Negotiating one's space:

Moroccan youths' strategies to make themselves heard

LITERATURE REVIEW

By

Lalla Amina Drhimeur

PRIME Youth Researcher
PhD candidate in political science
Sciences Po Lyon, France

January 13, 2022

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.5842628

ERC AdG PRIME Youth
ISLAM-OPHOB-ISM
785934

European Research Council
Established by the European Commission

BiLGi PRIME YOUTH

İstanbul Bilgi University

Preface

This literature review was prepared in the scope of the ongoing EU-funded research for the “PRIME Youth” project conducted under the supervision of the Principal Investigator, Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya, and funded by the European Research Council with the Agreement Number 785934.

AYHAN KAYA

Jean Monnet Chair of European Politics of Interculturalism

Director, European Institute

Istanbul Bilgi University

Negotiating one's space: Moroccan youths' strategies to make themselves heard

Lalla Amina Drhimeur
ERC AdG PRIME Youth Researcher, European Institute, İstanbul Bilgi University, and PhD Candidate in Political Science, Sciences Po Lyon, France

Introduction

Morocco remains a demographically young country with a median age of 29.5 years (World Population Review, 2021). This youth, highly educated and tech-savvy, "devise their own methods and spaces to engage politically" to "work out ways to live outside the system and to construct alternatives" (Herrera and Sakr, 2014, p. 3). With the combination of neoliberal globalization practices, shifting moral and social politics, unemployment, and economic insecurity, the youth differ in their contestation of power. They are constantly "accommodating strategies" to negotiate what it means to be young, Moroccan, Muslim, or modern (Gandolfi, 2015). They "operate within and use the dominant (constraining) norms and institutions, especially religious rituals, to accommodate their youthful claims, but in so doing, they creatively redefine and subvert the constraints of those codes and norms" (Bayat and Herrera, 2010, p. 18). There is more to the lives of Moroccan youth than religiosity, extremism, and instability. They diverge in their understanding of what it means to be young, Moroccan, or Muslim and diversify their strategies to assert themselves, their youthfulness, and their rights.

When referring to the youth, this paper uses empirical studies that analyze Moroccan youth characteristics, political attitudes, or behaviors. These studies all seem to agree that being young in Morocco is related to a feeling of political apathy and "social malaise." The youth denounce the unequal access to state services, education, employment, and spaces of participation. The political unrest that shook Morocco back in 2011 came to refute the previously held thesis that Moroccan youngsters are apolitical or depoliticized (Bourqia, Harras and Bensaïd, 1995). Their implications revealed a dynamic young generation eager to take part in change and define their future. They organized themselves into a movement known as February 20Th and took to the street to demand reforms. They asked for freedom, democracy, and social justice. The "street," virtual spaces, or art have become their way of doing politics and claiming their citizenship rights. These informal modes of political participation sometimes interplay with formal institutional politics to create the "art of presence" using "courage and creativity to assert collective will in spite of all odds, to circumvent constraints, utilizing what is available and discovering new spaces within which to make oneself heard, seen, felt, and realized" (Bayat, 2013).

In Morocco, the youth use different formal and informal spaces available to them to denounce their social exclusion and influence social and political change. Formal modes of political participation refer to one's involvement in institutionalized political life, including voting, being a member of a political party or a trade union, and participating in debates or meetings (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992). Informal modes of participation range from legal activities of boycotting a product and signing a petition to illegal, violent ones like the occupation of a building (ibid). In this paper, we would firstly like to examine what it means to be Moroccan. Then, we will examine youth participation within formal and informal spheres of politics to draw attention to the heterogeneity of the youth and how they use different strategies to participate

in collective action.

What it means to be young in Morocco

In this section, we would like to cover how youths in Morocco have been represented within the literature. We would like to examine their diverse aspirations and what it means for them to be young, Moroccan, or Muslim.

Between "modernism" and religiosity

One of the first empirical studies on youth in Morocco dates back to the sixties. The survey conducted among 418 high school students in urban Morocco revealed that young people aspired for "modernism" and for Morocco to follow the example of Western developmental societies (Adam, 1963). The majority of respondents rejected polygamy and gave less importance to religion either in their private lives or in managing public affairs (ibid). Surveys in rural Morocco, on the other hand, revealed that youth are conservative in the way they conceive the status of women, the authority of the father, and the central role of the family (Pascon et al., 1970). They rarely questioned the patriarchal nature of the family structure and the position of women (ibid). For them, religious education should guide the way they behave with and look after their parents in terms of respect, obedience, and gratitude (ibid). They also idealized the role of the state as the main provider of employment and the authority to solve problems (ibid).

Starting in the 1980s, the religious discourse became more influential within movements, political parties, or the younger generation. In a survey conducted between 1983 and 1984 among 400 university students about the place religion should occupy in public space, 15 percent of respondents believed being a Muslim meant being "a believer and a militant in an Islamic group in order to make all Muslims implement the true religion"(Tozy, 1984, pp. 249–250). Fifty-eight percent of those students rejected secularism (ibid, pp. 249–253). This strong sense of attachment to Islam was further emphasized when sixty-two percent of respondents agreed that "in order to reconstruct the cultural identity of Moroccans, the precepts of the Quran should be emphasized" (ibid, pp. 249, 253). Forty percent agreed with the idea that Islam "can by itself organize all aspects of life," and thirty-two percent of students believed Islamic law should constitute the sole legal code (ibid, pp. 249, 253).

When questioned about the place of religion within politics in a survey conducted among high school and university students in the 1990s, the majority of respondents expressed the view that Islam should guide economic, political policies, and administrative life (Bourqia, Harras and Bensaïd, 1995). In 2005, the Economist, a Moroccan newspaper, conducted a survey among 776 young people aged 16 to 29 (L'Economiste, 2006). Fifty-seven percent of respondents were in favor of the veil, while 99 percent declared doing Ramadan, and a third of them expressed the idea that Islam should guide political parties (ibid). Because of their higher level of education, young people have more access to religious sources of information (Desrues, 2012). Their "re-Islamization" might also reflect their desire for greater "morality, social justice and equality" (ibid, p. 29).

These studies seem to have failed to recognize the diversity of Moroccan youth and how they compete to produce different images of their society. Youth adopt subcultures styles: Rockers, Rastas, Punks, or Hip-hop as new forms of identification and resistance against traditional social structures and institutions such as the family, religion, or society at

large (Arab Media and Society, 2018). Others adopt religious symbols and practices to reposition themselves in a continuously changing global system (Bayat, 2013). What they seem to share, however, is a feeling of general uneasiness within society at large.

"Our voices are muted."

Youths often refer to a state of exclusion and marginalization within their own families, schools, or within society at large (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). The 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca drew attention to how the politically marginalized and socially excluded Moroccans may tend to commit violence (Baske, 2020). A new category of youth emerged: young people living in poor and marginalized areas exposed to extremism (Paciello and Pioppi, 2018).

Urbanization and demographic transition in recent decades have impacted family relationships which shifted towards more autonomy and individualization of the youth (Gandolfi, 2015). Access to technology and globalization have created a more "individualistic youth" different from previous generations (Leiter, 2018, p. 25). Zirari argues that "the nuclearization of the family does not bring to a social and ideological rupture with the traditional family, which still survives (with all these references such as the authority of the male, the honor, the solidarity) and still interferes within the relations of the couple" (Zirari, 2008, p. 241). Youth's process of individualization is often confronted with a family experience full of patriarchal constraints (Gandolfi, 2015). While the youth, influenced by global modernity, aspire to personal autonomy and success, parents' conception of the family still emphasizes hierarchy, authority, and respect for the elderly (Boudarbat and Ajbilou, 2007). Schools have highlighted the relevance of socialization within peer groups at the expanse of families (Desrues, 2012). This has created a gap between parents and the new generations, questioning their hierarchical social practices (ibid). Relations between parents and children are changing as autonomy and dialogue are more important values for the youth than obedience (Rachik, 2005). These relationships are sometimes conflictual (Gandolfi, 2015). The youth have a different set of values and their desire to engage in politics or to defend individual liberties is not often welcomed (Rachik, 2005). Relationships are also conflictual because families usually do not provide a space for their children to participate in decision-making processes (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). It remains difficult for young people to "approach the authority" of the family and consolidate their individualization (Gandolfi, 2015, p. 5). Lack of dialogue and involvement in decision-making leave many youngsters feeling excluded from their own families (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). To make up for this lack of autonomy within their families, young people turn to the internet to create a space of their own, private and independent (Desrues, 2012).

The family continues to be a safety net for the youth as both parents and the youth rely on each other for financial support. While parents view their children as guarantors against life insecurities, young people often rely on their families to face difficult economic conditions given the high rate of youth unemployment and the increasing cost of living (Rachik, 2005). Youngsters often criticize pressure from their families, who expect them to provide financial help once they graduate and find a job (Haut-Commissariat au Plan, 1995). In Morocco, family relations are still an important reference, and the family institution continues to play the main role inside the society (Gandolfi, 2015).

Youth in Morocco criticize the educational system for reproducing exclusion. Accordingly, the educational system fails to be responsive to the demands of the job market (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). Even if school drop-out rates decreased between 2018 and 2020, they are still high amounting to 2.1 percent in primary school, 10.4 percent in middle schools, and 7.4 percent in high schools (Le Desk, 2021). Not to mention major disparities between rural and urban areas as the average years of education are 2.2 years in rural areas and 6.1 years in urban ones (Observatoire National du Développement Humain (ONDH), 2018). Youth from rural areas often highlight their geographical exclusion speaking of a dual Morocco—i.e., urban Morocco and rural Morocco. They refer to the latter as the "al-Maghrib al-Mansi" (en. forgotten Morocco), because "[w]e tend to always forget about the child of the mountain[:] he doesn't have the means to study, he doesn't have a kindergarten, there are no roads, no hospitals, the child is missing basic things; he doesn't know what exists beyond the mountain" (cited in Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016, p. 18). They also mention disparities between the public and private schooling systems. As a matter of fact, there seems to be a disengagement of the state from education to the detriment of the private sector. Strong governmental support for private education has contributed to creating a "multi-speed" society deepening inequality and segregation (Abdous, 2020). While in 1990, only 3.6 percent of primary students were enrolled in private schools, this percentage rose to 16 percent in 2016 (ibid). Young people do not believe in the ability of the educational system to lift them out of poverty (Floris, 2012). Addiction to drugs is also very high as twenty-eight percent of respondents for a survey on drug abuse within public high schools reported ever using alcohol, hashish, psychotropic drugs, or other drugs (El Omari et al., 2015). They also criticize the system for failing to emancipate them from "older and recycled socio-cultural hierarchies" (Boutieri, 2014, p. 54). Structures of authority experienced within the family are also experienced within schools (Zerhouni, 2017).

