Is France the victim of the inconsistencies of its policy?

Author: Prof. Mehdi Lahlou, University Mohammed V, Morocco 

Rabat, 30 October 2020.

In just over a month, between the 25th of September and the 29th of October 2020, three terrorist acts were committed in France against three easy and highly symbolic targets: two journalists, a teacher and three people praying in a church frequented by Catholics.  

These three attacks occurred within a timeline of 34 days, and were committed by three young terrorists aged between 18 and 25. The one who stabbed two journalists next to the former headquarters of the weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris on September 25th, 2020, was of Pakistani origin (25 years old). The second one, who beheaded a teacher after leaving his high school on the 16th of October in the city of Conflans-Sainte-Honorine in the Paris region, was one of Chechen origin (18 years old). The third terrorist, who killed three people on the 29th of October in a church in Nice, south of the country, is one of Tunisian origin. These three horrific and totally reprehensible acts share the following aspects:  

1)     They have been committed using a knife, which was not the case in 2015 when the attackers used firearms against Charlie Hebdo journalists or against the hostages of the Hyper Casher in Paris;

2)     Each of them has been committed by a single person;

3)     They have been initiated by a refugee and two immigrants, who had recently arrived in France;

4)     None of them has been claimed; and

5)     They did not contribute to international solidarity, especially from the point of view of Arab-Muslim countries. On the contrary, it is quite the opposite.  

In this context, the third observation presented above might de-emphasize, to some extent, the explanation of radicalization and violence based on a religious reference that originates from a situation of marginalization, as well as economic and social difficulties in which children of migrants and their families live. However, it seems clear that the integration of refugees will be successful only with a genuine integration policy which respects the fundamental rights of migrants. Thanks to this policy, it would no longer be necessary to specify in the media or elsewhere the origin, religion or status of a delinquent, criminal or terrorist.

On the other hand, the fifth observation is in fact more problematic for France. France has almost become—in a context marked by the ongoing trial of the accomplices of the murderers of Charlie Hebdo journalists and some of the Hyper Kosher hostages[i] in Paris, in January 2015, and by the announcement of a bill on “Islamist separatism”[ii]–responsible for the acts of terror, from which it suffers. In this sense, it is noteworthy that part of the speech[iii] of the French president during the tribute paid, on October 21, to Professor Samuel Paty was interpreted as a provocation to Muslims, from distant Pakistan[iv] to friendly Morocco.[v]

There may be several reasons for this perception. Firstly, setting aside the domestic conditions, which are often mentioned to explain or justify the radicalisation of a part of the youth within certain countries, it is possible to put forward many external/international reasons. These include, obviously, the colonial legacy. Although it has a decreasing effect, the legacy might be taken into account, given that young and old North Africans are still particularly concerned about what France is doing at home and elsewhere, especially in the Mediterranean.

More fundamentally, France's “Arabic policy” has completely changed since the end of Jacques Chirac's presidency in 2007. Therefore, former presidents Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande, and the current president Emmanuel Macron are considered by many Arabs as supporters of Israel. By the same token, they are seen, at best, as the opponents of Palestinians as well as the Lebanese resistance in southern Lebanon.

In addition, one may consider that the French action in Libya is also oriented as opposed to Arab interests. Although it brought an end to Muammar Gaddafi's dictatorship, many believe that the motive behind his elimination was to get rid of a witness behind the financing of Sarkozy's 2007 election campaign. Today, along with Russia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, the French government is involved in the Libyan conflict by supporting the party commanded by Marechal Khalifa Haftar, even though France has recognized in 2016, within the framework of the United Nations, the legitimacy of the Government of National Union based in the capital Tripoli.[vi]

In the same vein, the Serval and Barkhane military operations,[vii] which have been carried out in Mali since 2014, and supported by very few countries including Europeans, are seen to serve the specific interests of France alongside some undemocratic governments involved in the conflict.

