The Moroccan approach to counter religious radicalization and building resilience against violence
This article was published in September 2020 as part of the GREASE project. The following post is a re-edited draft.
Rabat, 29 January 2021
Authors: Mehdi Lahlou & Mounir Zouiten, University Mohammed V
Managing the religious sphere and combating radicalization is, first of all, a matter of public policy in Morocco. Thus, the Moroccan State considers that such management falls, both in terms of design and execution, within its prerogatives. This approach comprises three components—an institutional one, in the broad sense, an educational and legal, and an operational one.
1. The Institutional Component of the State Approach
Under the King's umbrella, who is defined by the constitution as the holder and organizer of powers in religious matters in Morocco, the government—represented in this context by the Ministry of Habouss and Islamic Affairs—has adopted an approach based on four complementary objectives. One of them is combating radicalization. Thus, the State's main goals behind the management, insofar as possible, of the religious sphere may be summarized as follows:
· A search for political and social legitimacy. Thus, the preservation of the King's authority so that the royal system's sustainability does not depend on elections, a parliament's vote, or any other designation system, but on the majority's supposed adhesion. This process is fundamentally linked to the belief among a large part of the society[i] that the authority lies in the King's prominent religious role, which meets the demand for serenity and moral security in the absence of material well-being, economic and social order.
· Countering political opposition on the field, as that has already happened in the last three decades of the twentieth century against the socialist and communist opposition, and more recently, the protests appearing in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in 2011.
· Responding to the rise of Shiite Islam in Morocco, which supposedly accompanies the increasing Iranian influence in the Maghreb and the Middle East, and other religious radicalizations linked to the wars in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and the repression carried out by the Israeli security forces against the Palestinian population in the occupied territories.
· Supporting Moroccan diplomacy, especially in sub-Saharan African allies like Mali, Senegal, and Guinea-Conakry. This was one of the main reasons for the establishment of the Mohammed VI Foundation for African Scholars. The foundation is based on a set of goals, among which is "to unify and coordinate the efforts of Muslim scholars, both in Morocco and in the rest of the African countries, to define, spread and consolidate the tolerant values of Islam on the basis of the unity of (Islamic) doctrine."
1.1. The Action of the Minister of Habouss and Islamic Affairs (MHIA)
The MHIA is at the forefront in order to achieve the abovementioned objectives. The institution is responsible for managing the religious sphere by allocating effective financial, institutional, and human resources.
"One manifestation of the intensive work that has been carried out with the stated aim of dealing in particular with the phenomenon of radicalization is the immense body of regulatory, legislative texts and the tenfold increase within one decade of the State budget allocated to religious services. These include the following, in particular, the construction, renovation, and equipment of mosques; looking after imams and taking care of their material and social needs; holding in-service training of imams under the supervision of the religious scholars; training young imams from among university graduates; training spiritual guides from among female university graduates who would provide guidance to women and men in mosques and in other institutions, such as schools, hospitals and prisons; enacting laws that regulate relations with the caretakers of religion and between the State and the individuals who wish to contribute to building mosques and to their upkeep in such a way as not to allow their intervention to interfere with the fundamentals or to disseminate extremist ideology or political exploitation of religion in any form or shape; providing administrative supervision that can closely follow the local management of religious affairs and structuralizing religious education." (A. Toufik, 2014).
1.2. The High Council of Ulemas
Ensuring that the population, especially the youth, follows the "right path" is the task of the Council of Ulemas.[ii] Chaired by the King and placed under the authority of the Minister of Habous and Islamic Affairs, as indicated above, the High Council of Ulemas orients and controls "the religious scholars in a number of domains, such as implementing the fundamentals of religion, especially in mosques, the intellectual enhancement of the care-takers of religion and of the general public, which would definitely curb negative phenomena such as terrorism." Also, the role of the Ulemas "in providing guidance and in directing people's behavior includes the dignity of the individual, the Divine Decrees and human rights in general, a role they perform in accordance with the traditions of the Sunna and the acts of the founding fathers. They exercise it within the sphere of freedom and legality, and their educational roles are in conformity with the great principle known in Islam as 'enjoining good and forbidding evil.' More often than not, terrorism abuses this principle to disturb public life in societies and to contest the legitimacy of the ruler" (A. Toufik, 2014).