Unemployment within the youth reinforces their feeling of exclusion and social malaise. Youth Unemployment Rate in Morocco reached 32.50 percent in the first quarter of 2021 (Haut-Commissariat au Plan, 2021). A new World Bank report documents the exclusion of many Moroccans, especially women and youth, from the labor market (The World Bank, 2021). Most of the unemployed are young, live in urban areas, and have high levels of education (ibid). The youth who could find a job often report difficult working conditions. In 2019 only 45 percent of workers reported having a contract, and only 25.6 percent of Morocco's employed labor force has work-related medical insurance (Haut-Commissariat au Plan, 2020). They face the dilemma of accepting precarious working conditions or the emotional strain of being unemployed and pointed out by society as lazy (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). Unable to find a job, a house, and get married, they feel 'stuck' in their liminality and cannot make a transition to experience adulthood (Bayat and Herrera, 2010). Lack of economic prospects leaves the youth in a "prolonged period of adolescence" with a strong desire to leave the country (Baune, 2005). Young unemployed people often speak of 'hogra' (lack of dignity), 'tahmish' (marginalization), 'alkamâ' (oppression), and risk of falling into deviance and drug abuse (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016).

Moreover, the youth express a feeling of frustration and "general malaise and discomfort" in society (ibid). They are often "feared" and stigmatized as the "disruptive agents more prone to radicalism and deviance" (Bayat and Herrera, 2010, p. 3). "Young people often describe Moroccan society as "schizophrenic" pointing to the discrepancies between law, practice, and social norms (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). They usually express dissatisfaction with the society they think fails to understand or value them (Baske, 2020). They criticize

social prohibitions that do not allow them to express themselves freely or be different from the dominant norms (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). Youth believe the dominant culture does not allow them to be themselves (Zerhouni, 2017). Being different is usually interpreted as rejecting Islam or the Moroccan identity and might lead to youth exclusion (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). For these young people, Moroccan society does not accept difference: “I feel very much excluded. In our society, we do not accept differences and people who think differently. Since middle school, I liked rock and punk; I dressed differently, and I had long hair. At home, they told me that I was not a good Muslim. In the street, I was insulted and accused of being satanic or a blood drinker. [...] I am just a different person who lives in his own world” (cited in Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016, p. 16). Marginalization and exclusion, which entail a feeling of hogra, humiliation and hassle, lead to violence and delinquency (Zerhouni, 2017). Being a youth is often associated with a sense of anxiety and uncertainty. Young people feel “trapped” in Morocco and feel they cannot do anything about it (Leiter, 2018, p. 25).

Youth and formal modes of political participation: what is available is not always desired

Since 1962, the legal framework has allowed young people to vote, run for elections, and join a political party or a union (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). The constitutional reforms of 2011 put into place the Consultative Council of Youth and Community Work (Art. 33), allowing citizens to present petitions or draft legislation (Arts. 13 to 15) and introduced the principle of consultation with civil society for the evaluation and the implementation of public policies (Art. 12).

The existing literature on youth political participation and studies conducted before the Arab uprisings usually concluded that Moroccan youth lacked interest in participating in politics. When questioned about their interest in electoral participation in a survey conducted among 500 university students between 1979 and 1979, only 25 percent of respondents voted in the municipal elections and 3 percent in the legislative election of 1976 (Parlmer and Nedelcovych, 1984). Despite their understanding of the political game and the functioning of the institutions and the regime, respondents were reluctant to participate in politics believing the existing institutions lacked credibility and legitimacy (ibid). They were also less active in unions or political parties disenchanted with formal political participation modes in general (Bennani-Chraïbi, 1995). Most of these young people did not believe the change could happen through legal means, but through unconventional methods of political participation, that is to say, protests and strikes (Parlmer and Nedelcovych, 1984). In the 1990s, most young people did not identify with a political party (L’Economiste, 2006). Their membership in political parties has been dwindling, and their activism through party politics has also been very weak. Only 10.8 percent of respondents among students reported being a member of a political party in the early 1990s. In comparison, 98.2 percent reported a high level of distrust towards political parties, and 97.8 percent towards the state (Bourqia, Harras and Bensaïd, 1995). A survey conducted in 2007 among 353 university students confirmed youth’s lack of trust in the parliament and its ability to solve issues (Zerhouni, 2019).

The Arab uprisings seem to have failed to increase youth’s interest in political parties as only 1 percent engaged in political action from within a political body (Belfellah, 2015). An abstention is a form of protest against political institutions that fail to represent the will of the people (Zerhouni and Bahoussa, 2008). It comes from a lack of trust in political parties

because of “the absence of internal democracy at the level of parties, their strong dependence on the regime, the lack of responsiveness of their political theses to the vision of young people, the marginalization of youth and seeing them only as voting numbers” (cited in Baske, 2020, p. 19).

The youth do not vote because they do not trust the electoral process. “Elections are only for the sake of appearance. Winners are already defined” (cited in Baske, 2020, p. 21), and “candidates serve only their self-interests” (cited in Baske, 2020, p. 20). Politics are compared to a “muddy place,” a “swamp” of interests and lack of ethics (Leiter, 2018, p. 24) Abstention from voting seems to be valid given the monarchy’s grip over the political system (Drhimeur, 2020a). The fact that the monarchy manages to influence the political game increases youth’s distrust in political parties (Kadi, 2019). Very few political parties dedicate a section to the youth, and most of them do not specify the proportion of youth and women within their organizations, failing to respect the provisions of the 2006 party bill (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). Political parties seem to marginalize the youth because they fail to understand their concerns (Boutaleb, 2019). Parties are run by elder statesmen who often deny the current young generation opportunities of attaining power and privilege (Bayat and Herrera, 2010). Thus has nourished in the youth the idea that these political parties are incapable of modernization and renewal and so of leading the country (Boutaleb, 2019)

The existence of a range of trade unions in Morocco has contributed to the fragmentation of the political sphere and the consolidation of the centrality of the monarchy (Vinogradov and Waterbury, 1971). In the 1960s and the 1970s, unions played a major role in mobilizing the youth and presented the major opposition forces to the monarchy pushing for democratic reforms (El-Ayadi, 1999). The analysis of the student movement and the political role of the National Union of Students of Morocco (Union Nationale des Etudiants du Maroc, UNEM) showed the high level of politicization of the youth (Menouni, 1970). This youth movement represented "a new political intelligentsia” and the main opposition force to power when the main opposition parties were being persecuted (ibid, p. 204). For the youth, the university was a privileged space to express their political opinions, socialize, and construct their relationship to politics (Darif, 1996). The internal organizational and ideological divisions that characterized student movements since the 1980s made them lose their ability to mobilize significant numbers of young people (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016).

Formal spaces for youth political participation exist, but their cooptation or fragmentation pushed them to look for informal alternatives to politics (Baske, 2020). It was also the state repression over leftist parties and movements in the 1960s and the 1970s that eventually made young people demobilize (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). They vote less, lack trust in formal political institutions, and are less numerous to adhere to a political party (Hegasy, 2007).

This disappointment does not mean that the youth are not interested in politics. It means that young people believe parties are corrupt and the elections remain manipulated (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). Refusing to participate in political parties is a refusal to participate in an authoritarian and hierarchical system that continues to oppress them (Sadoqi, 2021). For young people in Morocco, political parties do not help make their voices heard. They fail to represent their concerns or to include them in decision-making. The youth speak of their inability to become high-level members or to have their activities promoted. Besides feeling marginalized, the youth believe parties only use them to help with electoral campaigning

(Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). They criticize parties for lacking practices of good governance and internal democracy (ibid). The patriarchal way of thinking among traditional party members still prevents the youth from the political sphere. It bars them from having access to decision-making positions within political parties run mainly by the elderly (Kadi, 2019). Youth frustrations increase when they feel they are looked down on by the political elite that monopolizes all aspects of social, political, and economic life (Desrues, 2012). The monarchy has long sought to control the production of the political elite to maintain its dominance and continuity (Zerhouni, 2014). Because most of the political elite consist of older generations, the youth feel they do not represent them (Boutaleb, 2019). The concept of respect of seniority, based on a long "tradition of patriarchal and tribal obedience," preserves the political and social realm to the elderly as young people are not expected to express their opinions (Kadi, 2019).

This feeling of disdain from the government was exacerbated when Morocco reintroduced compulsory military service in 2018 to help fight unemployment and "promote patriotism among the young, within the framework of the correlation between the rights and responsibilities of citizenship" (Reuters, 2018). However, the action was seen as an initiative to control youth protest movements that could erupt at any time, leading to social or political unrest (Leiter, 2018). A way to prevent the youth from leaving the country and from speaking out because "would you speak out against your boss at work? No, and neither would a young man or women enlisted in the Moroccan military" (ibid, p. 19)

These studies should be nuanced as they fail to analyze how young people use the alternative mode of political engagement and how they resort to new spaces outside formal politics. The youth in Morocco is a diverse social group, and similarly, their political orientations and participation should not be standardized. Their relationship to politics can occur outside traditional, formal, and institutional frameworks of political action. They organize protests, sit-ins, participate in marches and use social media to express their ideas (Zerhouni, 2019). In other words, youth choose to do politics differently (Baske, 2020). They are generally informed about politics but are only willing to engage in politics provided the regime undertakes deep political and socio-economic reforms (Zerhouni and Bahoussa, 2008). This negative perception of political institutions does not reflect a critical view of democracy. On the contrary, the vast majority believe democracy is the better system of governance (Arab Barometer, 2019).

Political exclusion seems to be a shared feeling among young people in Morocco regardless of their gender. However, they combine or alternate between formal and informal modes of politics to make their voices heard. They remain active within political parties and trade unions, but they also seek to express their voices differently. They take part in protests movements, mobilize on social media, and make use of social and cultural activities to express their concerns.