More recently, France's unconditional support for Greece in its dispute with Turkey over the division of maritime space in the Aegean Sea, which Germany has approached with a seemingly more neutral position, gave an additional argument to the Turkish president who called Macron a crusader. It may have also appeared, in the eyes of many Arabs and Muslims, as a clear support for a Christian nation against a Muslim nation.

More generally, what is also criticized in the Maghreb as well as in the rest of the Arab-Muslim world is a certain French inconsistency in its support for some universal values, egalitarian principles and freedoms of opinion and speech. Though the attachment to these freedoms and values are strongly highlighted by the French government, France ostensibly supports the current Egyptian, Saudi, Emirati or Qatari regimes, which are clearly not the best examples of respect for such values, or democracy in general.

Last but not least, many people inside or outside France criticize that the French government supports free criticism, including those directed against religions, but prohibits “anti-Semitic” criticism with a resolution that equates anti-Semitism with Zionism,[viii] which is basically political in essence.

This double standard, which represents French politics in recent years according to many who form the Arab-Muslim public opinion, has been used by other governments, as well as the Islamist groups hostile to France. In all these cases, one way or another, France has been seen as a lecturer that seeks above all to preserve its interests, such as selling arms in the Middle East and the Maghreb, or securing access to various mining and oil resources in Africa.

All these points explain why 'fanatics/fundamentalists/terrorists', manipulated or not, have been attacking France, particularly since 2015, more so than countries such as Denmark where the cartoons of the prophet were drawn in 2005, Spain, Italy and even Germany or Greece. In this regard, Germany, which received more than 1.5 million refugees and immigrants including Syrians in 2015, and which allowed most of them to be fully integrated into its society, is not considered as an enemy by anyone in the Arab-Muslim communities, living in Europe or abroad.

The German model, often cited by French officials and politicians in connection with economic issues and public finance management, should serve as a benchmark for France especially in terms of diplomacy. French diplomacy should adopt a more confident and consistent tone, in conformity with the principles and values ​​that it cherishes.

Thanks to its historical, linguistic and economic links particularly with the Maghreb countries, and in general with the rest of the Arab-Muslim world, France clearly has a significant capacity to change the current situation. The French government should start change by defending the values of progress and integration against regression and exclusionism—i.e. that of radical Islamism as well as the extreme right.

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[i] Le Monde, 18 September 2020.

[ii] Le Monde, 1 October 2020.

[iii] During this speech, Mr. Macron notably affirmed ‘’We will defend the freedom that you taught so well, and we will strongly proclaim the concept of laïcité [secularism]. We will not disavow the cartoons, the drawings, even if others recoil ‘’. La Sorbonne, 21 October 2020.

[iv] Read @ImranKhanPTI, 25 October 2020.

[v] https://www.diplomatie.ma/en/morocco-strongly-condemns-continuing-publication-cartoons-insulting-islam-and-prophet-sidna-mohammed, Rabat, 25 October 2020.

[vi] Among the 20 countries present at the meeting to reaffirm that the only legitimate government remains the one based in Tripoli are France, Italy, Turkey, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and the United States. A final statement mentions the need for "inclusive dialogue and national reconciliation." https://www.econostrum.info/La-communaute-internationale-demande-une-reconciliation-nationale-en-Libye_a22263.html

[vii] Operation Serval, which involved 4,500 troops, was launched on 13 January 2013 by French President F. Hollande "at the request of the Malian government". It was replaced by Operation Barkhane in August 2014. The latter, which now includes 5,100 soldiers, covers the countries on the Sahel-Saharan strip, such as Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso. https://www.ecpad.fr/actualites/les-operations-serval-et-barkhane-au-mali-dans-les-fonds-de-lecpad/ .

[viii] A resolution adopted by the French National Assembly on 3 December 2019. Le Monde Fr. 3 December 2019. https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2019/12/03/l-assemblee-nationale-adopte-une-resolution-controversee-sur-la-lutte-contre-l-antisemitisme_6021535_823448.html.