1.3. Traditional Religious Education
The "training of Imams" and providing necessary educational components are essential for the MHIA to act on the younger generations' minds in its endeavor to put and keep them on the right path. At this level, Islamic education, introduced into the general public education system in the mid-1970s, represents a significant change in teaching religion in Moroccan public schools. Through the political instrumentalization of Islam, it was deliberately intended to counteract the rise of secular political and ideological streams, particularly strong among the educated youth in high schools and universities. From then on, the youth would become the privileged target of a systematic action of Islamization carried out both by the State, under the supervision of the MHIA, and by the emerging Islamist organizations. The policy of Islamizing youth in schools and universities started in the mid-1960s, following the demonstrations of 1965, and continued ever more significantly in the following years. The goal was to eradicate secular (Socialist/Marxist) ideologies in schools and universities. The government thus believed it would be able to contain the resistance of the youth who, at that time, was the spearhead of the opposition.
The religious policy inaugurated at that time responded to the monarchy's hegemony strategy, which had made the conquest of school youth one of its main objectives. Naturally, the emerging traditional Islamist forces also made the Islamization of schools one of their strategic goals. The field of education has always been under pressure from their side to review educational programs in order to Islamize their content. The traditional clerics organized in the League of Moroccan Ulemas have never ceased to question the public authorities to change the curriculum in the same way. Some political parties had also pushed for the same purpose. One of these forces was the Party of Istiqlal (Independence), a center-right nationalist party led by the old reformist leader Allal Al-Fassi. Its executives, strongly present in positions of responsibility within the Ministry of National Education, have always worked for this cause, guided in their choice by the Salafist ideology of the party and its doctrine in education. The new choices of power in the field of education during the 1970s and 1980s would strengthen this trend, particularly in terms of the Arabization of education. Arabization went hand in hand with the Islamization of the content of the programs, and became more concrete as the authorities began to follow this path. The Party of Istiqlal could only rejoice at the turn taken by the course of events. The Party has not failed to participate in the process by involving one of its prominent leaders, the Minister of National Education back then, in the implementation of this Arabization-Islamization of education under the combined effect of the religious reformism of the Party of Istiqlal (i.e. Salafism) and the religious fundamentalism of the monarchy.
Within this traditional/religious education system, as in general public education, the MHIA Affairs plays a central role. Indeed, it controls five key areas, alongside the Mohammed VI Foundation of African Ulemas, which I have already mentioned above. These areas include the structure of religious education, covering the Koranic education called "renovated education" that the ministry has been in charge of since 1964. The so-called traditional schools are former centers of religious learning, scattered throughout Morocco, training junior clerics such as preachers, muezzins, and imams for mosques. According to the census of the MHIA conducted in the school year 2017-2018, there are 286 traditional schools. 50% of these schools are located in the regions of Souss-Massa, the birth place of the current prime Minister, and Tangier-Tetouan-Al Huceima, the region from which many Moroccan fighters left between 2011 and 2016 towards the Syrian and Iraqi war fields. 99.56% of these schools are annexed to a mosque and associations run 71.68% of them. The religious science chairs are held by the Ulemas (religious scholars) appointed by the Ministry in country's prominent mosques. The latter, which was founded in 1974, was autonomous before being taken in 1985 under the wings of the MHIA, Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, Morshidin (male religious counselors), and Morshidat (female religious counselors) in Rabat. This institute was founded in 2004 and then opened its doors to foreign students in 2015. In 2019, it had more than 1,300 students from 11 countries, including 150 women alongside Moroccan students. Foreign students come mainly from sub-Saharan African countries, including Mali, Guinea-Conakry, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Chad and Niger. In accordance with an official French-Moroccan agreement signed in 2016, about fifty French students join the institute each year. These students follow a three-year course devoted to Islamic sciences, humanities, Jewish culture and the introduction to Christianity.