Adopting new strategies to negotiate a space of their own

Increased education, unemployment, and limited opportunities for political participation pushed the youth to organize into large associations and social movements to question the traditional socio-political structures in Morocco (Leiter, 2018). The youth have learned to occupy new spaces outside formal politics to avoid state repression. They establish associations, form protest movements, or mobilize on social media to talk and debate politics.

Let's negotiate within associations and movements

A survey conducted in 1995 among 865 students revealed a high degree of depoliticization. Accordingly, only 15.1 percent of respondents declared that they belonged to an association, whereas only 0.8 percent were members of a political association (Bourqia et al., 2000). However, starting from 2000, hundreds of associations were created to defend human rights, women's rights, and cultural issues (Maghraoui, 2008).

The regime has long sought to control civil society actors through the promotion of pro-regimes associations that "meant to compete with associations affiliated to the opposition and to provide a new mechanism of control and stability during a time of severe economic restructuring in Morocco"(Sater, 2007, p. 69). Creating these loyal associations helped broaden the discourse on human rights, women's rights, and cultural rights and encouraged more young people to engage in public life (ibid). It also served to delegate state regulation of society to associations while initiating neoliberal reforms (Floris, 2012). The promotion of associations seemed useful to substitute their public policies or externalize their financing to international development organizations (Desrues and Garcia De Paredes, 2021). Most of these NGOs remain closely supervised by the Ministry of Interior to make sure they remain apolitical and do not challenge the prerogatives of the monarchy (Paciello and Pioppi, 2018).

Reports and studies have shown that the youth prefer to join or form associations to engage in the public sphere. A study conducted by the Ministry of Interior in 2014 indicated that 8 percent of associations were created by young people between 20 and 30 years old (Zoubairi, 2014). Other studies showed that a significant number of associations target young people (Haut-Commissariat au Plan, 2011) while only 8 percent of a sample of 1,254 associations employ young people within their management structure (MSFFDS, 2010). The associational life has further flourished after the constitutional reforms of 2011 that involved civil society in decision-making (Touhtou, 2014). Unlike politics, which is viewed as deceiving and difficult, associative life is perceived as "voluntary and charitable" (Baske, 2020, p. 24).

In 1991 students from the National Union Of Moroccan Students (Union Nationale des Etudiants du Maroc, UNEM) established the Moroccan Association of Unemployed Graduates with around 30,000 members with "two main goals: first we want to force the state to create jobs, and secondly, we want to establish real democracy, not this kind of façade democracy, with the other forces of civil society" (cited in Sater, 2007, p. 95). In short, the aim of the association was to put pressure on the political elite to put the problem of unemployment on their agenda (Hegasy, 2007). The association did not have an 'official' ideology as it attracted leftists, Islamists, and Amazigh activists (Schwarz, 2019). Branches of the association exist both within urban areas and rural ones (ibid).

Following their sit-ins and demonstrations, the regime proposed to hold a national conference to fight against unemployment (Conférence Nationale pour la Lutte contre le Chomage) on December 11th, 12th, 1998 (Sater, 2007) and intensified programs targeting unemployed graduates (Paciello and Pioppi, 2018). Their mobilization also made unemployment a public issue and pushed the Minister of Labour to recognize the problems young unemployed face (Sater, 2007). These problems include nepotism, privileges, and corruption within Moroccan authorities (ibid). 2002 saw the creation of two health insurance schemes that target disadvantaged and vulnerable groups: the Mandatory Medical Insurance (AMO) and the Medical Assistance Scheme (RAMED) (Rachik, 2014). Centers for professional

training and qualification have been created along with programs to assist employment and diversifying careers (Baske, 2020). In May 2005, the king launched the National Human Development Initiative (INDH) to involve public authorities and associations fighting poverty, illiteracy, and social exclusion (Rachik, 2014). The initiative helped improve access of the underprivileged to essential services and improve youth inclusiveness in local decision-making as women and youth represented 17 percent and 12 percent respectively in the governing bodies of the INDH (World Bank, 2013). In 2014 the government approved the first national youth strategy (Stratégie Nationale Integrée de la Jeunesse) to improve youth access to education, employment, health, and political, social and cultural life (Snidjer, 2015).

The inclusion of unemployed graduates consisted more of a move of the regime to monitor the political positions of the group, social tensions while going ahead with the neoliberal reforms that were the main cause of social inequalities (Paciello and Pioppi, 2018). INDH has helped the regime to monitor the growth of the associative sector while obstructing the activities of associations that tend to advocate for political reforms, human rights, or individual liberties (Desrues and Garcia De Paredes, 2021)

Globalization is another concern for the youth in Morocco. In 2000 they founded the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and Aid to Citizens (L'Association pour la Taxation des Transactions et pour l'action citoyenne au Maroc, ATTAC/CADTM) to mobilize against neo-liberal policies and capitalist mobilization (ATTAC/CADTM Maroc, no date). It indicates how Moroccan youth would like to participate in global activism and raise awareness about the implications of globalization on social justice in Morocco (Hegasy, 2007).

The youth favor activism through associations because they believe civil society organizations allow them to express themselves freely, advocate for youth issues, become involved in projects that target the youth, and engage in public and political life (Akesbi, 2012). They allow them for "greater visibility and self-esteem" (Baske, 2020, p. 25). Politics in Morocco are feared. Parents usually prefer that their children engage in their communities through associative work (Snidjer, 2015). These associations have managed to challenge the hegemony of the state as the sole agency in charge of leading political or social projects (Sater, 2007) and putting pressure on central and local authorities to expand their public policies and exclude the marginalized (Rachik, 2014). They contributed to raising people's awareness about their responsibility as citizens to engage in the public sphere, criticize government policies, and debate political questions (Sater, 2007). However, the impact of these policies has remained limited as young people abstain from voting (Alami and Casey, 2021) and 22,20 percent of Moroccan youth between 15 and 24 years are not part of the active population (World Bank, 2021). Many associations are often limited to urban educated youth and lack financial independence and political autonomy, remaining under the scrutiny of the regime that can decide to dismantle them anytime (Baske, 2020)

Within a repressive regime, the youth circumvent traditional modes of political actions and mobilize through alternate channels, through social movements, the street, or the virtual space (Zoubairi, 2014). Protest movements have always been part of Morocco's political landscape. In the thirties, the youth formed the "national youth" to protest against the French and Spanish colonial powers (Baske, 2020). In the sixties and the seventies, they formed underground Marxist movements the "25 March" and "Illa al-Amam" (Forward) and called for a Marxist revolution (El-Ayadi, 1999). Leftist movements have since gone into significant decline as more young people became more attracted to Islamist movements, in particular within

university campuses (Baske, 2020).

These movements managed to attract youth people disenchanted with political parties that have failed to integrate them. For these youth, these movements provide them with a space to express themselves and feel they can be actors of change. Like youth within secular movements, young Islamists have aspired to political reforms that would end the paternalistic and authoritarian political regime (Floris, 2012).

One of these religious movements was established in 1972 under the name of the Islamic Youth Movement (Jamiyyat al-Shabiba al-Islamiyya, IYM). It was founded under the leadership of Abdel-Karim Mouti as one of the first movements inspired by religious ideology (Munson, 1986). Within the movement, the youth was considered " a powerful challenge to currents of social corruption and moral decay and effective agents of the country's progress, the Islamic Ummah (nation) and humanity in general" (Mahmi and Jebbar, 2015, p. 263).

The movement published a review called al-Mujahid ("Fighter of Jihad") in Belgium and was clandestinely distributed in Morocco (Munson, 1986). The editorial of the first issue, entitled "Join the Fight, Revolutionary Muslim Youth" included the following passages:

> […]our present and our future are caught between the hammer of American imperialism and the anvil of its agents represented by the corrupt monarchical regime and those who support it[…]
>
> Your review appears in these circumstances in order to be, God willing, in the vanguard of an authentic Islamic revolution in Morocco, a revolution that enlightens the horizon of this country and liberates its people to bring them back to the Islam of Muhammad and of those among his people who have known how to follow him-not the Islam of the merchants of oil and the agents of the American (cited in Munson, 1986, p. 268).

The movement has managed to mobilize different age groups, but high school and university students constituted its main members (Mahmi and Jebbar, 2015). These students were involved in different fistfights against other students with a leftist political orientation and were accused of stabbing a high school teacher belonging to the communist party (Tozy, 1984). Some were arrested for distributing pamphlets of "Iranian inspiration" and taking part in riots (Le Monde, 1984).

The movement was dissolved in 1975 and fragmented into smaller groups (Darif, 2014). One of the movement's leaders, Abdelilah Benkirane , established the Movement of Reform and Renewal (Harakat al-Islah-wa-Tajdid) which would later become the Movement of Unity and Reform (Harakat al-Islah-wa-Tawhid, MUR) (Darif, 2014). The MUR has sought to organize different activities that target the youth, including trips, camps and religious lessons (Mahmi and Jebbar, 2015).

To further encourage young people to join, the MUR reduced the voting age from 20 to 18 (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). With time the movement has become a structure through which young people construct their identity, get a sense of religious security, and a means of empowerment (Mahmi and Jebbar, 2015). It has become a second home that "provides them with voices and allows them to act and react, assuming the responsibility of 'reforming oneself

as well as the Islamic nation through peaceful daawa (call to Islam)'" (ibid, p. 264). For them, belonging to the MUR goes beyond religion for religion's sake and becomes a means to gain social and political power" and challenge the political corruption and status quo (ibid, p. 280). To further disseminate their ideology and 'hire' more young sympathizers within university spheres the movement launched the Students' Renewal to organize "students' academic life within an Islamist framework. In other words, Islam is "the major background and academe is the aim as well as means of attaining progress in the light of Islamic teachings and laws" (cited in Mahmi and Jebbar, 2015, p. 268).

Another popular religious movement is AL Adl Wal Ihssan (Justice and Benevolence) which Sheikh Yassine established in 1987 (Sater, 2007). Different members of the movements were involved in violent clashes with 'secular' and leftist students within universities (Sater, 2007). The movement has managed to mobilize young people filling the social and phycological void left by the state (ibid). Its ability to establish charity networks in different underprivileged neighborhoods and provide essential public services where the state has failed, helped to contain the influence of the leftist ideology while the impact of the Islamist thinking increased at universities and student unions (ibid).

