religious discourse within the diaspora and influence how Islam evolves in Europe. State religious officials, when referring to Islam, like to emphasize how the Moroccan Maliki school is flexible in its understanding of religion by highlighting the importance of local customs and traditions (Ibid). Thanks to

the concept of *maslaha*, or taking into consideration public interest in deciding for religious matters, these officials explain how the Moroccan Maliki School has enabled to adapt to one's environment and thus can play a role model for Muslims in Europe (Council for the Moroccan Community Abroad (CCME), 2011). These structures are perceived to defend the interests of the Moroccan Muslim immigrants by proposing an interpretation of Islam that takes into consideration European social realities (Amghar, 2007). They even aim to play the role of intermediaries between these immigrants and European officials in dealing with issues relating to racism or delinquency (Ibid).

Furthermore, the Moroccan state has been founding and financing cultural associations in Europe, mainly in France, to promote knowledge about Morocco, including architecture, culture and language (Bruce, 2019). Hassan II Foundation for example, finances Arabic language classes and cultural trips (Ibid). The organization of these activities aims at promoting the idea of a Moroccan national Islam and thus preserving the regime's control over the religious field (Ibid). For the Moroccan regime, the promotion and the "safeguard" of a distinct national identity among its diaspora in Europe is part of a security strategy because it ensures that the Moroccan model of Islam is stable while unifying different religious actors around the idea of a Moroccan nationalism (Ibid).

Traditionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is what is commonly referred to as a 'sovereign' ministry and the *domaine réservé* of the King (El Houdaïgui, 2003). The monarch is the only authority with the right to take positions or decisions when it comes to international matters and the only one who can frame international relations and diplomacy (Ibid). With the constitutional reforms of 2011, Mohammed VI maintained his central role and preserved his preponderance, along with his entourage, over the decision-making process and the implementation of foreign policy (Fernández-Molina, 2016). Furthermore, the existence of technocrats nominated to important governmental decisions and an economic elite that gravitates around the monarchy makes the decision-making process ambiguous (Abouzzohour and Tomé-Alonso, 2019). Within this context, the agency of the PJD as a leading political party within the government is minimized (Ibid). The 2011 constitutional reforms, though extending the functions and the powers of the head of the government, they have not managed to change the balance of powers in favor of the

government or to alter the asymmetrical relations between the palace and the PJD (Hernando de Larramendi and Fernández-Molina, 2016). An examination of the articles 49 and 92 of the constitution explains how the powers of the head of government have been expanded. Article 49 stipulates that the Council of Ministers deliberates on the appointment of ambassadors proposed by the Head of Government (Moroccan Constitution 2011: Article 49) and Article 92 states that the Council of Government deliberates on “the treaties and the international conventions before their submission to the Council of Ministers” (Moroccan Constitution 2011: Article 92). The ability of the head of government to propose high-ranking foreign representatives, who might not necessarily agree with the king’s vision, and the ability to deliberate on international treaties, limit, though maybe only in theory, the king’s powers in matters of foreign policy (Abouzzohour and Tomé-Alonso, 2019). Despite these constitutional reforms and the rise of a new political party to power, foreign policy has continued to follow the same existing patterns and structure (Ibid). Even if these reforms extended the functions and the powers of the head of government, the king refused to accept the boundaries that the new constitutional framework has imposed on its powers and directly appointed ambassadors (Hashas, 2013). In addition, the provisions within the constitution have remained ambiguous, contradictory and vague in clarifying the powers that the head of government possesses when it comes to foreign-policy making (Ibid). Indeed, Article 55 of the constitution explains how the king has the exclusive power over signing and ratifying international treaties (Moroccan Constitution 2011: Article 55). These provisions do, however “subordinate” the head of government to the king or head of state (Abouzzohour and Tomé-Alonso, 2019). As a matter of fact, the king chairs the Council of Ministers, formed by the head of government and his ministers, which is the institution in charge of outlining the strategic orientation of the country (Ibid). As a consequence, the monarch remains the main political actor both in outlining domestic and foreign policies.

3. 2. 2 The PJD and diaspora politics

Having seen how the monarchy controls the religious discourse both within the borders of Morocco and abroad, and having seen how foreign policy is the *domaine réservé* of the

monarch, now we would like to examine if the PJD has sought to spread its Islamic ideology within the Moroccan diaspora and use Europe as a political platform.

Even if the Moroccan regime has always sought to maintain and control links with Moroccan immigrants in Europe through a network of associations, these communities were in charge of organizing their own religious activities (Godard, 2015). However, the emergence of the Islamist opposition in the 1980s, mainly the Islamic Youth Movement (*Chabiba islamiya*), from which the PJD evolved, came to change the Moroccan state's diaspora politics to include religious affairs (Ibid). This religious movement became popular in France, where it started creating its own network of influence (Ibid).

For Moroccan religious movements, Europe represented an opportunity for political expression to voice their opposition to the Moroccan regime and ask for political, economic and social reforms (Amghar, 2007). Since Moroccan authorities repressed these movements, the leaders often found in European countries a land of exile (Ibid). They used the Islamic associative networks or imams in local mosques to criticize the Moroccan regime, express their political demands and organize conferences and demonstrations (Ibid).

