Extremism and Radicalization: What makes the difference?

Author: Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya, ERC AdG PRIME Youth Project Principal Investigator, İstanbul Bilgi University

There are two terms extremism and radicalism, which are nowadays often being interchangeably used in everyday life as well as in the scientific literature (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009). This is not a surprise in an age dominated by the populist Zeitgeist (Mudde, 2004) in which a dualist understanding prevails over in conceptualizing and understanding social, economic and political phenomena. Scientific thinking is not also free from this myopic and reductionist inclination. Recent evidence suggests that, beyond the realm of scientific investigations, policy makers, journalists and the general public also use these terms quite flexibly and interchangeably to label various social and psychological phenomena. For instance, research suggests that individuals tend to attribute psychological pathologies to perpetrators of violent actions to deny them any similarity with themselves and protect their distinctiveness (Noor et al., 2019). Such processes may explain the popularity of the term ‘radicalization’ to designate terrorists (i.e. ‘radicalized’ individuals) in the public sphere, thereby emphasizing a hypothesized psychopathological root to their political action (Mandel, 2009).

The term 'radicalization' has been in circulation for centuries. Today, it is only coupled with Islamist aspirations of any kind such as with Salafism, Wahhabism, ISIS, Al Qaida and Boko Haram. Mainly, the negative connotations of the term are being highlighted. However, one could see other connotations of the term in the past. The radicals of the 19^th century were the democrats, socialists and liberals who waged a war against royal and imperial powers. The radicals of the 1968 generation were the youngsters who challenged the patriarchal structures of modern societies. 'Radicalization' is a a process that appears as a defensive response of various individuals suffering from social, economic and political forms of exclusion, subordination, alienation and isolation of Muslim youth and native youth residing in Europe.

The Global Context: The Rise of Violent Extremism in all Fronts

The neo-liberal age appears to be leading to the Nativisation of Radicalism among some groups of disenchanted native populations, while leading to the Islamization of Radicalism among segments of disenchanted migrant-origin populations (Kaya, 2019). The common denominator of these groups is that they are downwardly mobile and inclined towards radicalization. Existing studies report findings that place the two groups into separate ethno-cultural and religious categories (Keppel, 2017; Roy, 2017). Some social groups belonging to the majority nations are more inclined to express their unhappiness at insecurity and social-economic deprivation through the language of Islamophobia. Several decades ago, Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) stated that social-political discontent is likely to lead people to anti-Semitism, xenophobia, racism, regionalism, supernationalism, fascism, and anti-cosmopolitanism. If Lipset’s timely intervention in the 1950s is transposed to the contemporary age, it could be argued that Islamophobia has become one of the paths followed by the socio-economically and politically dismayed.

An Islamophobic discourse has resonated loudly in the last two decades following 9/11, and its proponents have been heard by both local and international communities, although their concern has not necessarily resulted from matters related to Muslims. In other words, Muslims have become the most popular scapegoats in many parts of the world, for any troublesome situation. For almost two decades, Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants have been perceived by some sections of the European public as a financial burden, and virtually never an opportunity, for member states. Muslim-origin immigrants tend to be negatively associated with, among many other issues, illegality, crime, violence, drug abuse, radicalism, fundamentalism, and conflict (Kaya, 2015). Islamophobia has certainly become a discursive tactic widely exploited by right-wing populist parties, social movements, and in particular, far-right groups in parts of Europe affected by the financial and refugee crises.

Extremism and Radicalism

Both extremism and radicalization have been the focus of extensive research among social sciences in the past decades. A quick google scholar search in January 2020 indicates that there are 282,000 referenced works on extremism and more than 84,000 on radicalization. Thus, it may be helpful to clarify what is meant by radicalization and extremism to get a sense of what these concepts respectively cover. First and foremost, most research on terrorism and political violence point to a major aspect of radicalization being a process while extremism is theorized as a psychological and ideological state (Kruglanski et al., 2019). One distinction between the two terms thus pertains to their reference to dynamic or static phenomena. Also, a second emphasis regards causal associations between the two terms. Extremism refers to the extent of one’s beliefs regarding political and ideological matters (including religiosity), while radicalization is related to the mechanisms that produce, or are caused by extreme beliefs (Van den Bos, 2018).
In fact, defining radicalization has been problematic within social sciences, and especially in psychology (Schmid, 2013). Indeed, while extremity regarding a ‘standard’ belief of reference can be, in principle, assessed using similar measures; the notion of radicalization itself is influenced by diverse historical, social, political and economic factors that lead to complex conceptualizations. Radicalization implies a direct support or enactment of radical behaviour and therefore begs the question: how does one define radical behaviour? As social sciences have grown ever more interest in understanding and explaining contextual and societal nuances cross-culturally, what appears to be radical or core truth becomes very difficult to answer.