The main influence of the Islamist movements on government politics has been their opposition to the Plan d'Action pour l'Intégration des Femmes au Développement (National Plan for the Integration of Woman to Development, PANIFD, 1999-2000) (ibid). PANIFD, which was drawn up by the government in collaboration with women's rights associations, aimed to improve women's access to education, reproductive health, fight against female poverty, and strengthen women's legal, institutional and political prerogatives (Bouhsini, 2016). The movement managed to mobilize 300,000 participants in its march demonstrating its capacity to use the streets for political purposes and influence politics since the plan was withdrawn (Sater, 2007).

Disillusionment with the political elite in 2011, corruption, and social injustice pushed the youth to take to the street and organize under the February 20 Youth Movement (Monjib, 2011). The 2011 uprisings were, in fact, a culmination of previous protests movements that found new ways of expressing their political, economic, social, and political grievances (Sánchez García, Feixa Pàmpols and Laine, 2016). It also represented a culmination of protest groups created on social networks to advocate for social justice and individual freedom (Leiter, 2018). The movement was heterogeneous and positioned itself as a movement "without ideology" (Rachik, 2014). It managed to bridge the ideological differences between the religious and the secular young people who found in the movement a voice to express their concerns (Desrues, 2012). Some of these young people did not belong to any political party, union, politico-religious association, or movement and others did (Rachik, 2014), meaning that mobilizations were not strictly carried by a "non-politicized" youth (Paciello and Pioppi, 2018, p. 9). What attracted young people to the movement was its horizontal and decentralised structure (Desrues, 2012). The use of social media and deliberative processes during meetings presented a new political culture that is democratic and liberal (ibid). They created a Facebook page called "Freedom and Democracy Now" to organize their mobilization and set their demands (Kadi, 2019). They asked for sweeping democratization of the political system (Monjib, 2011). They asked to limit the king's power and establish a "parliamentary monarchy" that would give him the right to reign but not rule (Hashas, 2013). They also demanded the end of corruption, the improvement of education and health systems, and the expansion of freedom, dignity and social justice (Alsadin, 2012).

The February 20 Youth Movement was the first to question the sacred nature of the monarchy and the nature of the relationship between the king and “his subjects”: the citizens (Rachik, 2014). It reflects the transition of demonstrations from spontaneous regional protests to planned national ones (Baske, 2020). The 20 February movement was the principal actor behind the political and constitutional reforms of 2011 (Drhimeur, 2020a) and forced public authorities to include the youth in their social, cultural, political, and economic strategies. Hence the constitution called for the establishment of an Advisory Council for the youth to facilitate youth access to active and civic life (Baske, 2020). Morocco decided to adopt youth quotas, reserving sixty seats for women and thirty for male candidates under 40 years old in the House of Representatives (Royaume du Maroc, 2011). In 2016, 14.7 percent of parliamentary members were under the age of 40, while just 1.6 percent were under the age of 30 (Leiter, 2018). But compared to the percentage of the population under the age of 40, this percentage illustrates how the youth remain underrepresented in politics (ibid) as political parties have failed to fully endorse youth's right to representation (Kadi, 2019). The adoption of the youth quota served mainly to legitimize and stabilize the regime that sought to reframe and appropriate the reform process (Belschner, 2021). Including the youth in conventional politics seemed to be a way to co-opt opposition groups, maintain control over political rivals and strip the youth from their urge to revolt (Barari, 2015). The discourse on enhancing youth participation has been instrumental in maintaining the political status quo while continuing neoliberal reforms (Paciello and Pioppi, 2018).

The February 20 Youth Movement helped to increase youth’s interest in political action, but this interest soon declined as the government's policies did not meet their aspirations (Baske, 2020). But probably the most valuable contribution of the February 20th movement is youth’s awareness that they can create other forms to express their concerns and have their voice heard (Desrues, 2012). They resort to “the philosophy of the street” to discuss philosophy in the street or the “Mahgor”(the oppressed) theatre where young people perform plays in public to talk about their issues (Baske, 2020). Since then, an online press has been flourishing, enabling the political debate to reach a wider audience (Desrues, 2012). The movement helped change the Moroccan political culture and sensitize issues relating to democratic citizenship (Schwarz, 2019).

Following the death of Mohsin Fekri, a fish vendor who was crushed to death by a garbage truck after the authorities seized his products, the youth organized demonstrations in the Rif region protesting against their poor socio-economic conditions and their exclusion from governmental development programs (The New York Times, 2017). The demonstrations became known as the Hirak Movement (Drhimeur, 2020a). Similar to the February 20Th movement, the Hirak positioned itself as a movement without any political framework (Boutaleb, 2019). It rejected all political parties, rejected negotiating with the government, and asked to meet with a commission designed by the king (Drhimeur, 2020a). They even blamed political parties for the demise of the February 20th movement (Chapi, 2021). The movement reflects the failures of political parties and the emptiness felt by the youth (Boutaleb, 2019).

Online social mobilization and protests are new modes for the youth to “inhabit the center” and respond to marginalization (Sadoqi, 2021). It means that political awareness happens outside official political institutions (Boutaleb, 2019). The movement produced innovative and unprecedented tactics to overcome repression and circumvent the police ban on demonstrations. They include surprise demonstrations, pot-banging protests on the rooftops at night, car horn protests, and beach-based protest (Chapi, 2021). This innovation

came mainly from the “youths of the neighbourhoods,” who pushed core activists to think about new ways to sustain their protest actions (ibid). The Hirak movement was a clear indication that youth activism is not over yet (Kadi, 2019).

Boycott movements also helped the youth to draw attention to their disenchantment with cronyism and the high cost of living (Leiter, 2018). In 2018 they launched an online call to boycott major national companies that either distribute gas, produce dairy products, or bottled water (Chaaibat, 2020). These market leader companies are known for their proximity to the regime (Drhimeur, 2020a). Cyber activism meant for the youth an alternative and informal way to express their grievances and criticize how the business elite, which gravitates around the monarchy, detain the monopoly of the economy (Masbah, 2018). Cyberactivism is deemed “safer” than street protests that the authorities can brutally disperse (Echine, 2019, p. 74).

Let’s occupy public space

The youth seem to disapprove of conformist modes of political participation and expression. To distance themselves from the “dominant status quo” while affecting change, they favor protest movements, art, cultural activities, and digital activism (Sadoqi, 2021) Occupying public space is another mode of political participation and civic engagement for the youth. Youngsters in Morocco have consistently called for the organization of protests and sit-ins (Rachik, 2014). Between 2005 and 2015, the number of protests, sit-ins, demonstrations, and marches rose significantly from 700 in 2005 to 5,091 in 2008, 6,438 in 2009, and 8,600 in 2010 (ibid). In 2012 protest actions reached 17,000, an average of 52 actions per day (ibid).

They were mobilized by unions, student unions, opposition political parties but mainly by the movement of the unemployed graduates both in urban and rural areas reflecting an intense feeling of frustration, exclusion, and being part of what they referred to as “useless Morocco” (ibid, p. 6). When the youth’s demands and expectations for social, economic, and political welfare are not met, they mobilize in large protest movements (Leiter, 2018)

When the February 20th movement called for nationwide protests, the first demonstrations managed to mobilize more than 200,000 citizens in 53 cities in the country (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). It was an opportunity for the youth to turn dispersed and divided protests into nationwide protests that unified their actions (ibid). Occupying the streets outside the regime's control turned them from excluded and marginalized voices to active political agents (ibid). Dignity or “al-hogra” (lack of dignity) has been on the lips of the youth to express their marginalization and to draw attention to their concerns in terms of employment, housing, health, education, and security, among others (Rachik, 2014).

The apparent depoliticization of the youth does not mean they are not interested in politics, but they are interested in reinvesting the political sphere through the appropriation of public space (Bennani-Chraïbi, 1999). Protests, sit-ins, strikes, hunger strikes, boycott movements, collective prayers, and disruption of events are part of Morocco’s everyday political life. The youth prefer to challenge social taboos, forbidden social relations, and exclusion from politics through mass protests (ibid). For these young people occupying the streets is the best way to engage in politics, connect with other young people, and sensitize about their issues (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016)

Youth’s protests have drawn the state's attention to youth issues. In 1990 the National Council for Youth and Future was established to integrate young people into the labor market

(Baske, 2020). Before it ceased to exist in 2000, the council was in charge of researching youth's concerns, family, education, and unemployment (Baune, 2005).

Youth mobilization in occupying public space resulted in the new management of opposition voices and changed the relationship between the citizen and authority. Dialogue came to replace repression, arrest, intimidation or imprisonment (Rachik, 2014). Protests improved awareness of one's citizenship rights and inclusion, which made speaking out publicly a possibility (ibid). Public opinion became sensitized about the importance of condemning state violence (ibid). However, the situation has not really changed when it comes to unemployment. Still very high, unemployment leads to financial insecurity and the inability for the youth to accomplish themselves (Baune, 2005).

Let's also occupy the virtual space

The youth have also been taking advantage of media tools to create their own spaces where they connect with other young people, share, or generate their own content, express their grievances, demands, or concerns. The online space is an opportunity to be free from social pressure or norms, from parental and governmental control (Baune, 2005). They use forums, YouTube videos, blogs, and social media to produce their own narrative and present a counter-narrative to the official press and state-owned media (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). The internet has enabled the youth to practice a new kind of journalism and become citizen journalists (Bouziane and Ibahrine, 2011). This has allowed online youth activism to emerge in Morocco to inform, raise awareness, mobilize, organize protest movements and express their issues (Bayat and Herrera, 2010). Activists capitalize on social media because of their low entry barriers (Bouziane and Ibahrine, 2011).