Similarly, the PJD has sought to infiltrate either cultural or Islamic associations in Europe in an attempt to appeal to their members with the hope of representing them (Amghar, 2007). During the 1980s, the Moroccan Islamic movements: Islamic Youth and the Islamic Society, from which the PJD evolved, started mobilizing within mosques in France (Bruce, 2019, p. 105). These movements, which later evolved into the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR), the religious branch of the PJD, have also been active within the Moroccan diaspora, mainly in France where members attended the annual Meeting of Muslims of France in 2005 for example (Le Monde, 2005).

The National Federation of French Muslims (*Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France*, FNMF), later the Rally of Muslims in France, for example, included different members who are supporters of the PJD (Amghar, 2007). This pushed the Moroccan Ministry of Habous to end its partnership with the Rally (Bruce, 2019). This Rally, which was created in 2006, intended to help the Moroccan state manage religious affairs abroad (Ibid). A partnership was created between the Rally and the Ministry of Habous and Islamic affairs,

which entitled the Rally with the responsibility of supervising and paying imams in France (Ibid). The partnership ended after the PJD's electoral victory in 2011 (Ibid).

For the PJD having access to the Moroccan diaspora, mainly in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy, is an electoral strategy (Amghar, 2007). It means a significant electoral base for the Party which can be mobilized during election campaigns since these immigrants have dual-citizenship and are able to vote as part of a proxy voting system (Ibid). Thus the PJD does not hesitate to organize official and unofficial meetings or gatherings to describe its political and social program with the hope of mobilizing Moroccan immigrants (Ibid). In 2006, before the 2007 general elections in Morocco, the PJD organized a 'European electoral campaign' in different European cities to recruit new members, appealing to immigrants and win their votes for the coming elections (Yabiladi, 2006). PJD members have also sought to meet with representatives of Moroccan immigrant workers to present their political party and programs (Amghar, 2007). They also wanted to establish a dialogue with European political parties as PJD delegations met with members from major political parties in Spain and France as part of a strategy that aims at appealing to Muslim communities in Europe and appear as respectable agents of change (Ibid).

Aware of its popularity within the Moroccan diaspora, the PJD has condemned the inability of Moroccan immigrants to vote in their guest countries and criticized the proxy voting system according to which these immigrants have to choose a person in Morocco to vote on their behalf (Ibid). Thus in 2006, the Party signed a communiqué denouncing "government backsliding with regards to the organization of elections among Moroccans living abroad" (Amghar, 2007, p. 20)

Beyond the monarchy's constitutional, religious and symbolic powers, the PJD has never questioned the Islamic legitimacy of the monarch nor challenged his religious or political powers. The party also refused to take part in the Arab Spring (Hashas, 2013), accepted the nomination of technocrats to strategic ministries (Masbah, 2015) and even preferred to consult with the monarch for the appointment the party's leader is entitled to make (Ibid). During the 2013 governmental reshuffle, the King replaced El Othmani, who was the PJD's Minister of Foreign affairs, with an apparent ally of the palace: Salah Eddine Mezouar (Abouzzohour and Tomé-Alonso, 2019). The party has even declared that "The

king is the head of state and no important decision can be taken in the Ministerial Council without the will of the king”, that the government is his Majesty’s government and that the party is here to serve the king (LePoint.fr, 2011). In its political program, the party endorsed the king’s official position in its conception of foreign policy to create a “sovereign state” with a widespread influence (PJD, 2011). Thus, the party’s foreign policy orientations followed the instructions of the king to defend ‘national territorial integrity’ and to balance international relations between the West and the East (PJD, 2011). Its positions and attitudes have failed to disrupt continuity in the way the monarch has led decision-making process in foreign affairs (Abouzzohour and Tomé-Alonso, 2019). The king made a point of not including PJD politicians among his official diplomatic missions and delegations (Desrues and Fernández-Molina, 2013). It was a clear message that there would be no possible ‘governmentalisation’ of Morocco’s foreign policy, which will remain the executive domain of the monarch and his entourage (Ibid).

Conclusion

Both the AKP and the PJD are the dominant political parties within their countries. They have evolved from Islamic movements and continue to make references to religion in their political programs and discourses. These parties have rationalized their ideologies for the sake of political competition while their emphasis on Islamic values serves to stand out in politics.

The AKP evolved into a conservative party that highlights the need to preserve traditional moral values. For the party religion and identity politics serve to give a voice to the marginalized and to express their grievances. The party’s nationalist understanding of Islam has managed to create identification tools between the party and citizens and to appeal to voters beyond its traditional electoral base. By using a victimization speech that presented devout Muslims as victims of the secular Kemalist elite, the party wanted to discredit its political opponents and invalidate the opposition. Secular political parties, mainly the CHP, were presented as being corrupt and disconnected from the Muslim values of their own society.

