Regional differences in Belgium’s integration policies
Author: Dr. Ayşe Tecmen, ERC PRIME Youth Project Post-doc Researcher, European Institute, İstanbul Bilgi University
Editor’s note: This blog entry is based on the review of the literature on migration, integration, and citizenship in Belgium, which is a part of the country-reports that will be published on https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/. Unlike conventional blog entries, these posts aim to inform our readers of the current state of affairs in Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands while conveying how the PRIME Youth project will contribute to the extant literature. Ayhan Kaya
The literature on Belgium’s integration policies frequently highlights the country’s federal state structure, which leads to diverse approaches to integration and citizenship policies that stem from distinct approaches to culture and diversity. As Belgium is a federal state, it has a citizenship policy at the national level, and integration policies at the regional level. Therefore, regional governments do not have a say in the citizenship policies but they can develop their understandings of integration based on their culture and history. One of the critical aspects of such migration policies is the differences in language proficiency requirement, which constitutes a substantial part of the literature on the case of Flanders. In other words, “migration policy is mainly a competence of the Belgian government within an international (European Union) legal framework, and migrant policy is mainly a local competence of the communities, regions and cities” (Loobuyck and Jacobs, 2009: 32). This entails that the federal government takes on the policies regarding formal citizenship, which includes: “(1) migration policy, voting rights for foreigners, anti-discrimination and anti-racism policies; (2) Entrance to the country; (3) permanent residency, and (4) acquisition of nationality” (Pulinx and Van Avermaet, 2015: 343). This also means that policies in education, integration, language, housing, and the religion of migrants, are competences of the regional governments. These differences become more prominent in the regional approaches to Islam and the integration of Muslim-origin immigrants (Kaya, 2012).
According to Marco Martiniello (1995), the main differences between Flemish and Walloon integration policies can be explained by exploring civic and cultural nationalism. In Wallonia, the Francophone approach of immigrant integration is prevalent which is inspired by the French model. Moreover, owing to this influence, the Francophone governments have not recognised ethnic-cultural groups as specific entities in their regional and national policies. As Martiniello (1995) notes, in Wallonia, the nation is defined as a political community based on constitution, laws and citizenship, with a lesser emphasis on culture, heritage, history and values (see also Martiniello, 2003). Similarly, Flanders implements cultural nationalism, in which there is a heavy emphasis on language proficiency and the importance of ethnic, cultural identities, which are rooted in the Flemish nationalist movement.[i] As Loobuyck and Jacobs (2010) argue, cultural nationalism makes it more difficult for newcomers to be integrated into the host community because the main goal is to maintain and protect a common culture, language, and territory (see also Loobuyck and Jacobs, 2006). These contrasting views on the “nation” create further differentiation leading to the fact that citizenship and integration policies in Flanders more politicised than those of Wallonia. This is also a result of the fact that Flanders has historically pursued more cultural, financial, and political history which became apparent with the rise of right-wing political parties in the 1990s, as well as the rise of minority nationalism and politicized sense of migration and integration (Adam, 2010). A more recent example of the Flemish administration is the Flemish Parliament’s President Jan Peumans’ speech in 2011 in which he stated that
The paradox remains: although the Flemings do not – as other nations – like to exhibit their identity. Flanders have become without a doubt more self-confident. The Flemish sub-state aspires to counter this lack of identity and to support Flemish identity that should lead to nation-building. But this awareness of common interests has not yet sunk in to convince the entire population of it (quoted in Pulinx and Van Avermaet 2015: 347).
Many instances illustrate the difference between Flemish and Francophone policies. For instance, whereas headscarves were actively discouraged or forbidden in the Francophone education system, the Flemish schools have taken a much more pragmatic attitude (Verlot, 2001). Nonetheless, after 2000, the Flemish attitude changed intensely and resulted in a ban on all religious symbols in all public schools of the Flemish community on September 11, 2009. It should be noted that in July 2011, a law banning the full-face veil came into effect in Belgium. The law bans any clothing that disguises the identity of the wearer in public places such as parks and streets. Two Belgian Muslim women, Samia Belcacemi (a Belgian national) and Yamina Oussar (a Moroccan national) challenged the 2011 veil ban, arguing that the law infringed on their freedom of religion. In 2017, the European Court of Human Rights found that Belgium’s ban on clothes that partially or fully cover the face in public was legal under the European Convention on Human Rights, “necessary in a democratic society,” and that the law tried to protect "the rights and freedoms of others." (ECHR 241, 2017).