The first documented case of youth cyber-activism dates back to 2008 when a young person from the Northern region of Morocco shared a video on YouTube showing a police officer receiving bribes (ibid). This young person became a model for other cyber-activists to raise their critical voices and social media became "a revival of the watchdog function of the media and paved the way for it to act as a fourth estate in monitoring political abuses by the regime" (ibid, p. 43). Facebook groups were created to demand cultural rights, democratic reforms (Moroccans Converse with the King), individual liberties (Alternative Movement for Individual Freedoms/Mouvement alternatif pour les libertés individuelles, MALI), and to expand freedom of expression (Bensalah, 2012). They made information available and on-the-spot access to events possible (Bouziane and Ibahrine, 2011). Youth in Morocco was the driving force behind the growth of Facebook. it is largely a youth media as the 18-24 age group is the first user followed by the 25-34 age group (Arab Social Media Report, 2011). (See table 1)

Similar to youth in Tunisia or Egypt, young people in Morocco used digital technology to organize protests and demand social, economic, and political reforms during the 2011 uprisings (Rachik, 2014). They used Facebook to organize demonstrations in different parts (Monjib, 2011). They also used blogs to reach a larger number of protesters and YouTube to share their own content, one that countered how state-controlled media covered the protests (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). Online they put aside their ideological differences to highlight their common concerns (Rachik, 2014). Social media played an important role in mobilizing citizens, empowering them, influencing opinions, and contributing to change (Arab Social Media Report, 2011).

Table 1: Demographic Breakdown of Facebook Users in the Arab Region* (April 2011)



*Excluding Syria and Sudan (due to US technology sanctions, no data on demographic breakdown of Facebook users is available)

Source: Arab World Media Report, May 2011.

Young people use the internet to influence political decisions. In 2013 they campaigned against the royal pardon granted to Daniel Galvan, a Spanish serial-child rapist (Baske, 2020). Their online mobilization pushing for street protests and sit-ins led to the cancelation of the pardon (ibid). Another example is when young people organized a campaign on Facebook against Shimon Pere's visit to Morocco (ibid).

Online platforms have emerged to draw attention to politically and economically excluded youth. In 2014 young people from disenfranchised neighborhoods posted pictures of themselves in looks that refer to global hip-hop cultures in an attempt to speak about how neo-liberal reforms produced social inequalities, youth unemployment, and isolation in their "open air prison" neighbourhoods (Strava, 2020). Occupying the virtual world with their images in hip-hop clothes carryings sabres and machetes is a "coping mechanism to deal with a system that many youth consider to be rigged against them" (Arab Media and Society, 2018, p. 4). By resorting to "cheap globalization", baseball caps, or Nike shoes, they make the best of what is possible to assert their youthfulness (Bayat and Herrera, 2010).

Youth use online platforms to assert their presence as a "response and affective reaction to the violence that neoliberal forces, couples with the local presence of authoritarian regimes, inflict in young lower-class male bodies and lives" (Strava, 2020, p. 6). They use social media to create new practices and a new youth subculture identity to express how globalization has pushed them to the ranks of the marginalized (Arab Media and Society, 2018). This "politics of possibility" serves to bypass the social, political and cultural constraints and at the same time redefine these constraining norms (Bayat and Herrera, 2010).

Youth online presence serves to "visualize" life in underprivileged neighbourhoods for those who have never set foot there and to confront the middle classes with "the elusive and tantalizing promises of globalization" (Strava, 2020, p. 14). A presentation of the destructive nature of neoliberal economic policies and globalization leaves the youth economically disinherited (Arab Media and Society, 2018). A form of resistance and escape from the

structural constraints of neoliberalism and globalization (Sadoqi, 2021). Cultural practices have become a "struggle against censure, the verdicts of the authorities and the power of the religious establishment" (cited in Floris, 2012, p. 6).

Others think that globalization has made the world feel smaller and the infinite flow of information and images makes them question their own identities (Baune, 2005). They are happy, however, to combine their local clothes with Nike shoes in an effort to "reconcile" traditional values and the "west" to "build a new flexible whole" (Baune, 2005, p. 130), one that is fundamentally Moroccan but open to the rest of the world (Desrues, 2012). But they are also aware of the infinite "out of grasp" socioeconomic possibilities abroad, leading to more frustrations (Leiter, 2018, p. 25).

Besides meeting in cafés to organize protests or spreading the word among people they trust, Hirak protesters used online platforms to spread calls for protest, organize themselves and to live-stream their mobilization (Chapi, 2021). A "horizontal" model of mobilization in which the youth found a valorised social activity (ibid).

It is a "wired generation" that uses the internet to express its citizenship rights but also to circumvent censorship, repression, and lack of internal democratic practices within formal political institutions (Herrera and Sakr, 2014). Because they are "silenced" during party meetings, "When you are on Facebook, you end up saying all the things that you don't dare to say in a meeting or a conference; there is no one who will tell you why you are saying this or that. On Facebook, you have the total freedom to say whatever you want, to say everything" (cited in Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016, p. 21). Social media have provided them with much-needed opportunities to bypass political control and social constraints (Bayat and Herrera, 2010). It is also an opportunity for them to express their "desire for visibility" and inclusion within a global youth subculture and to refer to their "repressed aspirations and unfulfilled dream" (Arab Media and Society, 2018, p. 2). This combination of activism within their formal political institutions and online structures allows them to fight back exclusion and develop new forms of solidarity, proximity, and a greater feeling of freedom (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016).

With that in mind, only a minority of internet users are interested in digital mobilization or are using the internet for civil and political activism given the high cost of the internet for most households (Bouziane and Ibahrine, 2011). Most of the content is about personal news and is meant to entertain (ibid). It is apolitical and not interested in creating a political debate (ibid). The low internet penetration, which is limited to urban areas and the educated urban segments of society, has made the impact of social media on political engagement insignificant. Half of Moroccans didn't cast a ballot in legislative elections in 2021 (Alami and Casey, 2021). Digital activism has failed to change the political culture of oppression and assault on freedom of expression (Human Rights Watch, 2020). The authorities continue to crack down on bloggers discouraging others from writing in protest (ibid). Online content is used to denounce police brutality, human rights abuses, marginalization and corruption and has raised citizens' consciousness about social and political issues (Gandolfi, 2015). It has helped break the barrier of fear of repression and break the red lines in political debates (Baske, 2020). But digital activism, in general, has failed to push for reforms on the ground (Bouziane and Ibahrine, 2011). Online campaigns manage to influence political decisions only when to reach out to a larger public or when other social groups (human right organization, religious movements, political parties) decide to join (Baske, 2020).

Between "roots" and "elsewhere"

In Europe, the existence of contradictory discourses, tendencies and practices have pushed the youth to negotiate a space between different religious, cultural contexts and references to reduce frictions within their families (Gandolfi, 2015). The first Moroccan immigrants in Europe set up informal religious networks and mosques under the tutelage of Morocco (Fadil, 2017). Moroccan migrants continue to show strong attachment to a national Moroccan Islam (Bruce, 2018) , "a kind of national Islam which transcends currents" (Godard and Taussig, 2007, pp. 40–41). Identifying themselves with Islam as practiced and preached in Morocco is a way to be Moroccan, to show attachment to their country of origin as most of them associate national identity with Islam (Sliman and Jouannic, 2010).

State religious associations and mosques provided first-generation Moroccan immigrants with a sense of belonging (Vertovec and Rogers, 1998). Their religiosity, based to a great extent on their memories about the status and the role of Islam in Morocco, represented a way to identify with their country of origin (ibid). Hence the construction of their ethnic identity referred to Islam in its Moroccan local and national dimension to Moroccan Islam (Cesari, 1998). "For them, it's obvious to be Muslim" (Richter, 2020, p. 6). For second and third-generation immigrants, who grew up in a secular context and lacked their parents' memories, their religious expressions tend to be more diverse and complex (Fadil, 2017). Unlike their parents, for which it is "obvious to be Muslim," these generations question their own cultural and religious identities (Richter, 2020, p. 6). Generally, they either develop a more individualistic or a more fundamentalist understanding of Islam (Vertovec and Rogers, 1998). In the first approach, Islam is perceived as cultural heritage (Beek and Fleischmann, 2020). This 'traditional' Islam is considered tolerant and open (Fadil, 2017). Religious affiliation and identification give "important symbolic meaning to their life" (Beek and Fleischmann, 2020, p. 5). Their parent's Islam is cherished as a legacy that should be maintained (Fadil, 2017). Religious transmissions from their parents, including Koran lessons and visits to parental mosques, represent important components of their religious identification (Güngör, Fleischmann and Phalet, 2011). This form of Islam is not seen as an obstacle to their integration in European societies (Lacoste Dujardin, 1994). Their attachment to this 'Moroccan' Islam can sometimes refer to a post-colonial syndrome and an attempt to manage Morocco's colonial past and reconcile the feeling of belonging both to Europe and Morocco (Cesari, 1998).

In the second approach to religion, migrants' descendants are eager to study Islamic texts and principles themselves (Beek and Fleischmann, 2020). The lack of scholars to respond to youths' religious needs and aspirations favors the individualization or religious choices (Cesari, 1998). This individualization may result in a rejection of their parent's understanding of Islam (Drhimeur, 2021). Sometimes it becomes a search for spirituality: "I discovered what Islam means here because at home in Morocco, you don't think about it, it's obvious like the air you breathe. Here being a Muslim comes from a choice, so you have to reflect on yourself, on the meaning you give to life to make informed decisions, and choose a truly spiritual approach that no longer corresponds to social and family conventions. In France, you do not do Islam because you have to do it but because you chose it "(cited in Cesari, 1998, p. 38).

Other times this marks a shift from a relatively 'open' and 'modern' parents' perception of Islam to a more strict, fundamentalist religious lifestyle (Fadil, 2017). This happened between

the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s after the Iranian revolution (ibid). Young people started looking for an 'authentic' Islam free from any traditional or cultural influence (Cesari, 1998). In France, for example, the emergence of self-proclaimed 'imams des caves' or the imams of the cellars in the 1990s contributed to the rise of underground Islam and a fundamentalist and reactionary reading of the sacred texts (Farkhondeh, 2010). These imams, preaching in the cellars of buildings, triggered conflicts between generations and pushed the youth to criticize their parents for their 'impure,' 'ethic,' 'traditional' and 'cultural' Islam (ibid). They see themselves as victims of global injustice and conflicts in the Middle East and turn to religious orthodoxy (Drhimeur, 2021). Their reference to Islam refers to the community of believers, the Ummah (Cesari, 1998). While their parents' Islam seems at odds with their social realities, the appeal of radical Islam lies in the fact that it "escapes from the control of Arab regimes and corresponds to their 'radical' social conceptions" (Belhaj, 2009, pp. 120–121).