2. Legal and Operational Components
2.1.The Legal Component
Two essential laws constitute the legal arsenal that Morocco has established in its fight against terrorism over the past 20 years. These are laws number 03-03 and 86-14.
The law 03-03:
On May 16, 2003, a few days after the unclaimed terrorist attacks in Casablanca, the country's largest city, Morocco enacted its first anti-terrorism law. According to the terms of this law, written in its article 2018-1,[iii] the following offenses "constitute acts of terrorism, when they are intentionally in relation to an individual or collective enterprise with the aim of seriously undermining public order by intimidation, terror or violence, the following main offenses: Deliberate attack on the life of persons or their integrity, or their freedoms, the kidnapping or sequestration of persons; counterfeiting or falsification of currencies; destruction, damage or deterioration; hijacking, degradation of aircraft or ships or any other means of transport, degradation of air, sea and land navigation facilities and destruction, degradation or deterioration of means of communication; theft and extortion of property; illegal manufacture, possession, transport, release or use of weapons, explosives or ammunition and participation in an association formed or in an agreement established for the preparation or commission of one of the acts of terrorism".
According to article 218-2 of the same law, "anyone who defends acts constituting terrorism offenses, by speeches, cries or threats uttered in public places or meetings or by writing […]" will be "punished by imprisonment of 2 to 6 years and a fine of 10,000 to 200,000 dirhams (1,000 to 20,000 $).''
As for the facts provided in the first paragraph above, they are punished by ten to twenty years' imprisonment. The penalty is life imprisonment when the facts have resulted in mutilation, amputation, or deprivation of the use of a limb, blindness, loss of an eye, or any other permanent infirmity for one or more people.
The culprit is punished with death if the facts lead to the death of one or more people. Under the terms of this law, nearly 2,000 people were convicted of terrorist acts following the attacks of 2003. Notably, this law does not mention Moroccans' participation in international terrorism.
The Law 86-14:
It was no longer the case after 2015. The Law 03-03 was amended to take into account Moroccan foreign fighters and the crimes they commit outside Morocco. The amendment was a consequence of the proclamation of the Islamic State (ISIL) in Mosul on June 29, 2014, which changed the position of the "international community," led by the USA. But also thanks to the vote by Morocco, the same month, of the resolution 2170, which "reaffirms that terrorism, including the actions of ISIL, cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, or civilization" and, among others, "calls upon all Member States to take national measures to suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to, and bring to justice, in accordance with applicable international law, foreign terrorist fighters of, ISIL, ANF (Front al-Nosra or Jabhat al-Nosra, which operates essentially in Syria) and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, reiterates further the obligation of Member States to prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups, in accordance with applicable international law, by, inter alia, effective border controls, and, in this context, to exchange information expeditiously, improve cooperation among competent authorities to prevent the movement of terrorists and terrorist groups to and from their territories, the supply of weapons for terrorists and financing that would support terrorists.[iv] More than that, Morocco will engage militarily with the international coalition against Daesh from September 2014,[v] which automatically implies that it will henceforth consider the combatants on Syrian and Iraqi lands as enemies.
Since then, the concerns over the local repercussions of these policy changes and the prospect of the return of defeated and war-hardened radicals have prompted Morocco to adopt a more intransigent, or less lax approach, focused on security. Thus, According to Law 86-14 adopted in 2015,[vi] the following acts constitute offenses of terrorism:
· joining or attempting to join individually or collectively, in an organized or unorganized framework, in entities, organizations, bands or groups, terrorists, whatever their form, their object, or the place where they are located, even if the terrorist acts are not intended to harm the Kingdom of Morocco or its interests;
· receiving or attempting to receive training in any form, nature, or duration inside or outside the Kingdom of Morocco, committing an act of terrorism inside or outside the Kingdom regardless of the occurrence of such an act; and
· enlisting or attempting to enroll one or more people in view of forming terrorist entities, organizations, bands, or groups inside or outside the Kingdom of Morocco.