History of the term Radicalization

The term radicalization has a history that spans over more than two centuries, hence it went through fluctuations in its meaning over time. According to Bötticher (2017), the term radicalism was first used in medical science and was moved into the realm of politics to designate post-glorious revolution progressives in England in the 18^th century. It then reached France at the end of the 18^th century, referring to the progressive revolutionaries in Parliament that still continues to have centre-left wing parties using the term 'radical' in their names. The term was later used in Germany in the 19^th century with still the same meaning. In fact, radicalism was at that time a political marker for liberals and left-wing politicians inspired by the philosophy of the Enlightenment and supporting progressive social policies. In line with this ideological tone, radicalism then became, throughout the 19^th century, the doctrine advocating republicanism and emancipation against absolute monarchical regimes in Europe. As such, radicalism comprised of secularism, pro-democratic components, and even equalitarian demands such as egalitarian citizenship and universal suffrage.

This has led political opponents of radicals to portray them as violent revolutionaries, a first attempt to psychologize political opposition for status-quo maintaining purposes (Sartori, 1984). It is from 'radicalism' that the verb 'to radicalize' was coined to designate the fact of adhering to a radical party, or to the ideas of this party. This was made by an extension of the meaning 'to make fundamental' (return to the etymology of the root) or ‘to render extremist’, implying the notion of a process at play. The word radicalization was derived from this verb as soon as in the 1930s, to name the action of one’s radicalizing, especially in relation to radical parties, or more broadly, to left-wing revolutionary movements. This association between radicalization and left-wing violence was maintained throughout the 1960s to designate civil rights activists and rioters of the May 68 uprisings. It is only from the years 2000 and especially 2010 that the word ‘radicalization’ started to change in its current meaning as a process leading to violent action in general, especially with regards to Islamist terrorism (Khosrokhavar, 2014).

Focussing on the early 19^th century social movements, Craig Calhoun (2011) makes a three-fold classification of radicalism: philosophical radicalism, tactical radicalism, and reactionary radicalism. Philosophical radicalism of theorists was concerned with penetrating to the roots of society with rational analyses and programs to understand the structural transformation of the public sphere. Tactical radicalism of activists was mainly related to their search for immediate change that required the use of violence and other extreme measures to achieve it. Reactionary radicalism of those suffering from the negative effects of modernization was more about their quest for saving what they valued in communities and cultural traditions from eradication by the growth of capitalism. Following this line of thinking, the leaders of the Reformation were radicals as they claimed to take back what was essential to Christianity from the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church. In philosophy, René Descartes was radical in his attempt to analyse knowledge by thinking through its elementary conditions anew. In everyday life, there were also radical individuals who challenged hierarchical order by judging basic matters for herself/himself - guided by her/his divine inner light, senses and reason (Calhoun, 2011).

Radicalism cannot be understood as a stable ideological position. Ideas that are radical at some point could be liberal or even conservative at another. Liberals and democrats of the 19th century were then the radicals. It is no longer possible to call them as such. The 1968 generation was also radical in the sense that they challenged the patriarchal and authoritarian socio-political order. The radicals of the 1968 generation were different from the radicals of the 19th century. Similarly, the radicals of the present are also very different from the former ones. Departing from the theory of social movements, Craig Calhoun (2011) claims that the defence of tradition by nationalist, nativist, populist and/or religious groups has become a radical stance today. He even continues to suggest that this sort of populism and conservatism “has been important to struggles for democracy, for inclusion in the conditions under which workers and small proprietors live” (Calhoun, 2011: 250).

Literature shows that individuals who are in the process of radicalisation tend to seek out like-minded individuals, who then turn into a collective. Afterward, collective action is required for the radicalisation of these groups. Charles Tilly (1977) claims that there are four lines of argument in politics to explain the formation of collective action: Marxist approach, Durkheimian approach, Millian approach, and Weberian approach. Accordingly, Marxist approach traces collective action back to solidarity within groups and conflict of interest between groups. Durkheimian approach treats collective action as a response to processes of integration and disintegration in societies. Millian approach explains collective action as a pursuit of individual interest. Finally, Weberian approach portrays collective action as the outgrowth of commitment to certain systems of belief (Tilly, 1977: 5). Hence, Marxist analysis describe collective action as a result of detrimental effects of capitalism such as alienation, while Durkheimian analyses designate it as a response to the processes of modernization leading to anomy and anger. The Utilitarian analyses of John Stuart Mill assume that some individuals are interested in what is wrong while some others have their private interest on the side of what is right (Mill, 1950). Whereas Weberian analyses draw our attention to the ways in which some individuals become receptive to the belief systems and ideologies advocated by some charismatic leaders who successfully mobilize collectives against the detrimental effects of rapid social change (Tilly, 1977: 42).