Young European Muslims of Moroccan origins, who actively reclaim their parent's Islam, often disqualify Islamic revivalist movements as an unauthentic understanding of religion (Fadil, 2017). They gradually distance themselves from these forms of Islam they qualify as 'different,' 'strict' and 'rigid'. At the same time, they see in their parent's Islam an 'open,' 'pure,' 'good,' and a counter-model to the reigning orthodoxies (ibid).

To create their own cultural spaces and feel accepted within a European environment that seems to exclude them, they set up their newspapers and TV channels (Cherti, 2014). They launch debates beyond the issues of immigration to speak about their aspirations and how they conceive and view a multicultural Europe (ibid). They resort to music to construct a European-Moroccan identity and feel at home in European societies that seem to marginalize them (Bayat and Herrera, 2010). Listening to Moroccan popular music or creating their own answer a desire to return to Morocco, a way to celebrate the Moroccan identity and construct solidarity with other young Moroccans in Europe regardless of their places of origins (Gazzah, 2010). They show pride in Morocco's cultural traditions. They integrate a part of their parents culture, the motherland, while demarking themselves from European youths (ibid). They refuse to be reduced to being Moroccan or Muslim but rather claim their belonging to a global identity (Gazzah, 2010). Europe is home, and so is Morocco (Charef, 2014). Art serves to express their multiple identities: Muslim, Moroccan, European, or just young.

Similar to young people in Morocco, they use online platforms to acquire positions, negotiate and reimagine their religion, ethnic identity, and gender. Online activities enable them to create space of their own to debate their issues and create counter-discourses (Leurs, Midden and Ponzanesi, 2012). In 2019 online social networking enabled women in the Netherlands to mobilize and organize street protests against the Dutch far-right politician Geert Wilders of the PVV party proposal to levy taxes in wearing the headscarf (Damhuis, 2019). Through these online platforms, young Moroccans present their side of the argument, their truths to counter stereotypes, and how migrants are represented within the European public debate (Leurs, 2016). Instead of being spoken for, youths use online forums to show who they are, what it means to be Moroccan or Muslim, and how they can adopt different personal trajectories (Wajcman, 2004). Women, in particular use online discussion boards to express their voices and to be heard (Brouwer, 2006). It is about the ability to express one's point of view in a safe space without restraint away from social pressure (Mamadouh, 2001). And also about the ability to combine and reconcile their European, Moroccan, and Muslim identifications (Leurs, Midden and Ponzanesi, 2012).

While the first generation perceived migration as temporary and refrained from participating in European political life, the new generation is eager to have their voices heard (Berriane, de Haas and Natter, 2015). They are claiming and exercising their political rights (Drhimeur, 2020b). The rise in Islamophobia and the antimigration discourse made them more interested in politics (Bousetta and Martiniello, 2003). So they started joining unions and political parties, which for the most part are either socialist or green (ibid). Moroccan activists have formed alliances with left-wing worker organizations to develop and influence the discourse on the integration of migrants in Europe (Bousetta, 1997). They seldom vote for parties that belong to the right side of the political spectrum (Heelsum, 2000). These alliances have pushed for the implementation of ethnic minority policies that concern Moroccan migrants and their descendants and the multi-ethnic Maghrebian community in general (Bousetta, 1997).

The 'Moroccan identity' does not inevitably manifest itself in Moroccan political behavior and is rarely politicized (Kranendonk and Vermeulen, 2018). Their mobilization is not only about integration. It is also about Islam, women's issues, youths 'issues, and social work, employment, housing and culture (Bousetta, 1997). They either have joined existing political, cultural, social and religious associations or created their own (Drhimeur, 2020b).

Contrary to the first generation that mostly mobilized within authority-oriented organizations, unions and social development organizations, the new generation "tends more towards universalistic political inclusion" (Bousetta, 2000, p. 138). They tend to engage more in "client-oriented" organizations, including youth, sports, religious or neighborhood organizations (van Londen, Phalet and Hagendoorn, 2007, pp. 1211–1212).

The more they engage in civic organizations, in their own communities' affairs the more they vote, participate in politics and trust political and governmental institutions (Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Heelsum, 2000; van Londen, Phalet and Hagendoorn, 2007). Being embedded in networks makes them identify more with European countries, and as a consequence, they more readily participate in politics (Kranendonk and Vermeulen, 2018). Social embeddedness thus makes them feel efficient and capable of influencing and changing their conditions (Klandermans, van der Toorn and van Stekelenburg, 2008). Youth, who feel aggrieved because they believe European countries are treating them unfairly, favor other forms of political actions (Klandermans, van der Toorn and van Stekele). They favor protests, demonstrations, marches, signing petitions, hanging up political posters, or even engaging in violent actions (ibid).

When leftist organizations started losing their capacity to mobilize or claim to represent all migrants, Moroccan migrants began to organize more within religious associations, especially after the public discourse on migrants had started representing them as first and foremost Muslim (Dumont, 2008). The involvement of Moroccan immigrants in religious networks has helped enhance their political participation and their ability to mobilize other Muslim communities to address their issues (Kranendonk and Vermeulen, 2018). These Islamic associations are not only concerned with local matters, such as building Islamic mosques or cemeteries. They are also concerned with national issues, with the representation of Islam in the public sphere, integration policies, and educational activities (Bousetta, 2000). On the other hand, service attendance, which encourages embeddedness in civil organizations, does not translate into a greater intention to vote among Moroccans (Kranendonk and Vermeulen, 2018). The more they attend the mosque, the more they trust

politics, but this does not necessarily lead to more willingness to vote (Fleischmann, Martinovic and Böhm, 2016).

They also turned to new actors and associations that highlighted their new conception of citizenship, which reconciled their dual Moroccan and European identities and belongings (Dumont, 2008). These associations, religious or secular, rarely emphasize the 'Moroccan identity' but tend to adopt a multiethnic approach based on the idea of multiethnic solidarity (Bousetta, 2000).

Even though European countries have implemented a number of policies to increase migrants' political participation at the local and the national level, the normative meaning of integration and assimilation in these countries has represented an obstacle to migrants' involvement in formal politics and consequently the implementation of ethnic policies (Bousetta, 2000). Also, the impact of Moroccan's political mobilization and participation on ethnic policies and issues that concern them has been limited (Dumont, 2008). Their different strategies have failed to translate into greater political representation (Bousetta, 1997) or improve Moroccans' housing, education, or employment conditions (Bousetta, 2000). Co-ethnic organizations better stimulate the intention to vote. Moroccans are more involved in ethnically diverse organizations than in co-ethnic ones might explain why they are less willing to participate in politics (Fleischmann, Martinovic and Böhm, 2016). The history of the country of origin also serves to understand migrants' involvement in civic community life. Migrants that have dealt with colonialism in their countries of origin, the case of Moroccans, tend to participate less in politics and tend to trust less the political institutions in European countries (Fennema and Tillie, 2001). However, scholars believe that migrants will form the most important protest movements in Europe in the future (Klandermans, van der Toorn and van Stekelenburg, 2008) and will vigorously continue to invest in the networks of community associations and networks (Bousetta, 2000).

Conclusion

Youths' political activity outside formal political institutions does not mean that they lack political commitment. Their protests, civic engagement, sit-ins, marches, online political campaigns, and cultural or artistic activities reflect a high degree of political consciousness. Their refusal to join political parties or vote indicates their awareness of the general political landscape and its functioning.

The wave of national protests led by the February 20Th movement renewed the youth's interest in politics but failed to translate into durable political reforms. The youth do not reject participation. They reject the nature of the political system and the difficulties they meet in doing politics. The youth favor engagement within civil society organizations because of a lack of trust in political parties and the election process. Rising economic and social issues and a lack of substantial political reforms feed youth's frustrations.

Youth's participation in global cultural productions and international NGOs indicates a desire of "actively partaking in and appropriating processes of globalisation for themselves" (Hegasy, 2007, p. 31). Agency from below can cope with marginalization and violence and create a more inclusive society (Sadoqi, 2021). They become involved in globalized artistic and musical productions as identity markers but also to push their cultural boundaries (Bayat and Herrera, 2010). This allows them to create links with a global musical culture while asserting and expressing their local ethnic distinctiveness.

Years after the uprisings, the youth in Morocco still feel they are not understood but they have and continue to negotiate spaces of their own. Contrary to the general assumption that they are not interested in politics, public affairs, or society, these young people are willing to participate in change. Still, they reject the hierarchical practices of the political elite and reject how society views and frames them. Youth still strongly feel marginalized by the political elite and still feel their opportunities for upward social mobility are extremely limited. They feel alienated from politics and politicians but remain active in politics in a different way. They want to produce change through non-conventional politics because they believe the political system needs to be fixed for their representation. They favor a more participative and direct way of engaging in public affairs. They diversify and multiply political engagement from protest politics to social movements and the internet. But as they continue to feel the government is not addressing their issues, their frustrations are boiling. The feeling of social malaise and being silenced push many youth to consider immigration, and "the desire to leave Morocco outweighed any desire to change internal factors" (Leiter, 2018, pp. 24–25).

References

Abdous, K. (2020) *Privatisation de l'éducation au Maroc by Education International - Issuu*. Internationale de l'Education.

Adam, A. (1963) *Une enquête auprès de la jeunesse musulmane du Maroc*. La Pensée universitaire.

Akesbi, A. (2012) 'La société civile entre contribution économique et plaidoyer politique', *Rabat, Presses Universitaires du Maroc*

Alami, A. and Casey, N. (2021) 'Islamists See Big Losses in Moroccan Parliamentary Elections', *The New York Times*, 9 September.

Alsadin, A. (2012) 'Averting a Moroccan Revolution', *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)*

Arab Barometer (2019) 'Do Arabs Want Democracy?', August.

Arab Media and Society (2018) *Youth in Morocco: Rebels without a Cause? Youth Violence, Social Media, and the Discontents of Moroccan Consumer Society*.

Arab Social Media Report (2011) *Civil Movements: The Impact of Facebook and Twitter*.

ATTAC/CADTM Maroc (no date) 'ATTAC/CADTM Maroc', *Thousand Currents*.