The aforementioned acts are punishable by imprisonment from five to fifteen years and a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 dirhams (about 5,000 to 50,000$). In the same vein, anyone who persuades, incites, or provokes others to commit one of these offenses are punished with imprisonment of five to fifteen years and a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 dirhams.
2.2. The operational/security component
As presented, the legal arsenal will be supported by the creation of a new operational security structure, the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation (French acronym BCIJ), qualified by certain observers of the Moroccan FBI. The BCIJ is a high-level Moroccan security service, founded upon King's decision at the beginning of 2015.[vii] The creation of the BCIJ comes as part of the strengthening of good security governance following the new changes in the international and regional situation, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, marked by the upsurge in terrorist acts.
The Bureau reports, hierarchically, to the General Directorate of Territorial Surveillance. In this sense, it is responsible for handling, under the supervision of the public prosecutor, the crimes and offenses provided for in Article 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in particular banditry, drug trafficking, arms, and explosives trafficking, terrorism, attack on the security of the State and falsification of currency.
This new structure includes an elite police service, which receives quality training in legal and professional matters. The office of this service is equipped with advanced technical and technological logistics. In July 2019—that is to say, in a little more than four years after its creation—the BCIJ dismantled nearly 70 terrorist cells in Morocco.[viii] Between 2015 and 2018, it had dismantled 57 terrorist cells, including 51 related to Daesh. Its agents also arrested 902 people, including 14 women and 29 minors. In addition, according to the head of this structure, the total number of terrorist cells dissolved in Morocco since 2002 has risen to 183, while that of people arrested for terrorist activities stands at 3,129.[ix]
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[i] In fact, in Morocco there has never been an opinion poll on the attachment to the King or his popularity, or the effectiveness of his action. But, as with any autocratic system - and in any social configuration where precariousness and a high level of illiteracy dominate - the majority of the population seems to adapt to the different roles of the King, especially those in the religious and political spheres. As an illustration, support for the last constitution proposed by the King in 2011 reached 98%, with voter turnout of almost 74%. Turnout is less than 45% during legislative or local elections. See Le Monde (French newspaper), July 2, 2011. https://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/07/02/victoire-du-oui-au-referendum-constitutionnel-au-maroc_1543794_3218.html
[ii] See also, on this subject. Mission permanente du Maroc à Genève : ‘’L'expérience du Royaume du Maroc dans la Prévention et la Lutte contre l'Extrémisme Violent’’. (Document in French. Undated). https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/RuleOfLaw/PCVE/Morocco.pdf
[iii] Dahir of May 28, 2003 promulgating the Law No. 03-03 on the fight against terrorism. Official Bulletin n° 5114 of Thursday, June 5, 2003 http://adala.justice.gov.ma/production/legislation/fr/penal/luttecontreterrorisme.htm
[iv] United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 2170 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7242nd meeting, on 15 August 2014.
[v] See ‘’Le Maroc envoie ses F-16 en Irak contre l’État islamique’’. Jeune Afrique (December 16, 2014). https://www.jeuneafrique.com/37536/politique/le-maroc-envoie-ses-f-16-en-irak-contre-l-tat-islamique/
[vi] Law No. 86.14, amending and supplementing the provisions of the penal code and penal procedure relating to the fight against terrorism. http://adala.justice.gov.ma/production/legislation/fr/Nouveautes/code%20penal.pdf
[vii] See, on this subject. https://aujourdhui.ma/actualite/le-bcij-demantele-une-cellule-terroriste-117320#.VRxlFDvz0So
[viii] L’Opinion.fr (France), 29/7/2019 https://www.lopinion.fr/edition/international/comment-maroc-a-structure-services-lutte-contre-terrorisme-192938
[ix] Tel Quel, Casablanca, 12/10/2018 https://telquel.ma/2018/10/12/nombre-de-cellules-demantelees-personnes-arretees-attentats-dejoues-le-patron-du-bcij-fait-le-point_1614135