Charles Tilly’s elaboration of collective action is also instrumental for social scientists to figure out the distinctive characteristics of mobilization at present time. He makes distinctions among defensive, offensive and preparatory mobilization. Defensive mobilization is often bottom-up. A threat from outside induces the members of a group to pool their resources to fight of the enemy. The threat might be capitalism, globalism, injustice, overwhelming taxation, or coercive state power. Tilly classifies the radical food riots, tax rebellions, invasions of fields, and draft resistance in Europe as defensive forms of mobilization. Decisions to become active citizens and to mobilize politically have posed significant risks for Muslim-origin youth both before and after 9/11. One could also list nativist and Islamist youth mobilizations in the same cluster. Offensive mobilization is often top-down. This could be a political alliance between bourgeois and artisans to produce the Great Reform Bill of 1832 that introduced wide-ranging changes to electoral system of England and Wales (Tilly, 1977: 34). One could also argue that the new political alliances organized by some European right-wing populist parties among various social groups such as working-class groups, precarious groups, women, and LGBTI groups that generate a growing stream of Islamophobic sentiments, also fall into the same category of offensive mobilization (Kaya, 2019). Eventually, the last category of mobilization according to Tilly (1977) is preparatory mobilization, which is also a top-down one. In this kind of mobilization, the group pools resources in anticipation of future opportunities and threats. For instance, labour unions store some money to cushion hardships that may appear in the future in the form of unemployment, or loss of wages during a strike. This is a kind of proactive mobilization planned for the future threats. Accordingly, one could argue that PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident)² established first in Dresden, Germany and then in different European countries can be named as preparatory form of mobilization as they seek to protect the Occident from the Muslim ‘invasion’, and prepare their strategy accordingly (Kaya, 2019).

This brief historical overview allows us to make two important observations. First and foremost the historicity of the notion of radicalism itself seems intertwined with concerns of denouncing threats to the status quo and political ideologies that may bring about change in any kind of form. The plasticity of this notion combined with this strong system justification feature (Jost, 2017) might paradoxically inform us more about the characteristics of groups which use this notion and those of their targets. This leads us to the second point. Seen through these lenses, the post-9/11 use of the term ‘radicalisation’ to designate almost exclusively violent political action stemming from Islamist groups might indicate that, indeed, the former left-wing utopias have now lost to Islamism being perceived by individuals as the only viable counter-hegemonic utopia in the face of globalization (Appadurai, 1996; De Certeau, 1984).

In Lieu of Conclusion

Radicalisation should be understood first and foremost as a socialisation process in which group dynamics are often more important than ideology. Islam is not a monolithic entity – its beliefs and practices are not the same throughout the World (Leonard, 2003). Sunni Islam has no centralized clergy, but Shia Islam has. Thus, Muslims across different states understand and practice Islam in ways strongly influenced by the local contexts. On the other hand, it is not only Muslims who become radicalized to express their concerns against the destabilizing effects of neo-liberalist ideology, there are also many native individuals who live in the "places which don’t matter anymore" such as remote towns, rural and mountainous regions. These individuals may also pick up a kind of nativist, or ethno-nationalist form of radicalization to express their discontent against various flows of globalization such as international trade, mobility, diversity and internationalization.

The role of local context should be prior to the role of ideology in assessing the root causes of radicalization. Studies have provided us with a more detailed account of the stages in this process, which is similar to other forms of deviant behaviour. The process of socialisation into extremism and, eventually, into terrorism, happens gradually and requires a prolonged group process. Feelings of frustration, alienation, anomy, inequity, ambiguity and deprivation are first interiorised by individuals. The state of individual interiorization then leads to a mental separation from society that is considered responsible for the emergence of those feelings. Individuals then reach out to others who share the same feelings and create an ‘in-group’. This process is not any different from the formation of a ethno-cultural, or religious minority group. Within such a minority group, personal feelings become politicised to the extent that the members of the ‘in-group’ start asking 'what are we going to do about it?'. The ‘in-group’ mentality gradually solidifies into an unquestioned belief system and attitude, with alternative pathways gradually being pushed aside. Coolsaet (2019) states that ideology helps to dehumanise the outside-group in this process and transforms innocent individuals who have no responsibility for the aforementioned feelings of frustration and inequity into guilty accomplices.

[1] Oxford Dictionary, available at https://www.lexico.com/definition/radicalism

[2] PEGIDA stands for Patriotische Europäer Gegen Islamisierung Des Abendlandes in German. Although the British media translate the PEGIDA's name as ‘Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West, the word Abendland is in fact a rather archaic term for the Occident, which literally means 'evening land', as opposed to the Morgenland or 'morning land', corresponding to the locations of the sunrise and sunset. The nostalgic connotation of the term Occident (Abendalandes) apparently appeal to the supporters of the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland).

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Jais Adam-Troian, Ayşe Tecmen and Ayşenur Benevento for their support, suggestions and remarks during the writing of the extended version of this paper.

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