Barari, H.A. (2015) 'The Persistence of Autocracy: Jordan, Morocco and the Gulf', *Middle East Critique*, 24(1), pp. 99–111. doi:10.1080/19436149.2014.1000084.

Baske, M. (2020) *Political Participation and Political Commitment of Moroccan Young People after Changes Resulting from the Arab Spring, field study*. Cordoba Foundation of Geneva.

Baune, I. (2005) 'Youth in Morocco How Does the Use of the Internet Shape the Daily Life of the Youth and What Are Its Repercussions?', in Simonsen, J.B. (ed.) *Youth and Youth Culture in the Contemporary Middle East*. Aarhus : Aarhus University Press,.

Bayat, A. (2013) *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*. Stanford University Press.

Bayat, A. and Herrera, L. (2010) 'Introduction: Being Young and Muslim in Neoliberal Times', in *Being Young and Muslim*. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195369212.003.0001.

Beek, M. and Fleischmann, F. (2020) 'Religion and integration: does immigrant generation matter? The case of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 46(17), pp. 3655–3676. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2019.1620417.

Belfellah, Y. (2015) 'Moroccan Youth's Reluctance to Political Participation/ عزوف الشباب المغربي عن المشاركة السياسية', *Al- Araby al-Jadeed*.

Belhaj, A. (2009) *La dimension islamique dans la politique étrangère du Maroc: Déterminants, acteurs, orientations*. Presses univ. de Louvain.

Belschner, J. (2021) 'The adoption of youth quotas after the Arab uprisings', *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 9(1), pp. 151–169. doi:10.1080/21565503.2018.1528163.

Bennani-Chraïbi, M. (1995) *Soumis et rebelles: les jeunes au Maroc*. Editions Le Fennec.

Bennani-Chraïbi, M. (1999) 'L'ouverture d'une brèche. Les événements du 14 décembre 1990 et de la guerre du Golfe au Maroc', in Le Saout, D. and Rollinde, M., *Émeutes et mouvements sociaux au Maghreb*. Paris, Karthala, pp. 127–135.

Bensalah, M. (2012) *Réseaux sociaux et révolutions arabes ?* Editions Michalon.

Berriane, M., de Haas, H. and Natter, K. (2015) 'Introduction: revisiting Moroccan migrations', *The Journal of North African Studies*, 20(4), pp. 503–521. doi:10.1080/13629387.2015.1065036.

Boudarbat, B. and Ajbilou, A. (2007) 'Youth Exclusion in Morocco: Context, Consequences, and Policies'. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1087430.

Bouhsini, L.E. (2016) 'Une lutte pour l'égalité racontée par les féministes marocaines', *Rives méditerranéennes*, (52), pp. 121–133. doi:10.4000/rives.5034.

Bourqia, R. *et al.* (2000) *Les jeunes et les valeurs religieuses*. Casablanca, Maroc: Ed. EDDIF.

Bourqia, R., Harras, M. and Bensaïd, D. (1995) *Jeunesse estudiantine marocaine: valeurs et stratégies*. Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines de Rabat.

Bousetta, H. (1997) 'Citizenship and political participation in France and the Netherlands: Reflections on two local cases', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 23(2), pp. 215–231. doi:10.1080/1369183X.1997.9976587.

Bousetta, H. (2000) 'Political Dynamics in the City: Three Case Studies', in Body-Gendrot, S. and Martiniello, M. (eds) *Minorities in European Cities: The Dynamics of Social Integration and Social Exclusion at the Neighbourhood Level*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK (Migration, Minorities and Citizenship), pp. 129–144. doi:10.1007/978-1-349-62841-4_10.

Bousetta, H. and Martiniello, M. (2003) 'Marocains de Belgique : du travailleur immigré au citoyen transnational', *Hommes & Migrations*, 1242(1), pp. 94–106. doi:10.3406/homig.2003.3977.

Boutaleb, A. (2019) 'Youth and Politics: The Decline of Party Membership in Moroccan society', *Siyasat Arabiya* [Preprint], (38).

Boutieri, C. (2014) 'Morocco On-Trial: Decolonial Logic and Transformative Practice in Cyberspace," In Wired Citizenship: Youth Learning and Activism in the Middle East (', in Herrera, L. (ed.) *Wired Citizenship Youth Learning and Activism in the Middle East*. Routledge.

Bouziane, Z. and Ibahrine, M. (2011) *Mapping Digital Media in Morocco*. Open Society Foundations.

Brouwer, L. (2006) 'Giving voice to Dutch moroccan girls on the internet', *Global Media Journal*, 5(9).

Bruce, B. (2018) 'Transnational Religious Governance as Diaspora Politics: Reforming the Moroccan Religious Field Abroad', *Mashriq & Mahjar: Journal of Middle East & North African Migration Studies*, 5(1), pp. 36–70. doi:10.24847/55i2018.159.

Cesari, J. (1998) *Musulmans et républicains: les jeunes, l'islam et la France*. Editions Complexe.

Chaaibat, K. (2020) 'Le Cyberactivisme au Maroc : Focus sur la campagne de boycott en 2018', *Langues, Cultures et Communication*, 4(1), pp. 63–78.

Chapi, A. (2021) 'Morocco's Hirak al-Rif Movement: "Youths of the Neighbourhood" as Innovative Protesters?', *PARTECIPAZIONE E CONFLITTO*, 14(2), pp. 604–620. doi:10.1285/i20356609v14i2p604.

Charef, M. (2014) 'Les Marocains et les Maroco-descendants de France', in Berriane, M. (ed.) *Marocains de l'extérieur*. Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains du Monde.

Cherti, M. (2014) 'La migration de retour vers le Maroc: Un voyage sans fin', in Berriane, M. (ed.) *Marocains de l'extérieur*. Rabat: Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains Résidant à l'Etranger : Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations.

Damhuis, K. (2019) '"The biggest problem in the Netherlands": Understanding the Party for Freedom's politicization of Islam', *Brookings*,

Darif, M. (1996) *Moroccan Student Movement Between 1956 and 1996*. المجلة المغربية لعلم الإجتماع السياسي،.

Darif, M. (2014) 'The Moroccan Islamist movement: from secessionism to participation', in Peter, F. and Ortega, R. (eds) *Islamic Movements of Europe: Public Religion and Islamophobia in the Modern World*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Desrues, T. (2012) 'Moroccan Youth and the Forming of a New Generation: Social Change, Collective Action and Political Activism', *Mediterranean Politics*, 17(1), pp. 23–40. doi:10.1080/13629395.2012.655044.

Desrues, T. and Garcia De Paredes, M. (2021) 'Participation, association-building and dissent in North Africa: the various dimensions of youth activism, from the fall of Ben Ali to the revolt against Bouteflika (2011–2019)', *The Journal of North African Studies*, 26(2), pp. 188–205. doi:10.1080/13629387.2019.1665274.

Drhimeur, L.A. (2020a) *Moroccan political system: Literature Review*. Available at: https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/publications/moroccan-political-system-literature-review/.

Drhimeur, L.A. (2020b) *The State of the Art on Moroccan Emigration to Europe*. Istanbul Bilgi University. doi:10.5281/ZENODO.3822021.

Drhimeur, L.A. (2021) 'Escape from Insignificance: How Moroccan youths radicalize in Europe', *Istanbul Bilgi University PRIME Youth* [Preprint]. Available at: https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/publications/working-paper-13-escape-insignificance-how-morocca/.

Dumont, A. (2008) 'Representing voiceless migrants: Moroccan political transnationalism and Moroccan migrants' organizations in France', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31(4), pp. 792–811. doi:10.1080/01419870701784463.

Echine, A. (2019) 'Social Media and Social Mobility: Exploring the Role of Social Networks in the 2018 Boycott Campaign in Morocco', *Journal of Cyberspace Studies*, 3(1). doi:10.22059/jcss.2019.264126.1024.

El Omari, F. *et al.* (2015) 'Prevalence of substance use among moroccan adolescents and association with academic achievement', *World Journal of Psychiatry*, 5(4), pp. 425–431. doi:10.5498/wjp.v5.i4.425.

El-Ayadi, M. (1999) 'Les mouvements de la jeunesse au Maroc, l'émergence d'une nouvelle intelligentsia politique durant les années soixante et soixante-dix', in Le Saout, D. and Rollinde, M. (eds) *Emeutes et mouvements sociaux au Maghreb. Perspective comparée,*. Paris, Karthala, pp. 201–230.

Fadil, N. (2017) 'Recalling the "Islam of the parents" liberal and secular Muslims redefining the contours of religious authenticity', *Identities*, 24(1), pp. 82–99. doi:10.1080/1070289X.2015.1091318.

Farkhondeh, S. (2010) 'Young French Women of Muslim Descent: Discriminatory Social Context and Politicization', in Moghissi, H. and Ghorashi, H. (eds) *Muslim Diaspora in the West*. Routledge.

Fennema, M. and Tillie, J. (1999) 'Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam: Civic communities and ethnic networks', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 25(4), pp. 703–726. doi:10.1080/1369183X.1999.9976711.

Fennema, M. and Tillie, J. (2001) 'Civic Community, Political Participation and Political Trust of Ethnic Groups', in Behr, H. and Schmidt, S. (eds) *Multikulturelle Demokratien im Vergleich: Institutionen als Regulativ kultureller Vielfalt?* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 198–217. doi:10.1007/978-3-322-85129-1_9.

Fleischmann, F., Martinovic, B. and Böhm, M. (2016) 'Mobilising mosques? The role of service attendance for political participation of Turkish and Moroccan minorities in the Netherlands', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 39(5), pp. 746–763. doi:10.1080/01419870.2015.1081962.

Floris, S. (2012) 'Youth, those Anti-Heroes of the Arab Spring', *IEMed* [Preprint]. Available at: https://www.iemed.org/publication/youth-those-anti-heroes-of-the-arab-spring/ (Accessed: 3 November 2021).

Gandolfi, P. (2015) 'Multiple families in changing societies in the Maghreb: The case of Morocco', *DIFI Family Research and Proceedings*, 2015, p. 7. doi:10.5339/difi.2015.7.

Godard, B. and Taussig, S. (2007) *Les musulmans en France: courants, institutions, communautés, un état des lieux*. Laffont.

