netherlands

Immigration and Framing in the Netherlands: From Migrants to “Suspect Community”

Author: Dr. Ayşe Tecmen, ERC PRIME Youth Project Post-doc Researcher, European Institute, İstanbul Bilgi University

Editor’s note: This blog entry is based on the review of the literature on migration, integration, and citizenship in the Netherlands, which is a part of the country-reports that will be published on https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/. Unlike conventional blog entries, these posts aim to inform our readers of the current state of affairs in Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands while conveying how the PRIME Youth project will contribute to the extant literature. Ayhan Kaya

Western Europe’s immigrant integration policies have been transformed, beginning in the mid-1990s (Joppke, 1998, 2007; Kaya, 2012). This transformation entailed a move away from distinct “national models” and toward convergent systems of “civic integration” for newcomers and “anti-discrimination” for settled immigrants and their descendants. This transformation has significant consequences in the Netherlands in which integration displaced the multiculturalist paradigm in the late 1990s (Vink, 2007; Van Oers et al., 2010; Prins and Saharso, 2010) with the institution of strict inburgering (citizenisation) classes starting a “testing regime” for integration (Extra and Spotti, 2009; Spotti, 2011). The emergence of inburgering also preoccupied academic research by surpassing other influential factors and markers of integration (Kaya, 2012).

In this sense, while “integration” is mainly discussed in relation to language or cultural requirements, political representation and national allegiance are central in this debate. For instance, countries with a multi-party political system provide minority or conceivably migrant groups with the chance of participating in democratic politics with an ethnic or religious minority political party (group representation) (Bot and Verkuyten, 2018). Political representation can be essential in the integration of Muslims into the host society and in enhancing the legitimacy of the national democratic system (Bloemraad 2013; Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013). In this sense, despite the multi-party system in the Netherlands, studies show that Muslims still face majority opposition and skepticism about their national allegiance and the right to participate in the political process (Bloemraad and Schoenwälder, 2013; Petrusevska, 2009; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008).

This skepticism about national allegiance is further perpetuated through the framing of Muslims and Islam in the press and in the Dutch parliament. To that end, Rens Vliegenthart and Conny Roggeband (2007)’s examination of the framing of integration and migration within critical political issues in the Dutch press and parliament between 1995 and 2004, is an enlightening study. Vliegenthart and Roggeband (2007: 313-314) consider the outcome of the parliamentary election of 1998 and 2002 with electoral gains for the liberal right party as a turning point. They argue that this lead to an increase in the use of the restriction frame in both the parliament and the media. This was a shift towards the framing of “Islam-as-threat,” which came at the expense of the multicultural frame. It is important to remember that surely there were other factors that contributed to these frames; such as the developments amongst the Muslim-origin people in the Netherlands and the Islamic World, the rise of popular right-wing politicians like Pim Fortuyn and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, as well as mechanisms of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ within the Dutch population (Vellenga, 2008).

In a similar vein, Masja van Meeteren and Linda van Oostendorp’s (2019) study analyses if and how Muslim-origin individuals are also constructed as a ‘suspect community’ in Dutch political discourse on terrorism in the period 2004-2015.[i] This analysis shows that political discourse in the Netherlands has shifted significantly in this period. In this sense, the authors deconstruct the ‘2007 Action plan Polarization and Radicalization’ (Actieplan Polarisatie en Radicalisering) applied between 2007 and 2011.[ii] Significantly, the phrases were carefully worded, and both ‘polarization’ and ‘radicalization’ were carefully defined. Furthermore, this document states that the threat of radicalization “is not primarily the ideas or ideology, but the expectation that the ideology will increasingly influence actions. This concerns actions with negative consequences for individuals and the democratic state” (2007:20). In this sense, the Action Plan articulated radicalization as a global threat that was not reserved exclusively for Muslim-origin groups.

This line of reasoning was continued in the work of Sipco J. Vellenga (2008), which examines and analyses the frame of the Muslim-origin immigrant debate in the Netherlands, which is characterised by five key elements: Culturalisation, Islamisation, rejection of Islam, ‘new’ nationalism and the plea for assimilation. Vellenga explains these elements as follows:

Culturalisation: the debate’s ‘cultural turn’ is reflected in an ever-greater focus on the protection of social standards and values, the significance of Dutch history in school curricula, the introduction of the naturalization procedures and the establishment, the New Comers Integration Act of 1 January 2007 (Vellenga, 2008: 29; Kaya, 2012). 

Islamisation: Religion and mainly Islam increasingly classify immigrant cultures. The immigrants’ way of life is not seen as an attempt to create a meaningful life by putting together elements from their cultures and aspects of Dutch hegemony, but rather as a result of their Islamic religion (Vellenga, 2008: 29; Sunier, 2005). 

Rejection of Islam: Western culture is enlightened, and Islam is backward; Western culture is supportive of tolerance, and Islam is intolerant; Western culture promotes democracy, and Islam oppresses people; Western culture advocates for equality and Islam promotes inequalities; Western culture is democratic and Islam primarily undemocratic; Western culture tends toward secularism, and Islam is authoritarian (Vellenga, 2008: 30).   

‘New’ nationalism: This assumes that there is a sharp distinction between ‘autochthones’ and ‘allochtones,’ as such between ‘the Dutch’ ‘self’ and ‘the Muslim’ ‘other.’ Furthermore, this new nationalism is formulated through the opposition between the Netherlands and the EU (Vellenga, 2008: 30-31). On these issues, Thijl Sunier similarly wrote: Towards the end of the 1990s, a growing number of intellectuals started to argue for a deepening and wider dissemination of national awareness and the protection of Dutch cultural identity, both in opposition to the presence of minority ‘ethnic’ groups and the issue of European unification” (Sunier, 2005:93).                 