Furthermore, studies on citizenship and integration in Flanders often make use of comparisons with the Netherlands due to the integration courses called ‘inburgering’ (citizenisation or becoming a citizen) (e.g., Eisinga, Billiet, Felling, 1999; Thissen, Fortuijn, Strijker, Haartsen, 2010; Gysen, Kuijper, Van Avermaet, 2009; Rakic, 2001; Verhoeven, De Pauw, Kloots, 2004). Pulinx and Avermaet (2015: 340) note that “this implies that immigrants are not seen as citizens before migration, or at least not citizens of the ‘right kind’ living by moral standards reconcilable with the host society.” This creates moral scrutiny, which applies to all migrants in Belgium, including Turks, Moroccans, and Eastern-Europeans. Significantly, Pulinx and Van Avermaet (2015: 341) state that first-generation migrants, as well as second and third generation migrants, have to demonstrate linguistic proficiency as well as societal knowledge such as an awareness of the culture, heritage and history of Flanders.
In Flanders, integration was introduced through the “strategic plan for ethnocultural minorities” (1996), and the “minorities’ decree” (1998). In 2004, the Flemish government accepted a ‘strategic plan for minority policy,’ called ‘living together in diversity’ (see Loobuyck and Jacobs, 2009: 35; Pulinx and Van Avermaet, 2015), which also introduced inburgering courses. These courses were modeled after that of the Netherlands. This was a turn from the policy of reception, which aimed at familiarising migrants with the Flemish society and promoting economic participation (Pulinx and Van Avermaet, 2015: 349). The compulsory training programme contains Dutch as a second language, lessons of introduction to Flemish/Belgian society and democratic values, and some help for access to the labour market. “The idea of inburgering is controversial in migrant communities because people usually discuss the policy in terms of ‘assimilation’ and ‘obligations,’ while the policy could be legitimised in terms of qualification, empowerment, emancipation and capabilities” (Loobuyck and Jacobs, 2009: 32).
Nonetheless, despite the similarities between the inburgering courses in Flanders and the Netherlands; Gysen, Kuijper, and Van Avermaet, (2009: 104)) argue that unlike the Netherlands
Flanders has not adopted the passing of language tests as a requirement for entrance and residence. Nor has Belgium officially introduced a language condition for citizenship purposes. Despite a similar discourse on political and societal level in both countries Belgium has not installed the same rigid immigration control system with harsh language conditions as in the Netherlands.
Despite the widely argued criticisms of the language requirement in inburgering classes, Jan Blommaert (2011) takes on a different view noting that the long-lasting language-ideological debate in Belgium between Dutch-speaking Flemish and French-speaking Walloons was an emblematic argument that signified a more extensive set of issues. As such, in this case, language has become a proxy for ethnicity (Laitin, 2000:142), which is a particularly significant issue for Belgium due to the “one community, one language” principle (which was written into the Belgian constitution in 1961) which favours linguistically homogeneous regions (Van Avermaet and Gysen, 2009). This also leads to criticisms about the significance of the Belgian model as an example for the EU and multilingual societies. For instance, Vogl and Hüning (2010) argue that Belgium not necessarily an example of multilingualism but instead is an example of a European region where the struggle for linguistic rights led to the establishment of monolingual territories.
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Belgium, with its multilingual nature, has been a notable example in the EU’s emphasis on linguistic diversity. As the literature indicates, this diversity does not result only in regional differences but also in different approaches to language and language proficiency in each region. This form of diversity also stems from historical differences in regard to how the nation and the community are constructed. This varying significance of linguistic proficiency in integration policies is a reflection of the community’s history and heritage. This also illustrates the non-uniform nature of migration, integration, and citizenship policies in Europe. While there have been attempts to harmonize and streamline the migration policies of the EU member states, it is still a competence of the member states. Significantly, the integration of migrants and refugees are still considered at the national level. Complementing this, public discourses further influence the policy level at the local level, which encompasses the reception of migrant and migrant-origin individuals by their immediate surroundings that are their neighbourhood. As such, as we will explore in the PRIME Youth project, it is essential to look at the everyday lives and the day-to-day interactions of the individuals, which shape the way they articulate their sense of belonging or isolation.
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