Güngör, D., Fleischmann, F. and Phalet, K. (2011) 'Religious Identification, Beliefs, and Practices Among Turkish Belgian and Moroccan Belgian Muslims: Intergenerational Continuity and Acculturative Change', *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 42, pp. 1356–1374. doi:10.1177/0022022111412342.

Hashas, M. (2013) 'Moroccan Exceptionalism Examined: Constitutional Insights pre- and post-2011', *Institute of International Affairs*, 13(34), p. 19.

Haut-Commissariat au Plan (1995) *Familles au Maroc: les réseaux de la solidarité familiale*.

Haut-Commissariat au Plan (2011) *Enquête nationale auprès des institutions sans but lucratif*.

Haut-Commissariat au Plan (2020) *La situation du marché du travail en 2020*.

Haut-Commissariat au Plan (2021) *La situation du marché du travail au premier trimestre de 2021*.

Heelsum, A. (2000) 'Political Participation of Migrants in the Netherlands'. IMES

Hegasy, S. (2007) 'Young Authority: Quantitative and Qualitative Insights into Youth, Youth Culture, and State Power in Contemporary Morocco', *The Journal of North African Studies*, 12(1), pp. 19–36. doi:10.1080/13629380601099443.

Herrera, L. and Sakr, R. (2014) *Wired Citizenship: Youth Learning and Activism in the Middle East*. Routledge.

Human Right Watch (2020) *Morocco: Crackdown on Social Media Critics*. Human Rights Watch.

Kadi, Y. (2019) 'Youth Political Participation and Attitudes in Contemporary Morocco', in *Youth Politics in the Middle East and North Africa*. POMEPS (36).

Klandermans, B., van der Toorn, J. and van Stekelenburg, J. (2008) 'Embeddedness and Identity: How Immigrants Turn Grievances into Action', *American Sociological Review*, 73(6), pp. 992–1012. doi:10.1177/000312240807300606.

Kranendonk, M. and Vermeulen, F. (2018) 'Group identity, group networks, and political participation: Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands', *Acta Politica*, 54. doi:10.1057/s41269-018-0094-0.

Lacoste Dujardin, C. (1994) 'Transmission religieuse et migration: l'Islam identitaire des filles de maghrébins immigrés en France', *Social Compass*, 41(1), pp. 163–170.

doi:10.1177/003776894041001013.

Le Desk (2021) ‘Les derniers chiffres du décrochage scolaire exposés par Amzazi’, *Le Desk*, 20 January.

Le Monde (1984) ‘Maroc le procès des “intégristes de Casablanca”’, *Le Monde.fr*, 2 August.

L’Economiste (2006) *Qui sont les jeunes?* ■ *Quel Maroc nous préparent-ils?* L’Economiste.

Leiter, R. (2018) ‘Missing Youth: The Absence of the Young Moroccan Voice in the Nation’, p. 30.

Leurs, K. (2016) *Digital Passages: Migrant Youth 2.0: diaspora, Gender and youth cultural intersections*. Amsterdam University Press.

Leurs, K., Midden, E. and Ponzanesi, S. (2012) ‘Digital Multiculturalism in the Netherlands: Religious, Ethnic and Gender Positioning by Moroccan-Dutch Youth’, *Religion and Gender*, 2(1), pp. 150–175. doi:10.1163/18785417-00201008.

van Londen, M., Phalet, K. and Hagendoorn, L. (2007) ‘Civic Engagement and Voter Participation among Turkish and Moroccan Minorities in Rotterdam’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33(8), pp. 1201–1226. doi:10.1080/13691830701613991.

Mahmi, N. and Jebbar, A. (2015) ‘Islamists’ Conceptualization of Belonging and Otherness: The Case of Atawhid w’Al-Islah in Morocco’, *Digest of Middle East Studies*, 2(24), pp. 260–282. doi:10.1111/dome.12074.

Mamadouh, V. (2001) ‘Constructing a Dutch Moroccan Identity through the World Wide Web’, *The Arab World Geographer* [Preprint].

Masbah, M. (2018) *“Let it Spoil!” Morocco’s Boycott and the Empowerment of ‘Regular’ Citizen*.

Mayer, N. and Perrineau, P. (1992) *Les comportements politiques*. A. Colin.

Menouni, A. (1970) *L’union nationale des étudiants du Maroc*. Université Mohammed V, Faculté des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Sociales, Rabat,.

Monjib, M. (2011) *The “Democratization” Process in Morocco: Progress, Obstacles and the Impact of the Islamist-Secularist Divide*. Brookings.

MSFFDS (2010) *Etude sur les associations marocaines de développement. Diagnostic, analyse et perspectives, Rapport III, Synthèse et recommandations*. Ministère de la solidarité, de la femme, de la famille et du développement social.

Munson, H. (1986) ‘The Social Base of Islamic Militancy in Morocco’, *Middle East Journal*, 40(2), pp. 267–284.

Observatoire National du Développement Humain (ONDH) (2018) *Rapport d’Activités*.

Paciello, M.C. and Pioppi, D. (2018) ‘Youth as Actors of Change? The Cases of Morocco and Tunisia’, *The International Spectator*, 53(2), pp. 38–51. doi:10.1080/03932729.2018.1454081.

Parlmer, M. and Nedelcovych, M.S. (1984) ‘The Political Behavior of Moroccan Students’, *Journal of Arab Affairs*, 3(1), pp. 115–130.

Pascon, P. *et al.* (1970) *Ce que disent 296 jeunes ruraux: enquête sociologique*. Rabat, Maroc: Société d’études économiques, sociales et statistiques du Maroc.

Rachik, A. (2014) *Les mouvements de protestation au Maroc : De l’émeute à la manifestation*. Rabat, Forum des Alternatives Maroc (FMAS).

Rachik, H. (2005) *Rapport de synthèse de l’enquête nationale sur les valeurs*. RDH50, 2005.

Reuters (2018) ‘Morocco reinstates compulsory military service for under-25s | Reuters’.

Richter, L. (2020) ‘Swimming against the Current - A comparative perspective on leaving Islam in Morocco and the Moroccan diaspora in Belgium’.

Royaume du Maroc (2011) ‘Loi organique 27-11’.

Sadoqi, I. (2021) ‘Youth in the margin in Morocco: a qualitative approach to the perception of subjectivity and agency politics’, *SHS Web of Conferences*, 119, p. 01007. doi:10.1051/shsconf/202111901007.

Sánchez García, J., Feixa Pàmpols, C. and Laine, S. (2016) *Contemporary Youth Research in Arab Mediterranean Countries: Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Research*. SAHWA Project. doi:10.24241/swcp.2014.cp.

Sater, J.N. (2007) *Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco*. Routledge.

Schwarz, Christoph H. (2019) ‘Political socialisation and intergenerational transmission: life stories of young social movement activists in Morocco’, *The Journal of North African Studies*, 26(2), pp. 206–230. doi:10.1080/13629387.2019.1665277.

Schwarz, Christoph H (2019) ‘Transmediterranean Political Socialisation: The Hirak Movement, the Moroccan Diaspora and Europe as a Political Imaginary’, *European Institute of the Mediterranean*, p. 10.

Sliman, G. and Jouannic, E. (2010) *Sondage aupres des jeunes Marocains residant en Europe (France, Espagne, Italie, Belgique, Pays-Bas el Allemagne)*. BVA Opinion.

Snidjer, M. (2015) *Youth work in Morocco and youth participation projects at local level*. Euromed.

Strava, C. (2020) ‘Dissenting poses: Marginal youth, viral aesthetics, and affective politics in neoliberal Morocco’, *Focaal*, 1(aop), pp. 1–18. doi:10.3167/fcl.2020.072005.

The New York TImes (2017) ‘Opinion | Morocco’s Refusal to Listen’, September.

The World Bank (2021) *Morocco’s Jobs Landscape: Identifying Constraints to an Inclusive Labor Market*. The World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1678-9.

Touhtou, R. (2014) ‘Civil Society in Morocco under the New 2011 Constitution: Issues, Stakes and Challenges’, *Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Research Papers* [Preprint].

Tozy, M. (1984) *Champ et contre champ politico-religieux au Maroc*. Thèse de doctorat. Université Paul Cézanne.

Vertovec, S. and Rogers, A. (1998) ‘Introduction’, in Vertovec, S. and Rogers, A. (eds) *Muslim European Youth: Reproducing Ethnicity, Religion, Culture*. Routledge.

Vinogradov, A. and Waterbury, J. (1971) *Situations of Contested Legitimacy in Morocco: An Alternative Framework*. Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/178197 (Accessed: 20 October 2021).

Wajcman, J. (2004) *TechnoFeminism*. Cambridge ; Malden, MA: Polity.

World Bank (2013) *Morocco: Improving inclusiveness, accountability and transparency of decision making at the local level*.

World Bank (2021) *Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate) - Morocco | Data*.

World Population Review (2021) *Morocco Population 2021 (Demographics, Maps, Graphs)*. World Population Review.

Zerhouni, S. (2014) ‘“Smartness” without vision: the Moroccan regime in the face of acquiescent elites and weak social mobilization’, *SWP-Berlin*

Zerhouni, S. (2017) *Jeunes et Violences au Maroc: Réalités et Enjeux*. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Afrique du Nord, Rabat.

Zerhouni, S. (2019) *Jeunes et participation politique au Maroc*. IRES. Available at: https://www.ires.ma/images/PDFs_publications/jeunes_et_participation_politique_au_maroc.pdf.

Zerhouni, S. and Akesbi, A. (2016) ‘Youth Activism in Morocco: Exclusion, Agency and the Search for Inclusion’, (15), p. 29.

Zerhouni, S. and Bahoussa, A. (2008) ‘Le Marketing politique. Faible impact électoral | Economia’, *Revue Economia*, (1), pp. 48–71.

Zirari, H. (2008) ‘La trajectoire du mouvement des femmes: entre le changement social et l’affirmation politique’, in Gandolfi, P. (ed.) *Le Maroc aujourd’hui*. Bologna: Il Ponte.

Zoubairi, R. (2014) ‘La société civile au Maroc : Entre effectif et effectivité’, *Quid.ma*.

FOLLOW US
on Social Media:

@BilgiERC

@BilgiERC

https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/

BiLGi
PRIME
YOUTH

İstanbul
Bilgi University