Plea for assimilation: Many participants in the public debate have called for assimilation and require immigrants to respect and internalise the core values of Dutch public culture. They consider Islam to be irreconcilable with Western values such as democracy, freedom, equality, and tolerance (Vellenga, 2008: 31).

***

In the last decade, migration and integration policies have become more nationalised and more diverse. Nonetheless, as is the case of the Netherlands and other European countries, such policies are accompanied by certain discursive constructs which "frame" the perception of immigrant and immigrant-origin individuals. In this case, an important frame is the rise of terrorist activities in Europe in the past decade. Combined with the frames identified by Vellenge (2008), the Netherlands has witnessed the growing Islamisation of radicalisation, which refers to the exclusive association of radicalisation with Islam and Muslim-origin individuals.

Moreover, up until the early-2010s, terrorism was framed as a social problem that had to be addressed by society at large. In recent years, Islam has been presented as the root cause of terrorist activities. As stated above, the fact that Muslim-origin social groups are constructed as a “suspect community” which also defers the responsibility for radicalisation to the Muslim community. 

As this ERC project interjects, this is a very dangerous construction which does not only further marginalize Muslim-origin individuals but also fail to formulate a proper definition for radicalism and radicalisation. 

[i] Research on the impact of counter-terrorism on Muslim communities argue that these policies produce a ‘suspect community’, which was originally developed by Hillyard (1993) in the context of British anti-terror laws in Northern Ireland. This concept has been adopted by a large range of authors to discuss the current effects of anti-terror laws. See also; Hillyard, P. (1993). Suspect community: people's experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain. Pluto Pr; Awan, I. (2012). “I am a Muslim not an extremist”: How the Prevent Strategy has constructed a “suspect” community. Politics & Policy40(6), 1158-1185; Baker-Beall, C. (2014). The evolution of the European Union’s ‘fight against terrorism’ discourse: Constructing the terrorist ‘other. Cooperation and Conflict, 49(2), 212–238; Breen-Smyth, M. (2014). Theorising the “suspect community”: Counterterrorism, security practices and the public imagination. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7(2), 223–240; Buijs, F. J. (2009). Muslims in the Netherlands: Social and political developments after 9/11. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35(3), 421–438.

[ii] For the full text see https://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/E9353925-A523-41C6-94F1-643EACF826CC/0/minbiz007_actieplanukv3.pdf

References

Bloemraad, I. (2013). Accessing the corridors of power: Puzzles and pathways to understanding minority representation. West European Politics, 36, 652-670. doi:10.1080/01402382.2013.773733

Bloemraad, I., and Schönwälder, K. (2013). Immigrant and ethnic minority representation in Europe: Conceptual challenges and theoretical approaches. West European Politics, 36, 564-579. doi:10.1080/01402382.2013.773724

Bot, W., and Verkuyten, M. (2018). Evaluating the political organisation of Muslim citizens in the Netherlands: The role of political orientation, education and multiculturalism. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, Vol. 6(2), 364–382, doi:10.5964/jspp.v6i2.901. 

Extra, G., and Spotti, M. (2009). Language, migration and citizenship: a case study on testing regimes in the Netherlands. Discourses on language and integration: critical perspectives on language testing regimes in Europe, 61-81.

Joppke, C. (1998). Why liberal states accept unwanted immigration. World politics50(2), 266-293. Joppke, C. (2007). Transformation of immigrant integration: Civic integration and antidiscrimination in the Netherlands, France, and Germany. World politics, 59(2), 243-273.

Kaya, A. (2012): Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization. London: Palgrave.

Petrusevska, T. (Ed.). (2009). A guide to minorities and political participation in South-East Europe. Brussels, Belgium: King Baudouin Foundation.

Prins, B., and Saharso, S. (2010). From toleration to repression: the Dutch backlash against multiculturalism. In The Multiculturalism Backlash (pp. 82-101). Routledge.

Sniderman, P. M., and Hagendoorn, L. (2007). When ways of life collide. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

Spotti, M. (2011). Ideologies of Success for Superdiverse Citizens: the Dutch Testing Regime for Integration and the Online Private Sector. Diversities13(2).

Strabac, Z., and Listhaug, O. (2008). Anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe: A multilevel analysis of survey data from 30 countries. Social Science Research, 37, 268-286. doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2007.02.004

Sunier, T. (2005). Interest, Identities, and the Public Sphere: Representing Islam in the Netherlands since the 1980s. In European Muslims and the Secular State, Jocelyne Cesari and Seán McLoughlin (eds.), 85-98. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Van Meeteren, M. M., and Van Oostendorp, L. L. (2019). Are Muslims in the Netherlands constructed as a ‘suspect community’? An analysis of Dutch political discourse on terrorism in 2004-2015. Crime, Law and Social Change71(5), 525-540.

Van Oers, R., Ersbøll, E., and Kostakopoulou, D. (Eds.). (2010). A re-definition of belonging?: language and integration tests in Europe. Brill.

Vellenga, S. J. (2008). Huntington in Holland: The Public Debate on Muslim Immigrants in the Netherlands. Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, 21(1), 21-41.

 

 

 

Vink, M. P. (2007). Dutch ‘multiculturalism’beyond the pillarisation myth. Political Studies Review5(3), 337-350.

Vliegenthart, R., and Roggeband, C. (2007). Framing immigration and integration: Relationships between press and parliament in the Netherlands. International Communication Gazette69(3), 295-319.

Authors:

Published: Feb. 4, 2020, 11:15 a.m.
Edited: March 26, 2021, 11:56 a.m.