Would COVID-19 bring any significant political change in Morocco?
Author: Lalla Amina Drhimeur, ERC PRIME Youth Project Researcher, European Institute, İstanbul Bilgi University; and PhD candidate in Political Science, Hassan II School of Law, Mohammedia, Casablanca, Morocco
I honestly doubt it. Let me tell you why.
On March 2nd spoke El othmani, Morocco’s Head of Government, during a press conference on the evolution of the COVID-19. He was optimistic, reassuring, as often he tries to be. He mentioned Morocco’s great efforts and border control precautionary measures to reduce the risk of COVID-19 importation further. Not one single case was reported in the country he insisted[i]. Two hours later, the Ministry of Health confirmed the first Coronavirus case. Immediately after, it was announced that SIAM (the International Agricultural Fair) was canceled since large gatherings are not recommended[ii]. The question that was on everyone’s lips: didn’t he know? Then how much credit can we give the current government?
A few days later, a set of strict measures rolled out. Schools, cafés, restaurants and mosques were closed. Cultural and religious events were banned. International flights were suspended, and all borders were shut down. These measures were understandable as Morocco lacks both resources and infrastructure that would enable an efficient response to an outbreak. They were necessary to avoid overwhelming the country. From the start, King Mohammed VI chairs a committee in charge of deciding and following up on the preventive measures against the spread of COVID-19, and he holds frequent meetings with the Head of Government, security officials and the Minister of Health. The king had previously ordered the creation of an emergency fund to which he donated 2 billion dirhams[iii]. Large businesses, public institutions and individuals among others were encouraged to donate[iv]. The fund is dedicated to mitigate the economic and social consequences of the pandemic and to supplement the needs of the healthcare sector. Mechanisms were set up to offer financial help and cash transfers to those who lost their jobs and to the most affected and the most vulnerable citizens both in the formal and informal sector[v].
We saw public authorities crisscrossing cities and districts calling on people to limit their movements, to wash their hands and to comply with preventive measures to curb the spread of the virus[vi]. Videos of public authorities became widely popular on social media, and we started wondering if we were witnessing a change, a country which is genuinely concerned with its citizens’ safety while Trump kept calling the virus a hoax.
On March 20th, a state of health emergency is declared, and more aggressive measures were implemented[vii]. The Ministry of Interior announced most of these measures while the Ministry of Health organized daily press conferences to share updates and give clarifications about the virus. Both public and private media outlets organized special programs. Their objectives were to sensitize people about the danger of the virus, or to explain to them how to benefit from financial help.
Will these measures help Moroccans regain trust in the government, political parties and public institutions? Trust they lost due to the slow pace of reforms and the failure of different public policies to address the country’s economic and social problems[viii]. Again I honestly doubt so.
First, measures were driven by the palace and announced by the Ministry of Interior which is part of what is commonly referred to as “ministries of sovereignty”, and under the direct supervision of the king[ix]. Political actors, including the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) that heads the current government, have been busy implementing them quietly and obediently. The monarchy thus positions itself once more as the main political actor concerned with the well being of its citizens. Again the king is perceived as the prime mover, the one who takes important decisions while the government is the branch in charge of executing his directives. These measures are associated with the palace and will only serve to strengthen and consolidate its popularity. Even opposition groups, such as Adl wal Ihssan[x] and protesters of the Rif[xi] have openly expressed their support for the measures and even asked their followers to comply with them[xii].