Similarly, the PJD’s use of religious symbolism serves to differentiate itself from other political parties. For the party ethics should determine the way politics are thought

and conducted. References to religion have helped to convey the message that the PJD is an honest and incorruptible party while portraying other political parties as being unethical. Within the PJD discourse, the Moroccan people are presented as pious and victim of the corrupt elite and by claiming their piousness party members would like to show their integrity and ethical responsibility in doing politics better than anyone else.

Thus, the AKP has capitalized on a victimization speech that opposes devout Muslims to the secular elite in order to discredit the opposition and stand out in Politics. In contrast, the PJD has capitalized on a speech that highlights its members' piousness to present its political opponents as corrupt and differentiate itself from other political actors. Victimization and piousness become a political argument to mobilize and broaden their constituency.

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
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
Appendix1

General Elections in Turkey, 2002, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2018 (Source Daily Sabah).


General Election, 2002 (Source: Daily Sabah)




General Election, 2007 (Source: Daily Sabah)




General Election, 2011 (Source: Daily Sabah)



General Election, 2015 (Source: Daily Sabah)



General Election, 2018 (Source: Daily Sabah)




The 2002 General Elections in Turkey brought a landslide victory for the AKP, which won an overwhelming majority in the Parliament one year after it was created Çarkoğlu, A. (2002). The left-leaning CHP, AKP's primary political opponent, was able to gain seats in parliament but remained about 14 percentage points below AKP (Ibid). The July 2007 parliamentary elections reinforced the ruling AKP as the dominant political party in Turkish politics (Sayari, & Hasanov, 2008). It won 341 out of the 550 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly while the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) also managed to win 112 and 70 seats, respectively (Ibid). In the 2011 parliamentary elections, the AKP's hegemony in Turkish politics was further consolidated (Tezcür, 2012). Elections results showed that the Party did not face a serious electoral challenge in many provinces (Ibid). However, The CHP significantly increased its voting support compared to 2002 and 2007 and became more competitive *vis-à-vis* the AKP (Ibid). During the June 2015 elections, the AKP lost the majority in parliament, while the HDP gained more ground (Bardakçi, 2016). Electoral support for the AKP dropped by nine percent, from 49.8 percent in 2011 to 40.9 percent in

2015 (Ibid). However, votes for the HDP doubled between the two elections, rising from 6.6 percent in 2011 to 13.1 percent in 2015 (Ibid). Failure to produce a governmental coalition led to repeat the election process on November 1, 2015 (Ibid). The results were entirely different and enabled the AKP to regain its status as a single-party government (Ibid). It won a sweeping victory increasing its seats in Parliament from 258 in the June 7 elections to 317 seats on November 1 and its votes from 40.9 to 49.5 percent (Ibid). The CHP also increased its votes while votes for the HDP declined (Ibid). In 2018 elections, the AKP failed to maintain its single-party parliamentary majority (Sözen, 2019). The party lost 6.9 percentage points compared to the last parliamentary elections in November 2015 and won only 42.6 per cent of the vote (Ibid). By forming a coalition with the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP), the AK Party laid the way for a strong parliamentary coalition with a total of 344 Members of Parliament (Altun, 2018).


Appendix 2

General Elections in Morocco, 2002, 2007, 2011 (Source Tafra)


General Elections in Morocco, 2002 (Source Tafra)




General Elections in Morocco, 2007 (Source Tafra)



General Elections in Morocco, 2011 (Source Tafra)



General Election in Morocco, 2011/2016 (Source:L'Economiste)



PJD: Justice and Development Party (Parti de la Justice et du Développement)

PAM: Authenticity and Modernity Party (Parti de l'Authenticité et de la Modernité)

PI: Independence Party (Parti de l'Indépendance)

RNI: National Rally of Independents (Rassemblement National des Indépendants)

MP: Popular Movement (Mouvement populaire)

USFP: Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires)

UC: Constitutional Union (Union constitutionnelle)

PPS: Party of Progress and Socialism (Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme)

In 2002 the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (*Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires*, USFP) won the legislative elections and 50 seats within the parliament (Tafra, 2016). In 2007 the party lost nearly 300,000 votes, mainly in big cities (Ibid). In 2011 The USFP collapsed in big cities and remained slightly popular in rural areas. 2007 saw a stagnation of the PJD while Istiqlal became largely popular especially in the south of the kingdom (Ibid). The PJD's stagnation was mainly explained by lack of popularity within rural areas where Istiqlal managed to mobilize (Ibid). 2011 marked the victory of the PJD being dominant both within urban and rural areas (Ibid). 2016 General Elections were described as a duel between the Justice and Development Party (PJD) and the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM, pro-monarchist). PJD ranks first with 125 seats (31.65%) while PAM is second with 102 seats (25.82%), a gap of six points lower than in 2011 (Szmolka, 2018). In 2016, the PJD faced difficulties in forming its governmental coalition. As a consequence, the king dismissed the former prime minister and PJD leader, Abdelilah Benkirane, and nominated PJD's former foreign minister Saadeddine El Othmani as head of the new government in charge of forming the new government. The palace has also appointed several pro-palace technocrats and conservative royalist parties' members to different ministries (Monjib, 2017).

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