Second, this sudden burst of trust in institutions is most probably short time and fragile. Moroccans view the measures to contain the virus as satisfactory[xiii], but their trust will not survive COVID-19 social and economic aftershocks. Low voter turnout during 2016 parliamentary elections was mainly explained by dissatisfaction in governmental performance and lack of public trust, as weaknesses in governance, corruption and failing public policies pushed people to protests, to alternative informal mechanisms to express their demands[xiv]. The COVID-19 pandemic came to highlight structural problems within the healthcare system but also the vulnerabilities of some economic sectors as agriculture and tourism have been hit hard. An analysis by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the World Bank expects the GDP in Morocco to recede by 1.5 percent in 2020[xv]. The same analysis indicates how "almost 10 million Moroccans can become poor or at risk of falling into poverty"[xvi]. The government might have been able to reinvent itself or at least get a respite from protests, social mobilization and political opposition since pandemics usually create a sense of solidarity that pushes people not to question existing political structures[xvii]. But the pandemic will end up revealing how mismanagement of economic resources and lack of investment in public infrastructures created social inequalities and precariousness. Failure of public policies and economic fallouts will come back to taint trust and confidence in the government.
Will this pandemic create change in Morocco? It will surely provide the government with a respite from popular dissent as it has weakened the opposition and postponed citizens’ desire for change but will definitely not change the way politics are perceived or done. Questions of credibility and efficiency will come back to haunt the government, questions that will probably lead to another low voter turnout in the coming parliamentary elections. The king’s popularity and image as the prime mover on the other hand will become stronger than before.
[i] "El Othmani appelle les Marocains à “garder le calme" (El Othmani calls on Moroccans to “keep calm), TelQuel, March 2, 2020, available at : https://telquel.ma/2020/03/02/el-othmani-appelle-les-marocains-a-garder-le-calme_1671251
[ii] "La 15e édition du SIAM sera annulée" (The 15th edition of SIAM will be canceled’, TelQuel, March 2, 2020, available at : https://telquel.ma/2020/03/02/la-15eme-edition-du-siam-sera-annulee_1671259
[iii] "Anti-coronavirus fund, a showcase of Moroccan solidarity", The North Africa Post, April 17, 2020, available at: http://northafricapost.com/39180-anti-coronavirus-fund-a-showcase-of-moroccan-solidarity.html
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Intissar Fakir, "Covid-19 may have given North African governments a respite from protests, but this is unlikely to last long." Carnegie Middle East Center, march 23, 2020, available at : https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/81343
[vi] "Maroc/Covid-19: Le crieur public renaît de ses cendres", (Morocco/Covid-19 : The town crier rises from the ashes », APA News, March 19, 2020, available at : https://apanews.net/news/maroccovid-19-le-crieur-public-renait-de-ses-centres
[vii] Mohammed Masbah, "Can Morocco Effectively Handle the COVID-19 Crisis?", Chatham House, April 6, 2020, available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/can-morocco-effectively-handle-covid-19-crisis-1
[viii] Masbah Mohammed, "What Protest in Morocco Reveals about Public Trust in Political Partie", Moroccan Institute of Public Policy, July 30, 2018
[ix] Maghraoui, Driss. 2018. Working Under Constraints: The PJD in the Aftermath of the 2016 Elections.
[x] A Moroccan Islamist association which is tolerated by Moroccan authorities but not given a legal status.
[xi] People organized protests in the Rif region in 2016 and 2017 after the death of a fishmonger in Al-Hoceima, a town in Rif. They denounced corruption and abuse of power.
[xii] Wehrey, F., Shuja al-Deen, M., Brown, N., Al-Saif, B., Fakir, I. and Boukhars, A., 2020. "Islamic Authority And Arab States In A Time Of Pandemic", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/16/islamic-authority-and-arab-states-in-time-of-pandemic-pub-81563#comments> [Accessed 16 April 2020].
[xiii] Mohamed Masbah, Rachid AOURRAZ, "COVID-19: How Moroccans view the Government’s Measures?’" , Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis, March 25, 2020, available at : https://mipa.institute/7486
[xiv] Fakir Intissar and Sarah Yerkes, "Governance and the Future of the Arab World", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 16, 2018
[xv] "Morocco’s most vulnerable economic sectors hit hard by the Covid-19 crisis", Yabiladi, April 3, 2020, available at : https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/91679/morocco-s-most-vulnerable-economic-sectors.html
[xvi] Ibid.
[xvii] Fakir Intissar and Sarah Yerkes, "Governance and the Future of the Arab World"